

# AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY

Founded by B. L. GILDERSLEEVE

Edited by  
HENRY T. ROWELL

LUDWIG EDELSTEIN, KEMP MALONE  
BENJAMIN D. MERITT, JAMES H. OLIVER  
EVELYN H. CLIFT: Secretary

Honorary Editor  
DAVID M. ROBINSON

---

VOLUME LXXVIII

---

BALTIMORE: THE JOHNS HOPKINS PRESS  
LONDON: ARTHUR F. BIRD  
PARIS: ALBERT FONTEMOING      LEIPZIG: F. A. BROOKHAUS

1957

805

A5

J86

# CONTENTS OF VOLUME LXXVIII.

No. 309

	PAGE
The Scholium on Naevius in <i>Parisinus Latinus</i> 7930. By HENRY T. ROWELL, - - - - -	1
The Ancient Dispute over Rhetoric in Homer. By GEORGE A. KENNEDY, - - - - -	23
On <i>I. G.</i> , II <sup>2</sup> , 3194. By JAMES H. OLIVER, - - - - -	35
Sunken Imagery in Sophocles' <i>Oedipus</i> . By HERBERT MUSURILLO, S. J., - - - - -	36
Roman Imperial Troops in Macedonia and Achaea. By ROBERT K. SHERK, - - - - -	52
The Stoic Categories. By MARGARET E. REESOR, - - - - -	63
The Identity of Plutarch's Lost <i>Scipio</i> . By KEVIN HERBERT, -	83
The Legislation of Spurius Thorius: Corrigenda. By A. E. DOUGLAS, - - - - -	89
REVIEWS: - - - - -	90
<i>Wilkinson's Ovid Recalled</i> (BROOKS OTIS).— <i>Mulder's Publii Papinii Statii Thebaidos Liber Secundus commentario exegetico aestheticoque instructus</i> (ROBERT J. GETTY).— <i>Dilke's Statius, Achilleid.</i> Edited with Introduction, Apparatus Criticus and Notes (ROBERT J. GETTY).— <i>La Notion du Divin, depuis Homère jusqu'à Platon. Sept exposés et discussions</i> par H. J. Rose, P. Chantraine, B. Snell, O. Gigon, H. D. F. Kitto, F. Chapouthier, W. J. Verdenius (FRANCIS R. WALTON).— <i>Tjäder's Die nicht-literarischen lateinischen Papyri Italiens aus der Zeit 445-700.</i> I, Papyri 1-28; III, Tafeln 1-160 (LIONEL CASSON).— <i>Nenci's Pirro: Aspirazioni egemoniche ed equilibrio mediterraneo</i> (JOHN V. A. FINE).	
BOOKS RECEIVED, - - - - -	111

## No. 310

	PAGE
The Function of the Homeric Simile. By MICHAEL COFFEY, -	113
<i>Aeneid</i> III: A New Approach. By ROBERT B. LLOYD, -	133
The Epitaph of Aerarius Aper at Tarraco. By JAMES H. OLIVER, -	152
The Latin Law of Bantia. By E. J. YARNOLD, -	163
The Imagery of the <i>Prometheus Bound</i> . By BARBARA HUGHES FOWLER, -	173
Macedonian Troops at the Battle of Zama. By T. A. DOREY, -	185
A Note on the <i>πίστεως</i> in Aristotle's <i>Rhetoric</i> , 1354-1356. By WILLIAM M. A. GRIMALDI, S. J., -	188
REVIEWS: -	193
<i>Wolfson's</i> The Philosophy of the Church Fathers, I: Faith, Trinity, Incarnation (JOHN REUMANN).— <i>Whatmough's</i> Language: A Modern Synthesis (ROBERT A. HALL, JR.).— <i>Webster's</i> Greek Theatre Production (MARGARETE BIEBER).— <i>Clarke's</i> The Roman Mind, Studies in the History of Thought from Cicero to Marcus Aurelius (KEVIN HERBERT).— <i>Stella's</i> Il poema d'Ulisse (FREDERICK M. COMBELLACK).— <i>Brugnoli's</i> Studi sulle differentiae verborum (WILLIAM T. AVERY).—† <i>Jalabert, Mousterde, Mondésert's</i> Inscriptions Grecques et Latines de la Syrie, Tome IV: Laodicée. Apamène (Nos. 1243-1997). Chronologie des Inscriptions datées des Tomes I-IV (C. BRADFORD WELLES).— <i>Richter's</i> Ancient Italy: A Study of the Interrelations of its Peoples as Shown in their Arts (J. H. YOUNG).	



# CONTENTS.

v

## No. 311

	PAGE
The Relation of the <i>Timaeus</i> to Plato's Later Dialogues. By HAROLD CHERNISS, - - - - -	225
A Suggestion about Palamedes. By E. D. PHILLIPS, - - - - -	267
Claudius and the Senators. By D. McALINDON, - - - - -	279
Extemporaneous Elements in Certain Orations and the <i>Prooemia</i> of Demosthenes. By ALFRED P. DOBJAHN, - - - - -	287
A Note on the Number of Isocrates' Pupils. By R. JOHNSON, - - - - -	297
REVIEWS: - - - - -	301
<i>Ryberg's Rites of the State Religion in Roman Art</i> (OTTO J. BRENDÉL).— <i>Bolgar's The Classical Heritage and its Beneficiaries</i> (REVILO P. OLIVER).— <i>Herdan's Language as Choice and Chance</i> (JOSHUA WHATMOUGH).— <i>Hackforth's Plato's Phaedo: Translated with an Introduction and Commentary</i> (THOMAS G. ROSENMEYER).— <i>Barker's From Alexander to Constantine. Passages and Documents Illustrating the History of Social and Political Ideas, 336 B. C.—A. D. 337. Translations with Introductions, Notes, and Essays</i> (ELIAS J. BICKERMAN).— <i>Lévêque's Agathon</i> (PATRICIA NEILS BOULTER).— <i>Bieber's The Sculpture of the Hellenistic Age</i> (J. H. YOUNG).— <i>Robert's Hellenica: Recueil d'épigraphie, de numismatique et d'antiquités grecques. Volume X</i> (JAMES H. OLIVER).— <i>TE RIELE'S Les femmes chez Eschyle</i> (ROBERT DUFF MURRAY, JR.).	
BOOKS RECEIVED, - - - - -	334

## No. 312

	PAGE
	PAGE
The Centuriate Assembly Before and After the Reform. By LILY ROSS TAYLOR, - - - - -	337
Notes on the <i>περί ὕψους</i> . By G. M. A. GRUBE, - - - - -	355
The Archonship of Symmachos. By BENJAMIN D. MERITT, - - -	375
<i>Aeneid</i> III and the Aeneas Legend. By ROBERT B. LLOYD, - - -	382
Modern Greek Corrections to Buck's <i>Dictionary</i> . By DONALD C. SWANSON, - - - - -	401
REVIEWS: - - - - -	414
<i>Lobel and Page's Poetarum Lesbiorum Fragmenta</i> (LLOYD W. DALY).— <i>Page's Sappho and Alcaeus, an Introduction to the Study of Ancient Lesbian Poetry</i> (LLOYD W. DALY).— <i>Mariotti's Il Bellum Poenicum e l'arte di Nevio</i> (HENRY T. ROWELL).— <i>Turner's The Hibeh Papyri, Edited with Translations and Notes; with the collaboration in the edition of No. 198 of M.-T. Lenger</i> (JOHN DAY).— <i>Martinet's Économie des changements phonétiques</i> (FRED W. HOUSEHOLDER, JR.).— <i>Finley's Pindar and Aeschylus</i> (FRIEDRICH SOLMSEN).— <i>Lewis' The Official Priests of Rome under the Julio-Claudians: A Study of the Nobility from 44 B. C. to 68 A. D.</i> (J. F. GILLIAM).— <i>Lowe's Codices Latini Antiquiores. A Palaeographical Guide to Latin Manuscripts Prior to the Ninth Century. Part VII: Switzerland</i> (LUDWIG BIELER).— <i>Goodenough's Jewish Symbols in the Greco-Roman Period, Vols. V and VI: Fish, Bread and Wine</i> (FRANZ LANDSBERGER).— <i>De Almeida's Egitânia: história e arqueologia</i> (JAMES H. OLIVER).	
INDEX TO VOLUME LXXVIII, - - - - -	453

P  
Vol. LXXVIII, 1

Whole No. 309

# AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY

Founded by B. L. GILDERSLEEVE

Edited by  
HENRY T. ROWELL

LUDWIG EDELSTEIN, JAMES H. OLIVER  
JAMES W. POULTNEY, JOHN H. YOUNG  
EVELYN H. CLIFT: Secretary

Honorary Editors  
KEMP MALONE, BENJAMIN D. MERITT  
DAVID M. ROBINSON

JANUARY, 1957

BALTIMORE 18, MARYLAND  
THE JOHNS HOPKINS PRESS

UNIVERSITY  
OF MICHIGAN

FEB 15 1957

PERIODICAL  
READING ROOM

# CONTENTS.

	PAGE
The Scholium on Naevius in <i>Parisinus Latinus</i> 7930. By HENRY T. ROWELL, . . . . .	1
The Ancient Dispute over Rhetoric in Homer. By GEORGE A. KENNEDY, . . . . .	23
On <i>I. G.</i> , II <sup>2</sup> , 3194. By JAMES H. OLIVER, . . . . .	35
Sunken Imagery in Sophocles' <i>Oedipus</i> . By HERBERT MUSURILLO, .	36
Roman Imperial Troops in Macedonia and Achaea. By ROBERT K. SHEER, . . . . .	52
The Stoic Categories. By MARGARET E. REESOR, . . . . .	63
The Identity of Plutarch's Lost Scipio. By KEVIN HERBERT, . .	83
The Legislation of Spurius Thorius: Corrigenda. By A. E. DOUGLAS, . . . . .	89
REVIEWS: . . . . .	90
<i>Wilkinson's</i> Ovid Recalled (BROOKS OTIS).— <i>Mulder's</i> Publii Papinii Statii Thebaidos Liber Secundus commentario exegetico aetheticoque instructus (ROBERT J. GETTY).— <i>Dilke's</i> Statius, Achilleid. Edited with Introduction, Apparatus Criticus and Notes (ROBERT J. GETTY).—La Notion du Divin, depuis Homère jusqu'à Platon. Sept exposés et discussions par H. J. Rose, P. Chantraine, B. Snell, O. Gigon, H. D. F. Kitto, F. Chapouthier, W. J. Verdenius (FRANCIS R. WALTON).— <i>Tjäder's</i> Die nicht-literarischen lateinischen Papyri Italiens aus der Zeit 445-700. I, Papyri 1-28; III, Tafeln 1-160 (LIONEL CASSON).— <i>Nenci's</i> Pirro: Aspirazioni egemoniche ed equilibrio mediterraneo (JOHN V. A. FINE).	
BOOKS RECEIVED, . . . . .	111

The American Journal of Philology is open to original communications in all departments of philology, and especially in the field of Greek and Roman studies. It is published quarterly. Four numbers constitute a volume, one volume each year. Subscription price, \$6.00 a year, payable in advance (foreign postage 50 cents, Canadian postage 25 cents, extra); single numbers, \$2.00 each.

Articles intended for publication in the Journal, books for review, and other editorial communications should be addressed to the editor, Henry T. Rowell, The Johns Hopkins University; proof should be returned to the secretary, Evelyn H. Clift, The University of Delaware, Newark, Delaware.

Contributors are entitled to receive twenty-five copies of their respective contributions free of charge. Additional copies will be supplied at cost.

Subscriptions, remittances, and business communications should be sent to

THE JOHNS HOPKINS PRESS, Baltimore 18, Md.

The contents of the American Journal of Philology are indexed regularly in the International Index to Periodicals.

Entered as second-class matter October 16, 1911, at the postoffice at Baltimore, Maryland, under the Act of March 3, 1879.

Acceptance for mailing at special rate of postage provided for in Section 1103, Act of October 3, 1917. Authorized on July 3, 1918.

PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
BY J. H. FURST COMPANY, BALTIMORE, MARYLAND

# AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY

---

VOL. LXXVIII, 1

WHOLE No. 309

---

## THE SCHOLIUM ON NAEVIUS IN *PARISINUS* *LATINUS* 7930.

In 1925, Professor John H. Savage increased our knowledge of Latin literature by publishing some hitherto unnoticed scholia which he had discovered in a Paris manuscript of the tenth century. This manuscript, *Parisinus Latinus* 7930 (*E*), contains among other writings the major works of Vergil with interlinear and marginal comments thereon.<sup>1</sup> Emile Thomas had already noticed that several of these marginal comments show a close relationship to the D scholia, the additions to the Servian vulgate which are found in the commentary on Vergil known as Servius auctus or Servius Danielis, in that they reproduce the contents of the latter, although the wording has been changed.<sup>2</sup> It had escaped his attention, however, that in this mass of material there were bits of information that do not appear elsewhere in Latin literature. They are embedded in or added to scholia already known from other manuscripts of the Servian Corpus or stand apart as complete and independent comments. Savage's

<sup>1</sup> The most complete description of this manuscript is given by Savage, *H. S. C. P.*, XXXVI (1925), pp. 100 ff. (cited henceforth as *H* 1) and *ibid.*, XLIII (1932), pp. 111 ff. (cited henceforth as *H* 2).

<sup>2</sup> *Essai sur Servius et son commentaire sur Virgile*, pp. 118 ff. Thomas, however, was mistaken in believing that these comments were limited to *Aeneid*, III-V; cf. Savage, *H* 1, pp. 101 ff. Thilo who inspected the manuscript hurriedly did not realize that it contained any D scholia until he was so informed by Thomas' more thorough investigation; cf. the *Praefatio* to his edition of Servius, pp. LXV f.

examination of the Paris manuscript brought them to light, and classical scholars are now indebted to him for shedding some new light on works of Sallust, Varro, and Naevius.<sup>3</sup>

The scholium which refers to Naevius is on *Aeneid*, VII, 123. Neither Servius nor Servius Danielis comments on this line. In fact, there are no scholia in our other manuscripts according to Thilo's edition between *HIC DOMUS* in line 122 and *ACCISIS* in line 125. I shall reproduce it exactly as it is given in Savage's text:<sup>4</sup>

Anchises fatorum arcana reliquit: hoc autem non praedixit Anchises, sed Celeno: unde vel catatosiopomenon intellegendum est vel divinitatem Anchise assignat, qui ubique divinus dicitur. Nevius enim dicit Venerem libros futura continentes Anchise dedisse: unde reliquit aut magdavit<sup>n</sup> (*sic*) significat aut libros reliquit qui haec responsa continebant.

Some years after the initial publication of this scholium, Savage discovered that it was also contained in *Laurentianus Palatinus* 69 which was written in Paris in 1403 A.D.<sup>5</sup> In this manuscript he also found the other hitherto unique scholia on Sallust and Varro as well as the scholium on the Latin names of the Eumenides which also had made its first appearance in the *Parisinus*. Savage realized that the *Palatinus* contained material that was not in the *Parisinus*. But the fact that the two manuscripts contained material that does not appear elsewhere led him quite naturally to conclude that the younger was "a copy, at least in part," of the older.<sup>6</sup>

Unfortunately, it is precisely in the scholium on Naevius that

<sup>3</sup> *T. A. P. A.*, LVI (1925), pp. 229 ff. (cited henceforth as *T*); cf. *H* 1, pp. 158 f. The notice on Varro has been elucidated by A. D. Nock, *C. R.*, XLI (1927), pp. 169 ff.; XLIII (1929), pp. 60 ff.

<sup>4</sup> *T*, pp. 236 f.; *H* 1, p. 159.

<sup>5</sup> *H* 2, pp. 118 f.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 115. Funaioli who collated the *Palatinus* in 1913 in connection with his work on Philargyrius states that its marginal comments on the *Eclogues* and *Georgics* are very similar to, but independent of, those of the *Parisinus* on the same works; *Esegesi Virgiliana antica*, pp. 25 f. He characterizes the manuscript as "fondo Serviano con mistura di altrii scolii antichi e medievali, tra cui i Filargiriani."



the *Palatinus* in one place presents a far better reading than the *Parisinus*. The latter has the phrase *qui ubique divinus dicitur*, whereas the former has *qui ubique divinus inducitur*.<sup>7</sup> The subject is Anchises. With the *inducitur* of the *Palatinus*, we may compare the following D scholia of the Servian Corpus which also refer to Anchises: D on *Aeneid*, III, 103: *ubique enim sciens futurorum inducitur* and D on II, 687: *et hic et alibi Anchisen divinandi peritum inducit*.

As we shall see below, the *peritia divinandi* and the *scientia futurorum* of Anchises are important indications that our scholium on Naevius was derived from the same commentary on Vergil from which the D scholia of the Servian Corpus descend. Consequently, since *inducitur* is not only the *lectio difficilior* but also reflects the phrasing of the D scholia in treating the same subject, it is clearly to be preferred to the *dicitur* of the *Parisinus*.

On the other hand, a second variant of the *Palatinus* is distinctly inferior to the reading in the *Parisinus*. For the *mandavit significat* of the *Parisinus*, the *Palatinus* has *mandavit signum*. At some point, a scribe apparently did not understand that *mandavit* is the object of *significat* and therefore created a *signum* out of *significat* to furnish a noun object for *mandavit*. The correct translation is "consequently, *reliquit* means entrusted (*mandavit*) or left (*reliquit*) books which contained these prophecies." Because of the position of the two *aut*'s I am inclined to think that *mandavit* does not, like *reliquit*, have *libros* as its object, but *fatorum arcana* of the lemma. The meaning, then, would be either that Anchises entrusted the secrets of the fates which he had learned from his prophetic books to Aeneas by word of mouth, or left him the actual books.

As to the exact relation of the *Palatinus* to the *Parisinus* it must remain obscure until a thorough comparison of both manuscripts has been undertaken. But on the basis of the variants not only in the scholium on Naevius but also in that on Varro,<sup>8</sup> I should conclude that the writer of the *Palatinus* did not copy these scholia directly from the *Parisinus* but had among his sources or as his source a manuscript which contained the rare scholia of the *Parisinus* but was not the *Parisinus* itself. The

<sup>7</sup> H 2, p. 118.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*

nature of this source or its relation to the *Parisinus* cannot be determined now.<sup>9</sup> But it clearly contained the correct reading *inducitur* which allows us to emend the *dicitur* of the earlier manuscript. Otherwise the *Parisinus* presents the better text and for this reason as well as for the sake of convenience, I shall refer to the scholium on Naevius which is the chief concern of this article simply as the "Paris scholium," it being understood that reference is made to the text of the *Parisinus* with *inducitur* for *dicitur*, as mentioned above.

The Paris scholium refers obviously to the *Bellum Punicum*. For although the title is not expressly mentioned, the contents are in perfect accord with the legendary part of this work in which, as we know from other fragments, Anchises played an important part.<sup>10</sup> It is now included among the fragments of the *Bellum Punicum* in the editions of Morel, Marmorale, and Mariotti,<sup>11</sup> and, consequently, should be familiar to all students

<sup>9</sup> Savage argues that part of a commentary on Vergil by Remigius of Auxerre is preserved in the *Parisinus*; *H* 1, pp. 162 f.; *H* 2, pp. 114 f. Since Remigius was familiar with the D scholia of the Servian Corpus, it appears possible that the rare scholia of the *Parisinus* and the *Palatinus* reached these manuscripts through him. But until further study, this is no more than a possibility.

<sup>10</sup> This was first recognized by Savage, *T*, p. 237, n. 33. But there are seven, not six, D scholia which refer to the *Bellum Punicum* and the reference in Macrobius, *Sat.*, VI, 2, 31 should not be identified with the D scholium on I, 198, as we shall see below. Anchises appears in frgs. 3, 4, 5 Morel; cf. note 11 below.

<sup>11</sup> Morel, *F. P. L.* (Teubner, 1927), p. 19, frg. 13 a; E. V. Marmorale, *Naevius Poeta*<sup>2</sup> (Florence, 1950), p. 239, frg. 13; Scevola Mariotti, *Il Bellum Punicum e l'arte di Nevio* (Rome, 1955), p. 100, frg. 11. Henceforth, the fragments of Naevius will be cited by the numbers alone that are assigned to them in Morel's edition, although the present writer is well aware that the "traditional" order of the fragments which Morel follows is no longer valid. This is due to the fact that since Morel's edition, a new conception of the organization of the poem and, hence, of the order of the fragments was advanced by L. Strzelecki, *De Naeviano Belli Punici Carmine Quaestiones Selectae* (Krakow, 1935), pp. 5 ff., which is now widely accepted. Both Marmorale and Mariotti have arranged their fragments accordingly and used it as the basis of their general reconstructions; cf. their editions and Mariotti in *Studi in onore di Gino Funaioli*, pp. 221 ff. Strzelecki's views in this matter have also been recognized as correct by H. T. Rowell, *A. J. P.*, LXVIII (1947), pp. 21 ff.; Bömer, *Symb. Ost.*, XXIX (1952), p. 40,



of the early Latin epic. Moreover, it has been discussed by Strzelecki in some detail and Marmorale and Mariotti more briefly.<sup>12</sup> But the problem of its source was not investigated by these scholars who were chiefly interested in its contents.

On the other hand, Savage who discovered our scholium states that the Paris manuscript "is nearer the archetype of all our DS manuscripts than is either the *Floriacensis* or the *Turonensis*—hitherto regarded as our chief authorities for the additional scholia on *Aen.* 3-12."<sup>13</sup> He also mentions the probability that the *inedita* of the *Parisinus* which include the scholium on Naevius "come from some ancient commentary on Virgil, probably that of Aelius Donatus."<sup>14</sup> This I believe to be capable of proof, at least in so far as the scholium on Naevius is concerned. But the only road by which this scholium can be carried safely back to Donatus leads through the Servian Corpus. First of all it must be demonstrated that our Paris scholium once formed an integral part of the D tradition or, in other words, that it descended from the same source as the other D scholia on the *Bellum Punicum* of Naevius. Then, comes the problem of the identity of the source itself. In another paper,<sup>15</sup> I have attempted to show that on the basis of internal evidence the original source of all these D scholia on the *Bellum Punicum* was the commentary on Vergil of Aelius Donatus. Here, I would do no more than place our Paris scholium in its proper position in the D tradition. If it is shown that it belongs in that tradition, it will naturally follow that it was derived eventually from the same source as its fellows and the conclusion which I have drawn in regard to their source will also apply to it.

Now there are nine certain references to Naevius in the D

and Ed. Fraenkel, *J. R. S.*, XLIV (1954), p. 16. Nevertheless, fragments will be cited by Morel's numbers in this article under the assumption that this edition may be most readily accessible to the majority of readers. Moreover, Mariotti, in a comparative table in his edition, pp. 120 ff., equates Morel's numbers with those assigned to the same fragments by Marmorale, Warmington, *Remains of Old Latin*, II (Loeb Library, 1936), pp. 46 ff., and himself.

<sup>12</sup> Strzelecki, *op. cit.*, pp. 33 ff.; Marmorale, p. 239, note on frg. 13; Mariotti, p. 100, note on frg. 11 and p. 91, n. 8.

<sup>13</sup> *H* 1, p. 160.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>15</sup> To be published in *Yale Classical Studies*, Vol. XV.

scholia on the *Aeneid* of which seven can be assigned for certain to the *Bellum Punicum*.<sup>16</sup> On the other hand, Naevius is never mentioned in the Servian vulgate. These D scholia have a distinct character of their own. First of all, they are concerned only with the legendary part of the epic; secondly, they show a precise knowledge of the contents of the poem; thirdly, they are introduced to illustrate a relation, stated or implied, between the ways in which Vergil and Naevius treat the same subject matter or to furnish some literary background for Vergil's treatment. Our Paris scholium possesses all these characteristics. It refers to the legendary part of the epic, shows knowledge of its contents, and explains a passage of Vergil by giving it a literary precedent in Naevius.

This is the most striking indication of a relationship between the Paris scholium and the D scholia on the *Bellum Punicum* and it is the kind of relationship which points to a common ancestor. But a question comes to mind immediately: if the Paris scholium belonged originally to the same source from which these D scholia were derived, is it likely that the compiler who added the seven D scholia to the Servian vulgate should have omitted one of such importance in making his compilation?

In formulating an answer let us recall that in the *Floriacensis*, the seventh book of the *Aeneid* to which our Paris scholium belongs is conspicuously poor in D scholia. To supplement this dearth, Daniel, followed by Thilo, had recourse to the *Turonensis* (*T*) which contained a considerable number of scholia omitted in the *Floriacensis*.<sup>17</sup> In his meticulous study of the *Turonensis*, Savage has argued persuasively that the principal source of the additional comments of the *Turonensis* was the commentary of Donatus.<sup>18</sup> For the purpose of this paper, let us assume no more than that these comments and the D comments of the Servian Corpus derive as a whole from the same source.

Moreover, Savage has pointed out that the *Turonensis* and the *Parisinus* alone have the additional note to Servius on *Aeneid*,

<sup>16</sup> Naevius, frgs. 4, 5, 6, 11, 16, 17, 25; D on *Aen.*, I, 213 and IV, 267. The brief citations in the last two references cannot be assigned to any particular work.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. Savage, *H* 1, pp. 148 ff.

<sup>18</sup> *H* 1, *passim* and particularly pp. 148 ff.

VII, 517 and that the latter omits the interpolation from Tiberius Claudius Donatus which is found in the first, but not in the fifth hand of the former.<sup>19</sup> This fact indicates an ultimate common source. But whereas the scribes of the *Turonensis* exploited it rather fully, the writer of the marginal comments of the *Parisinus* contented himself with occasional non-Servian scholia. In view of these circumstances, it is reasonable to conclude that the scholium in the *Parisinus* on Naevius could have suffered the same fate as many of its companions in Book VII, in that it was omitted by the compiler of the *Floriacensis*. But in this instance, it was also passed over by the scribes of the *Turonensis*, being preserved in the *Parisinus* alone.

There is also an indication from another quarter that all the D scholia on the *Bellum Punicum* were not included in the *Floriacensis* and *Turonensis*. It has long been recognized that Macrobius drew heavily on the commentary of Vergil from which the D comments of the Servian Corpus were derived.<sup>20</sup> In the sixth book of the *Saturnalia*, in which Vergil's indebtedness to his Latin predecessors is discussed, we find the following passage: <sup>21</sup>

In principio Aeneidos tempestas describitur, et Venus apud Iouem queritur de periculis filii, et Iuppiter eam de futurorum prosperitate solatur. Hic locus totus sumptus a Naevio est ex primo libro *Belli Punici*. Illic enim aequae Venus Troianis tempestate laborantibus cum Ioue queritur et secuntur uerba Iouis filiam consolantis spe futurorum.

The general character of this passage accords with that of the D scholia on the legendary part of the *Bellum Punicum* which we have described above. On the other hand, it has been noticed that in the *Saturnalia*, VI, 1-5, reflections of the D scholia are relatively rare and it has been assumed that here Macrobius was using a source which was also used by the author of the D commentary.<sup>22</sup> I concede that in this part of his work

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 149, 160.

<sup>20</sup> See the works cited by Wessner, *R.-E.*, II A, col. 1839; to them we may now add Funaioli, *Esegesi Virgiliana antica*, pp. 482 ff.; cf. p. 238; Marinone, *Elio Donato, Macrobio e Servio, commentatori di Vergilio*, pp. 49 ff.

<sup>21</sup> *Sat.*, VI, 2, 31 = Naevius, frg. 13.

<sup>22</sup> Cf. Wessner, *R.-E.*, XIV, col. 189.

the D commentary was not Macrobius' main source. But I see no reason to believe that he did not draw on it occasionally when it suited his purpose. In fact in the passage which follows Macrobius' comparison of Naevius and Vergil (VI, 2, 32-3), the information is given us that Vergil was following Ennius in his account of Pandarus and Bitias (*Aen.*, IX, 672 ff.) and was following Cicero in the beginning of Drances' address to Aeneas (XI, 124 f.). If we turn to Servius' comments on these passages (the first is on IX, 675; 672 in Thilo), we find that Donatus had scholia on both of them, and although we have intentionally avoided identifying the D scholia with the Vergilian commentary of Donatus, we may, at least here, make use of the general opinion of scholars that the commentary and the D scholia were very closely connected. Moreover, Servius cites Ennius in his comment on IX, 678 (675 in Thilo) as furnishing the example for Vergil's *armati ferro*. The D scholium on 675 (672 Thilo) is a conflation of the most important elements of the Servian scholium *ad loc.* and D material.<sup>23</sup> Since it deals with the interpretation of *ducis imperio commissa* with which Macrobius is not concerned, no further relation between Macrobius and Donatus can be established here.

On the other hand, we may have a reflection of Donatus' words in Macrobius' second parallel. In the scholium on XI, 124 under the lemma *O fama ingens ingentior armis*, Servius writes: *frustra ait Donatus hoc nomen de his esse quae non recipiunt comparationem; nam quia augmentum recipit, et comparatur*. The statement attributed to Donatus by Servius is startling at first sight, since Donatus uses *ingentius* himself in his commentary on Terence.<sup>24</sup> But he is not saying that *ingens* does not have the comparative form, but rather that it is the kind of adjective that is not followed by an object of comparison. He defines this kind of adjective as follows in his *Ars Grammatica*:<sup>25</sup> *saepe idem (comparativus gradus) pro positivo positus minus significat et nulli comparatur ut*

Iam senior sed cruda deo viridisque senectus  
(*Aen.* VI, 304).

<sup>23</sup> The true nature of this scholium was first noticed by Savage, *C. Q.*, XXIII (1929), p. 57.

<sup>24</sup> On *Eun.* 285, I, p. 329 Wessner.

<sup>25</sup> *G. L.*, IV, p. 374, 30.

The evidence in the *Thesaurus* shows that Vergil was the first to use the comparative *ingentior* and that other writers of the classical period avoided it intentionally.<sup>26</sup>

I am inclined to believe that Donatus made his comment not only because of the rare occurrence of *ingentior*, but also because he wished to warn the reader against taking *armis* as an ablative of comparison. When Macrobius writes under the same lemma (*O fama ingens*, etc.) *nempe hoc ait* (Vergil) *Aeneam famam suam factis fortibus supergressum, cum plerumque fama sit maior rebus, factis fortibus* which is the equivalent of Vergil's *armis* is certainly treated as a causal ablative. May not this interpretation have its roots in Donatus' scholium *ad loc.*? But be that as it may, to return to Macrobius' comparison of Naevius and Vergil, there is nothing on Naevius in those parts of the Servian Corpus that refer to the storm or the dialogue between Venus and Jupiter. Yet there is a D scholium on *Aeneid*, I, 198 which reads as follows: *et totus hic locus de Naevio Belli Punici libro translatus est.*<sup>27</sup> It has been thought by some that this scholium was the source of Macrobius' remark.<sup>28</sup> But it should be clear that the D scholium and Macrobius refer to different parts of Naevius' poem: Macrobius to the dialogue between the gods which took place while the Trojans were being battered by the storm,<sup>29</sup> the D comment to the exhortation of Aeneas to his companions.

Macrobius cites the *Bellum Punicum* twice again in the same book.<sup>30</sup> But in this chapter, although the numbers of the books of the *Bellum Punicum* are given, there are no descriptions of contents and the material appears to have been derived from a work on Vergilian epithets rather than from a commentary.

<sup>26</sup> *T. L. L.*, VII, cols. 1535 f.

<sup>27</sup> Frg. 16. I give the MS reading which Ed. Fraenkel accepts, *J. R. S.*, XXXVIII (1948), p. 139. The editors of the Harvard Servius emend *Naevio* to *Naevi (an)o*, Thilo to *Naevii*: I prefer Thilo's reading.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. Regel, *De Vergilio Poetarum Imitatore Testimonia* (diss. Göttingen, 1907), p. 69; Savage, *T*, p. 237, n. 33.

<sup>29</sup> The words *Troianis tempestate laborantibus* must give the circumstances under which or the reason why Venus complained to Jupiter. I cannot understand how Oppermann can maintain that the storm preceded the scene between the Gods: *Rh. Mus.*, LXXXVIII (1939), p. 208.

<sup>30</sup> Macrobius, *Sat.*, VI, 5, 8 and 9 = Naevius, frgs. 30 and 21.

To summarize, because of its character and position in the text of Macrobius, it may be reasonably assumed that his comparison of Naevius and Vergil was taken from the same source from which the D scholia of the Servian Corpus on the *Bellum Punicum* descend. And if this assumption is correct, we have an example of a comment on the *Bellum Punicum* which failed to be included in any of the collections of scholia on the *Aeneid*, yet was preserved by Macrobius. All the more, then, is it possible that our Paris scholium too suffered a somewhat similar fate of being preserved only in a single source from which it found its way into the *Parisinus* and the *Palatinus*.

But to turn to another aspect of the problem it can be shown, I believe, that in two places in the extant DS manuscripts reference is made to our Paris scholium on *Aeneid*, VII, 123. As we have seen above, it gives two explanations of the verse to which it refers. The first is *κατὰ τὸ σιωπώμενον*. Georgii counts twenty-three instances of this phrase in the Servian Corpus and states that it is usually used to answer criticism of *ἀνασταπόδοις*.<sup>31</sup> It was undoubtedly an oversight that he failed to list the instance in the DS scholium on *Aeneid*, I, 188, where the phrase *per silentium* is certainly used in answer to a critical *quaestio*. It is printed as follows in the Harvard Edition (II, p. 106):

188. CORRIPIVIT aut de pharetra *corripuit*, ut est (VI 290) *corripit hic subita trepidus formidine ferrum*,

aut *corripuit*, ut cervorum cele-  
ritatem praeciperet. aut *cor-*  
*ripuit* ab Achate. et quomodo  
ab Achate, quem apud ignem  
occupatum dixit? sed eum  
secutum esse per silentium in-  
tellegamus,

aut ab Achate, ut eum secutum  
esse per silentium intellegamus,

ut hoc loco (VI, 34) *ni iam praemissus Achates adforet*, item  
(VII, 123) *nunc repeto, Anchises fatorum arcana reliquit*.  
GEREBAT aut tunc aut quae gerere consueverat.

(The reader is reminded that the lines running all the way across the page are found in the manuscripts both of Servius and of Servius Danielis: the words to the left of the vertical line are found in the DS manuscripts alone; those to the right, in those of the vulgate.)

<sup>31</sup> *Die antike Aeneiskritik*, pp. 25, 417 f.



It seems reasonably clear that Servius has here shortened a longer scholium in the middle, keeping the beginning and end unchanged. But it is the references at the end to *Aeneid*, VI, 34 and VII, 123, that are of particular interest to us. They are given as examples for understanding *per silentium* that Achates has followed Aeneas. Now if we turn to VI, 34, we find a DS scholium after the lemma PRAEMISSIONUS ACHATES. It reads: κατὰ τὸ σωπώμενον intellegimus, *id est secundum taciturnitatem*.<sup>32</sup> Here the *Turonensis* has the marginal note *ostenditur Achates praemissus fuisse ab Aenea ad sibyllam* (cited from Thilo's *apparatus criticus*). It has long been recognized that the scholia in this manuscript are sometimes more complete than the S or DS scholia,<sup>33</sup> and consequently I am inclined to believe that the *Turonensis* preserved here a part of the source of the original scholium on VI, 34. But without pressing this point, we can say that we have found in the DS scholium on VI, 34 the interpretation *per silentium* which we were led to expect by the scholium on I, 188.

But in regard to the reference to VII, 123, there is no scholium on that line, as we have seen above, except our Paris scholium. Yet in it, we find an interpretation *per silentium* (*unde vel catatosiopomenon intellegendum est*) which not only accords with that of the scholium on I, 188 but also echoes the Greek phrase used in the comment on VI, 34. Is it not likely then, *a priori*, that the Paris scholium once existed in a source from which DS and S were derived where reference to it would be pertinent?

We may now turn to the DS scholium on *divini* in the passage (*Aen.*, V, 47-8) in which Aeneas informs his companions that a complete year has passed.

ex quo reliquias divinique ossa parentis  
condidimus terra maestasque sacravimus aras.

It reads: aut laus est ut "divini opus Alcimedontis" aut re vera "divini" nam ait (VII, 122) "*genitor mihi talia namque, nunc repeto, Anchises fatorum arcana reliquit.*" *Multa enim*

<sup>32</sup> In quoting DS scholia of the Servian Corpus on *Aeneid* III on, I shall follow Thilo's practice of putting the S material in ordinary type and the D material in italics.

<sup>33</sup> Cf. Barwick, *Phil.*, LXX (1911), pp. 119, 123, 138; Savage, *H* 1, pp. 151, 158, and *passim*.

*antiqua lectio Anchisen futurorum scientem concelebrat. Aut "divini," id est dei quia apud Romanos defunctorum parentes dei a filiis vocabantur.* The *Turonensis*, the importance of which we have mentioned above as a witness to the D tradition, also contains the D comment from *multa antiqua lectio (multa lectio antiqua T)* through *vocabantur*.

Let us begin with the interpretation *re vera divinus*. The Paris scholium states *vel divinitatem (Vergilius) Anchise assignat, qui ubique divinus inducitur*. Is this a concept, we may ask, that appears elsewhere in the Servian Corpus and in what connection?

*Divinitas* in the sense of the usual *divinatio* (ability to prophesy) is very poorly attested in Latin literature until we come to the Servian Corpus. The only reference before those to the Corpus in the *Thesaurus* is to Pliny, *N. H.*, II, 149.<sup>34</sup> To this we can add two instances in Cicero and two more in Pliny.<sup>35</sup> In the Corpus the *Thesaurus* refers to Servius, *Georg.*, II, 486; IV, 422 (423 is correct) and Servius auctus, *Aen.*, III, 209 and introduces these references with the words *nescio an huc—pertineant*. But a careful examination of these passages will show that *divinitas* in them is certainly used in the sense of *divinatio*. And furthermore, *divinitas* in this sense appears in the following scholia: D on *Aen.*, I, 329 (p. 170, line 10, Harvard edition, where we read Burmann's *divinationem*, instead of the MS reading *divinitatem* which should have been kept), S on *Aen.*, II, 247 (the D part of this scholium which follows makes the meaning clear), S on *Aen.*, XII, 397; cf. D on XII, 394.

Here, then, are the examples of *divinitas* used for *divinatio* in the Servian Corpus. Moreover, it is a certain kind of *divinatio* as can be seen from the persons to whom the word is applied. Cassandra (*Aen.*, II, 247) and Iapyx (*Aen.*, XII, 397) owe their divine gift to Apollo, whereas Phineus (*Geor.*, III, 209) owes his to Jupiter. Apollo (*Aen.*, I, 329) and Proteus (*Georg.*, IV, 423) possess it by virtue of being divine or semi-divine. In the Paris scholium, Anchises, a mortal, receives his knowledge of the future from Venus in a different form, prophetic books;

<sup>34</sup> *T. L. L.*, V, col. 1617.

<sup>35</sup> Cicero, *De Div.*, II, 80; 119; cf. the notes on these passages in Pease's edition; Pliny, *N. H.*, II, 191; VII, 33.



but through these books, he acquires true *divinitas*. It is clear, I believe, that *divinitas* is used in the same way both in the Servian Corpus and our Paris scholium.

The Paris scholium also states that *Anchises ubique divinus inducitur* and in view of the preceding *divinitas*, the word *divinus* must characterize here a person who is able to foretell the future. *Divinus* in this sense is common throughout Latin literature.<sup>36</sup> But it will repay us to ascertain if *divinus* is used in the Servian Corpus with any particular connotation. In the S scholium on the father of Halaesus (X, 417), its meaning is clearly defined: *FATA CANENS quasi divinus. Alii "cavens" legunt; secundum quod non statim et divinus; nam et ab aliis audita cavere potuerat*. In other words, the father of Halaesus personally possessed the gift of prophecy. In the D scholium on II, 122 and the S scholium on VII, 68, the word *vates* is explained as *divinus*. In the first example, Calchas is the subject, in the second, the unnamed soothsayer who interprets the omen of the bees that clustered on the Laurel in the palace of Latinus. In the S scholium on XI, 739, the Homeric *πάντι κακῶν* (Calchas; cf. *Iliad*, I, 106) is glossed by *malorum divine*. Both Daphnis, the son of Mercury (S on *Ecl.*, VII, 1, cf. 9), and the seer Melampus (D on *Georg.*, III, 550) are called *divini* and specific mention is made of their prophetic powers. With reference to the Sibyl, the S scholium of VI, 84 reads: *sed quia divina loquitur futura praeoccupat*. In this instance *divina* may agree with the subject, the Sibyl, or be the accusative plural object of *loquitur* as it is the object of *pronuntiare* in the D scholium on VIII, 314 (here the subject is *Fauni*).

The review of this evidence shows that the use of *divinus* in our Paris scholium and the Servian Corpus is essentially the same. It designates in general a person who can predict the future. But more specifically, in the passages of the Servian Corpus, in which the person can be identified to whom the adjective is applied (the father of Halaesus, Calchas, Daphnis, Melampus, possibly the Sibyl), we are in the presence of true seers, who received their divine gift at birth or had it bestowed upon them later, either in a temporary or lasting fashion. The unnamed *vates* who explains the omen of the bees is the only

<sup>36</sup> *T. L. L.*, V, col. 1633, II c; col. 1625.

one who interprets from *signa*. But both Vergil's use of *vates* in the text and Servius' gloss *divinus* indicate unmistakably that Servius felt him to be more than a common soothsayer. Given, then, the affinity between the use of *divinitas* in the Paris scholium and the Servian Corpus, it is only reasonable to assume that when the former tells us that Anchises was represented as *ubique divinus*, we should take *divinus* here with the same elevated meaning which it possesses in the latter. We are far removed from the *divini* whom Horace loved to watch (*Sat.*, I, 6, 114; Porphyrio, *ad loc.*, characterizes them as *sortilegi* and *circulatores*), or the *Chaldaei caeterique divini* of whom Cicero speaks with contempt (*De Fato*, 15).

But what does the Paris scholium mean by *ubique*? *Ubique* in Vergil alone or *ubique* in Latin literature? The literary precedent of Naevius introduced in the following sentence by the words *Nevius enim* surely indicates that the author of the scholium had Naevius in mind and probably Ennius too, for the latter speaks of Anchises' prophetic ability, bestowed on him by Venus, and his *divinum pectus*.<sup>37</sup> But *ubique* must also include Vergil and some investigation will show, I believe, that this interpretation of Anchises as *divinus* in Vergil belongs within the atmosphere of the Servian Corpus and the D part of it in particular. We shall not be speaking, of course, of Anchises after his death when he becomes the great prophet of Book VI. For the Paris scholium refers to an act which he performed while he was alive.

Let us look first at the text of Vergil. In Book II, Anchises prays to Jupiter to confirm the omen of the flames which played about the head of Iulus (679-91). Presumably, he recognized it as favorable for it made him rejoice (*laetus*, 687). But there is no indication that he understood its import fully and clearly. When we compare Anchises at this point with the *vates* who interpret the flames on the head of Lavinia (VII, 79 f.), we are struck by the difference between Anchises' hesitation and the forthright interpretation of professional soothsayers.<sup>38</sup> Heinze

<sup>37</sup> *Ann.*, 18-19 Vahlen<sup>2</sup> = Probus on *Ecl.*, VI, 31, p. 14 Keil and *Schol. Veron.* on *Aen.*, II, 687, p. 90 Keil.

<sup>38</sup> That *vates* is to be understood as the unexpressed subject of *canebant* (79) is not only indicated by the verb itself (*canere* in the sense of prophesy), but also by the fact that it is a *vates* who interprets the earlier omen of the bees (68 ff.).

has pointed out the necessity of having Aeneas abandon Troy *auspicato* or, better yet, after having received the *auspicium maximum* (thunder on the left).<sup>39</sup> But I feel with Lehr that he exaggerates in interpreting the entire episode, from the appearance of the flames to the descent of the shooting star, as an exact reflection of Roman augural rites.<sup>40</sup> Here Heinze seems to have paid uncritical attention to the scholia on the passage. But be that as it may, no true *divinitas* in the sense of prophetic ability is evinced by Anchises in this scene.

In Book III, Anchises explains the meaning of the oracle given to Aeneas at Delos (103 ff.) on the basis of his own recollections (*si rite audita recordor*, 107). His explanation has nothing to do with divination and furthermore is disastrously incorrect. Moreover, when Aeneas gives him an account of the prophecy of the Penates, he recalls that Cassandra who was an inspired seer and predicted the future correctly (II, 246 f.; 345 f.) had made the same prophecy (III, 183 ff.). Anchises, however, like all other mere mortals had paid no attention to her words. In the episode of the Harpies, there is even less question of divination. After Celaeno has uttered her terrifying prophecy concerning the eating of the tables (III, 255 ff.), Anchises has no word of comfort for his comrades. Apparently he is subject to the same forebodings as the rest of the company. His first reaction is to pray to the gods to avert the threatened disaster, after which he orders a hasty departure (265-7). Finally there is the omen of the horses seen where the Trojans first land on Italian soil (III, 537 ff.). Anchises states that they portend war but also give hope of peace. This we may characterize as a kind of *divinatio artificiosa ex signis*. But one did not need to be much of a *divinus* to make such a vague and trite prediction and the capacity to do so was far removed from *divinitas* (*divinatio naturalis*), in the Servian sense.<sup>41</sup>

<sup>39</sup> *Virgils epische Technik*<sup>3</sup>, pp. 55 ff.

<sup>40</sup> Heinrich Lehr, *Religion und Kult in Vergils Aeneis* (diss. Giessen, 1934), pp. 99 f.

<sup>41</sup> The division of *divinatio* into two classes, *genus naturale* and *genus artificiosum*, is set forth most fully by Cicero, *De Div.*, I, 11 ff., 72, 109 ff.; II, 26 ff., and it is on his authority that Servius in the DS scholium on *interpres*, *Aen.*, III, 359, assigns the *vaticinantes* to the class of *furor* and the *augures* to the class of *ars*. Here *furor* clearly represents the *genus naturale* and *ars* the *genus artificiosum*. *Divinitas*,

The fact is, of course, that before his death, Anchises could not have been made a true seer by Vergil without breaking one of the principal threads that run through the first books of the *Aeneid*. Whether Book III as we have it is early or late,<sup>42</sup> a large part of the story that it tells is concerned with the gradual revelation to Aeneas of his ultimate goal. Had Anchises possessed a divine knowledge of the future, through inspiration, sacred books, or any other means, the tale would have had to be told in a radically different manner from the departure from Troy on. We cannot well imagine a father who would not have told his dutiful son all that he knew about the future from the beginning; and had he known it and revealed it, the result would have been a course set straight for Italy. Aeneas, of course, might still have been buffeted about by wind and wave from shore to shore. But the very importance of Book III is that Vergil has given us not a story of pure adventure, but an account of a lofty mission determined by providence and gradually unveiled to its agent Aeneas through the inspired utterance of others.

Even an Anchises who like Helenus was permitted to prophesy some things and not others (III, 379 f.) would have spoiled the tone and purpose of the book. If Anchises was to be a member of the expedition, he had to share the original ignorance of all its members and become gradually enlightened by successive revelations. Because of his age and dignity and the respect in which he was held by his son and others (Helenus, for example; III, 472 ff.), he was not only Aeneas' chief adviser but also took command on several occasions.<sup>43</sup> But he could not be a true *divinus* and Vergil seems to emphasize his human limitations in this regard by making him responsible for the landing in Crete. Like any mortal he could pray for an *augurium* and interpret simple omens, but beyond that during his lifetime he could not go.

as we saw in our study of the word in the Servian Corpus, is *divinatio naturalis* or inspired divination of the kind that permits one to predict the future without reference to *signa*.

<sup>42</sup> See Schanz-Hosius, *Gesch. d. röm. Lit.*, II<sup>4</sup> (1935), p. 58, where the widely divergent views of scholars on the position of Book III in the order of composition are summarized.

<sup>43</sup> See Mackail's edition of the *Aeneid*, p. 91, where the part played by Anchises in Book III, is set forth.

On the other hand, the authors of the Servian Corpus emphasize Anchises' *peritia divinandi* and connect it frequently with the *disciplina auguralis*. This conception of Anchises' knowledge of augury reflects the tendency of the Servian Corpus to discover references everywhere in Vergil's text to religious rites and ceremonies and to attribute to the principal characters of the *Aeneid* a profound knowledge of priestly disciplines which guided them in word and deed.<sup>44</sup> As Boissier pointed out many years ago, this tendency led to some ludicrous interpretations.<sup>45</sup> But it was none the less fixed in the minds of the scholars of the fourth century. We can discern this tendency in its full vigor in Macrobius who unquestionably drew considerable parts of his *Saturnalia* from a commentary on Vergil which was the source of the D scholia of the Servian Corpus.<sup>46</sup> Of the principal speakers in the *Saturnalia*, Vettius Praetextatus volunteers to discuss Vergil's knowledge of the *ius pontificium*, a knowledge which he particularly admires.<sup>47</sup> Nicomachus Flavianus next chooses as his subject the same poet's *scientia iuris auguralis* which he finds to be of such magnitude that *si (Vergilius) aliarum disciplinarum doctrina destitueretur, haec illum vel sola professio sublimaret*.<sup>48</sup> Unfortunately the discussion of Flavianus has been entirely lost; but we do have part of the speech of Praetextatus on the *ius pontificium*.<sup>49</sup> Here it is expressly stated that Vergil makes a *pontifex* of Aeneas.<sup>50</sup> This has its counterpart in the many scholia of the Servian Corpus in which Aeneas is said to act as a *pontifex* or to observe the *ius pontificium*. Although it is stated that Vergil attributes to Aeneas *omne genus sacerdotii* (D on XI, 76),<sup>51</sup> in the eyes of the Servian commentators Aeneas is a *pontifex* or *flamen* first and foremost.<sup>52</sup> At the same time Vergil in his text afforded oppor-

<sup>44</sup> Cf. Lehr, *op. cit.*, pp. 13 ff.

<sup>45</sup> *La religion romaine*, pp. 233 f.

<sup>46</sup> See note 20 above.

<sup>47</sup> *Sat.*, I, 24, 16.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 24, 17.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, III, 1-12.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, III, 2, 17; cf. III, 6, 3.

<sup>51</sup> D on *Aeneid* III, 359 even goes so far as to state on the authority of *veteres auctores* that Aeneas and very many of the Trojans were *peritissimi auguriorum*.

<sup>52</sup> Cf. Mountford and Schultz, *Index Rerum et Nominum in Scholiis*



tunities for connecting Anchises with the *disciplina auguralis* which the commentators, influenced by the tendency which has been mentioned above, were not slow to seize and elaborate. If I am not mistaken, Anchises must have appeared often in the discussion of Flavianus which is now lost.

Coming now to specific scholia, in regard to the episode of the omens which persuade Anchises to abandon Troy (II, 679 ff.), we are told that Anchises uses the language and observes the procedures of the *disciplina auguralis* (D on 686; S on 691; D on 692; D on 702) or acts according to the *disciplina pontificalis* (D on 693). The D scholium on 687 also states that Vergil *et hic et alibi Anchisen divinandi peritum inducit*. When Anchises interprets the oracle at Delos (III, 103 ff.), the DS scholium on *spes discite vestras* reads as follows: *aut quasi senex loquitur*; *aut quia ut supra scit se esse moriturum*; *ubique enim sciens futurorum inducitur*. The word *supra* evidently refers to the S scholium on II, 704, the idea of which is more fully expressed by DS on II, 696. The fact that Anchises speaks of *spes vestras* instead of *spes nostras* was apparently taken as an indication that Anchises knew that he was destined to die before his hopes were realized. The incongruity of calling Anchises *sciens futurorum* when he was on the point of misinterpreting the oracle with grave results for the expedition shows to what length the D scholiast would go in order to make Anchises *re vera divinus*.

In the D scholium on *tertia lux* (III, 117), words which are also contained in the speech in which Anchises misinterprets the oracle, we are informed that they were spoken *iuxta speciem auguralem* and refer to the *condictio in tertium diem*. This may well have been a part of augural discipline,<sup>53</sup> but it is obviously far-fetched to interpret the words of Anchises in this manner. Yet the scholiast was not deterred from connecting Anchises with augury, even on so slim a pretext.

In the scene with the Harpies (III, 225 ff.), Celaeno is called *infelix vates* by Vergil (246). This leads D to interpret Celaeno's prophecy as a certain kind of *auspicium*. D, also, on 265 informs us that Anchises made his prayer *per speciem auguralem*.

*Servii et Aelii Donati Tractatorum*, s. v. Aeneas (*flamen*; *pontifex rerum divinarum peritus*); also Lehr, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

<sup>53</sup> Cf. Wissowa, *R.-E.*, II, col. 2327.

The words of Celaeno, however, are not an *augurium* and although the kind of prayer which Anchises delivers (called *invocatio* in the scholium), may have belonged to certain augural rites,<sup>54</sup> Anchises has practiced no augury involving divination.

Finally, in regard to the omen of the horses (III, 537 ff.), D on *primum* (537) makes a brave attempt to connect the Vergilian omen with the *iuges auspicium* known to us from Cicero and Festus.<sup>55</sup> In the scholium it is called *iugetis augurium* and we are told that Anchises was able to interpret it because he was *auguriorum peritus*. It is also in regard to this interpretation that S on 538 tells us that he possessed *omnis divinandi peritia* and characterizes the interpretation itself as *ratiocinatio divinationis*. But here again in the text there is no trace of *divinitas* (*divinatio naturalis*) in the Servian sense, as we have seen above. This concept of Anchises as a master augur is surely exaggerated and is part and parcel of the tendency which we have examined above. Yet, we can say that in all but one instance, Anchises' frequently mentioned *peritia divinandi* can and should be interpreted as *divinatio artificiosa ex signis*. This is not a parallel, except vaguely, to his *divinitas* in the Paris scholium. But the D scholium on *Aeneid*, III, 103 decidedly is, where we read about Anchises that *ubique enim sciens futurorum inducitur*. Here we have the *ubique* and *inducitur* of the Paris scholium, while the *sciens futurorum* is the true *divinitas* of the true *divinus* in the same comment.

Apparently, the author of the D scholia was determined to interpret Anchises as *sciens futurorum* wherever the text of Vergil gave him the opportunity to do so. In most instances he could do no more than emphasize Anchises' *peritia divinandi* as an *augur*. But even so slim a pretext as the *spes discite vestras* (III, 103) was seized by him, incongruously as we have seen, to elevate the character and extend the scope of Anchises' powers of divination. The Paris scholium and the D scholium on V, 47, which we shall examine shortly, give us a clue to his trend of

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, col. 2330; cf. Lehr, *op. cit.*, p. 101.

<sup>55</sup> Cicero, *De Div.*, II, 77 and Pease's note; Festus, s. v. *iuges*, p. 92, 11 Lindsay. In a detailed discussion of the *iuges auspicium*, Georges Dumézil writes as follows: "une troisième texte une note de Servius à *Enéide* III, 537, pêche évidemment par ignorance," *Nouvelle Clio*, III (1953), p. 249.

thought. He knew his Naevius and Ennius thoroughly in whose epics Anchises during his life was *re vera divinus* and he thought and wished to find reflections in Vergil of this more ancient Anchises. Both the *divinique ossa parentis* of V, 47 and the *Anchises fatorum arcana reliquit* of VII, 123 must have seemed to him to be clear evidence that Vergil was here following his predecessors in bestowing true *divinitas* on Anchises.

Let us return now to a detailed analysis of the scholium on V, 47. The lemma is *divini*. The first interpretation is given by Servius: *aut laus est, ut divini opus Alcimedontis*. The Servian scholium on the Vergilian passage (*Ecl.* III, 37) has the same interpretation in different words: *laus ab artifice*. The second interpretation is a mixture of S and D: *re vera divini*; *nam ait genitor mihi talia namque, nunc repeto, Anchises fatorum arcana reliquit*. It is clear what Servius did. He found the entire sentence from *genitor* to *reliquit* in his source and omitted the first part from *genitor* to *namque*. Here Servius terminates. But D continues by furnishing a literary precedent for the interpretation *re vera divini*: *multa enim antiqua lectio Anchisen futurorum scientem concelebrat*. To this he adds a third interpretation that need not concern us here.

Now if any work of Latin literature deserves to be included under the heading *antiqua lectio*, it is the *Bellum Punicum* of Naevius. Moreover, when we turn to the lines (VII, 122-3) which D on V, 47 cites, we find that our Paris scholium on these same lines refers to the *Bellum Punicum* of Naevius and, what is more, to a specific part of its contents which could have served Vergil as a literary precedent. This can hardly be sheer coincidence. Rather, this close relationship between these scholia is one more firm indication that our Paris scholium belonged originally in the work from which the D comments descend.

We may now propose the following reconstruction to explain the present state of our evidence. The author of the original commentary on Vergil from which the Servian vulgate and the D additions descend was well acquainted at first hand with the *Bellum Punicum* of Naevius. In it he had found an Anchises who was *re vera divinus*, in that he had received from Venus certain books containing future events. The commentator was also aware of passages in the *Aeneid* that showed reflections of the *Bellum Punicum* and was interested in comparing Vergil



and Naevius in their treatment of the same subject matter. As he wrote on the Anchises of Vergil, the Anchises of Naevius was in the back of his mind. When the author of the original commentary came to the *divini ossa parentis* of V, 47, the word *divinus* could be interpreted in several ways. One of them was *re vera divinus* and the commentator with Naevius and, probably, Ennius<sup>56</sup> in mind supported this interpretation with a reference to *multa antiqua lectio*. On reaching VII, 122-3, he faced the task honestly of explaining the curious reference to the *fatorum arcana* which Anchises had left to Aeneas. He knew very well that it had been Celaeno, not Anchises, who had uttered the prophecy about eating the tables and he began his scholium by calling attention to the discrepancy. An explanation of it *catatosiopomenon* (it had already been envisaged in DS on I, 188) was always a possibility and it was mentioned. But such an explanation was lame in itself and did not need to be the last word on the matter. In explaining *divinus* in V, 47, the commentator had previously referred to an old literary tradition. The *fatorum arcana* of VII, 123, called for more precise information along the same lines. Naevius would take the place of the vague "old literary tradition" and the reader would be told something definite about his treatment of Anchises. In this way, the literary relationship between Vergil and the earlier poet would again be illuminated and a reasonable explanation be given of VII, 122-3.

In compiling his commentary, Servius came to the citation of VII, 123 in the scholium on V, 47 in his source. He looked up the scholium on VII, 123 and found that it mentioned Naevius. On principle, he never cited this author, as we have seen above. Consequently, although he cited part of the Vergilian verses, VII, 122-3, which he found in his original, he omitted what followed, since he did not intend to include its more specific explanation in the scholium in VII, 123. He carried out his intention, for we have no Servian scholium on this verse. Later, when the conflation of Servius and D material was made, the original scholium on VII, 123 suffered the same fate as many others of Book VII: it was omitted in the *Floriacensis*. But instead of being preserved in the *Turonensis*, like many other D comments omitted in the *Floriacensis*, it was pre-

<sup>56</sup> See note 37 above.

served in the source of the *Parisinus* and the *Palatinus* where other precious material from this common source of S and D was also preserved.

To summarize, the nature, language, and spirit of the Paris scholium have been shown to be closely related to the D scholia on the *Bellum Punicum* of Naevius. In addition we have seen that the author of D on V, 47 almost certainly had the material which it contains in mind when he wrote the scholium on V, 47. The DS scholium on I, 188 also seems to have been written with reference to the first interpretation of the Paris scholium, *catatosiopomenon*. In view of the sum total of this evidence, it can be accepted now, I believe, as a fact that our Paris scholium belonged originally in the same commentary on Vergil from which the D comments on the *Bellum Punicum* were derived.

Finally, our Paris scholium sheds new light on the part played by Anchises in the *Bellum Punicum* and raises a number of fresh problems; for example, the relation of the commentary of Probus to the Servian Corpus, Ennius' indebtedness to Naevius, for he too made Anchises *divinus*, and Naevius' sources and how he treated them. The *Origo Gentis Romanae* also presents a problem in relationship, for it knows of an Anchises to whom Venus had predicted that the Trojans should settle where they were compelled by hunger to eat their tables (11, 1). To put this material in order and to draw conclusions from it would make it necessary to add many more pages to this article which is already long enough. Consequently, discussion of these other problems may best be reserved for another occasion.

HENRY T. ROWELL.

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY.

## THE ANCIENT DISPUTE OVER RHETORIC IN HOMER.

Among the works grouped together by Walz as the *Rhetores Graeci* are found a number of *Prolegomena* or "introductions to the study of rhetoric." They have been edited separately by Rabe.<sup>1</sup> These works, which seem to have been written in the fourth and fifth centuries A. D., have many similarities in form and substance. They generally contain a history of rhetoric, telling of its existence among the gods, then among the Homeric heroes, and finally among men. Since these historical accounts preserve otherwise unknown (though not necessarily correct) information about the beginnings of Greek rhetoric, they have received scholarly attention. The most recent and most valuable study of their nature and sources was that of Stanley Wilcox,<sup>2</sup> who was concerned only with the third phase of the history, that of rhetoric's beginnings among men. It is primarily with the rhetoric of the Homeric heroes that we will be concerned here.

The belief that rhetorical theories could be illustrated from the Homeric poems was widespread. It seems to appear first in Cicero (cf. *Brutus*, 40 and 50), was held by Quintilian (cf., e. g., X, 1, 46 ff.), and is greatly developed in the *De Vita et Poesi Homeri* found in the corpus of Plutarch.<sup>3</sup> From a general acquaintance with the rhetoricians one would suspect that grammarians and scholiasts were the first to note the existence of formal rhetoric in Homer, since they would have training in rhetorical systems and quite likely would be lacking the historical sense which might have told them that Homer was innocent of the rules which he seemed to illustrate. There can

<sup>1</sup> Hugo Rabe, *Prolegomenon Sylloge* (Leipzig, 1931).

<sup>2</sup> "Corax and the Prolegomena," *A. J. P.*, LXIV (1943), pp. 1 ff. Cf. also, Wilcox, "The Scope of Early Rhetorical Instruction," *H. S. C. P.*, LIII (1942), pp. 121 ff.

<sup>3</sup> On the *Vita* cf. H. Schrader, *De Plutarchi Chaeronensis 'Ομηρικαῖς Μελέταις et de eiusdem quae fertur Vita Homeri* (Gotha, 1899); *idem*, "Telephos der Pergamer περί τῆς καθ' 'Ομηρον ῥητορικῆς," *Hermes*, XXXVII (1902), pp. 530 ff.; and Fritz Wehrli, *Zur Geschichte der allegorischen Deutung Homers in Altertum* (Borna-Leipzig, 1928).

be no doubt that the scholiasts did apply rhetorical rules in their commentaries, and this has been studied at some length by Schrader.<sup>4</sup>

But this logical picture is by no means altogether correct and leaves out what is perhaps the most significant aspect of the topic of Homeric rhetoric as it appears in the more classical writers on rhetoric.

Among the writers of *Prolegomena* there is one sharply dissenting voice. It is really astonishing that there should be, considering the unanimity of organization and subject matter of the works. Yet the author of what is now number seventeen in Rabe's collection (Walz, IV, 1 ff.)—perhaps his name was Marcellinus—sharply denies that the eloquence of the Homeric heroes can be called rhetoric.<sup>5</sup> He begins (Rabe, p. 267) with the claim that rhetoric existed among the gods and refutes this by asserting that the gods lack tongues and palates, which are, obviously, necessary for successful speaking.<sup>6</sup> Nor is the rhythmic speech of Priam, Nestor, and Odysseus real rhetoric, but only the result of logical reasoning and a certain sharpness of mind. In rhetoric, as in everything else, there is an element of nature, but to find the origin of the art one must discover the man who brought it into existence, the place where this was done, the historical circumstances, the manner, and the cause (πρόσωπον, τόπον, χρόνον, τρόπον, αἰτίαν). The author promises to present these historically. There follows an account of the doings of Corax and Tisias in Sicily at the time of the fall of the tyrants. The account is similar to the descriptions in the other *Prolegomena*.

When a late Greek rhetorician says something unique one

<sup>4</sup> "Telephos der Pergamer" (cf. *supra*, n. 3); "Zeitbestimmung der Schrift *περί τῆς καθ' Ὁμήρον ῥητορικῆς*," *Hermes*, XXXVIII (1903), pp. 145 f.; and "Σχῆμα und τρόπος in der Homer Scholien," *Hermes*, XXXIX (1904), pp. 563 ff. Cf. also G. Lehnert, *De Scholiis ad Homerum Rhetoricis* (Leipzig, 1896) and K. Fuhr, "Mitteilungen," *B. P. W.*, XXII (1902), pp. 1499 f.

<sup>5</sup> It is strange that Wilcox (*supra*, n. 2) does not mention the fact that the author of *Prolegomenon* 17 is in disagreement with the other writers. He implies (pp. 7 f.) that there is general agreement.

<sup>6</sup> This "proof" does not seem to have been known to earlier authors and is perhaps derived from the conception of the gods held by the Neo-Platonists.

immediately assumes, not that he is being original, which is unthinkable, but that he is following an independent source. Is there any evidence of such a position from an earlier age?

There is evidence that the apparent existence of rhetoric in Homer was used by some writers as proof that rhetoric was not an art (*τέχνη*) as the rhetoricians always claimed. We may turn first to Quintilian's *Institutes* which represent a summation of all earlier rhetoric.

In discussing the nature of rhetoric Quintilian says (II, 17, 5 ff.):

Quidam naturalem esse rhetoricen volunt et tamen adiuvari exercitatione non diffitentur, ut in libris Ciceronis de oratore dicit Antonius, observationem quandam esse non artem. . . . Hanc autem opinionem habuisse Lysias videtur. Cuius sententiae talis defensio est, quod indocti et barbari et servi pro se cum loquuntur, aliquid dicant simile principio, narrent, probent, refutent, et (quod vim habeat epilogi) deprecentur. Deinde adiiciunt illas verborum cavillationes, nihil quod ex arte fiat ante artem fuisse; atqui dixisse homines pro se et in alios semper, doctores artis sero iam et circa Tisian et Coraca primum repertos, orationem igitur ante artem fuisse eoque artem non esse. Nos porro, quando coeperit huius rei doctrina, non laboramus exquirere, quamquam apud Homerum et praeceptorem Phoenicem cum agendi tum etiam loquendi et oratores plures et omne in tribus ducibus orationis genus et certamina quoque proposita eloquentiae inter iuvenes invenimus, quin in caelatura clipei Achillis et lites sunt et actores. Illud enim admonere satis est, omnia quae ars consummaverit a natura initia duxisse.

*Quidam*, therefore, insisted *orationem . . . ante artem fuisse eoque artem non esse*. One can easily see the problem: if a rhetorician defined rhetoric as an art and claimed that its rules were first stated by Corax and Tisias, he was forced to take some position about the apparent existence of rhetoric in Homer. If he believed that rhetoric was a formal art, he had to deny that it existed in the Homeric poems. This is the position of the author of the *Prolegomenon*. The only alternative was a middle of the road position by which he might claim that rhetoric existed by nature, as in Homer, but that it could be aided by art, as in the sophists. This is the position of Quintilian.

A debate over the nature of rhetoric involving "proof" that

rhetoric is not an art immediately suggests that we have come upon a topic in the famous debate between rhetoric and philosophy, which repeatedly crops up from the time of Plato on. It would seem that the philosophers may have argued that the apparent existence of rhetoric in Homer, before the invention of the "art," disproved the claim that rhetoric was an art. This interpretation is confirmed by the fact that Quintilian cites throughout this seventeenth chapter the opinions of philosophers that rhetoric is not an art and by a fragment of Philodemus. The latter is always hard to work with because much of his *Rhetoric* sets forth the views of others and because of the fragmentary nature of the text; but in one passage he seems to criticize those who regard Homer as the fount of philosophy and all other virtues, but will not admit that he had knowledge of rhetoric, since they believe that Corax invented the latter:

(πρὶν παρελθεῖν) Κόρακα τὸν Συρακόσιον ἢ τὸν Ἀθηναῖον Ἀντιφῶντα· μὰ θεοὺς γὰρ οὐδ' ἐρεῖ τις ἥττω κατὰ γε σύνεσιν γεγονέναι τούτων ἐκείνον (Odysseus). Ἀλλ' οὕτως ἀσύνετοί τινές ἐσμεν, ὥστε φιλοσοφίας μὲν αὐτὸν (Homer) εὐρέτην λεγόμενον ἀκούειν, οὐχί τε τῶν κριτικῶν μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν φιλοσόφων αὐτῶν, οὐδὲ μᾶς μόνον αἰρέσεως ἀλλὰ πασῶν· τὸ δὲ ῥητορικῆς εὐρέτην νομίζεσθαι τέρας (ὑπολαμβάνειν)

(Philodemus, fr. XXI [II, p. 111 Sudhaus],  
cf. Sudhaus, *Supplementum* [Leipzig,  
1895], p. xxxiii).

The use to which the philosophers put the topic of Homeric rhetoric and the circumstances which led to the development of the topic will be clearer if we review the positions of the various philosophical schools as regards the nature of rhetoric. It is necessary first, however, to dispose of references which have been regarded as showing that the existence of formal rhetoric in Homer was recognized in classical Greek times.

The commonest statement in later writers on Homeric rhetoric is the claim that the three styles of oratory—grand, middle and plain—are illustrated by the speeches of Odysseus, Nestor, and Menelaus, respectively. Cicero seems to have known of this comparison (*Brutus*, 40 and 50), and it may be seen in Seneca (*Ep.*, 40, 2), the *Laus Pisonis* (61 ff.), Fronto (*De Eloc.*, 1, 5), Aulus Gellius (VI, 14, 7), *De Vita et Poesi Homeri* (II, 172), Aristides (*In Plat. De Rhet.*, Dindorf, II, pp. 30-1), Eustathius



and most scholia to *Iliad*, III, 212, and also in Quintilian and the *Prolegomena*. Perhaps Tacitus' *Dialogus*, 16 should also be regarded as a reference.

The Homeric passage which occasioned this theory was *Iliad*, III, 212 ff. in which Menelaus is described as speaking fluently, but in very few words, and is contrasted with Odysseus, whose appearance was unprepossessing, but whose words flew like the snow. The honey-sweet eloquence of Nestor (*Iliad*, I, 249) was then interposed to fill the triad.<sup>7</sup>

It has been suggested<sup>8</sup> that this topic of the three styles of oratory in Homer is as old as the fourth century. In the *Phaedrus* (261 B) Plato jokingly refers to the "arts" of Nestor and Odysseus. Menelaus does not appear, but Palamedes does. Nothing at all is said of oratorical style, and Phaedrus suggests that Socrates is really referring to Gorgias, Thrasyarchus, and Zeno. The whole passage is thus clearly concerned not with Homeric rhetoric, but with sophistry, and there is no triad of styles.

A second early passage is the fragment of Antisthenes on *πολύτροπος* as an epithet of Odysseus.<sup>9</sup> Antisthenes interpreted this as referring to Odysseus' use of words, but it is possible that in discussing the meaning of the epithet as applied to moral character he may have compared Odysseus with Nestor, Agamemnon, and Ajax, whose names appear in Porphyry's quotation of the fragment. It has been thought that the fragment may be a part of Antisthenes' work *περὶ λέξεως*, which bore the subtitle *περὶ χαρακτήρων*<sup>10</sup> (cf. Diogenes Laertius, VI, 1, 15)

<sup>7</sup> On Homeric oratory cf. M. Croiset, *De publicae eloquentiae principis apud Graecos in Homeris carminibus* (Montpellier, 1874) and Marcel Delaunois, "Comment parlent les héros d'Homère," *Ét. Cl.*, XX (1952), pp. 80 ff.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. L. Radermacher, "Artium Scriptores," *Wien. Sitzb.*, CCXXVII (1951), pp. 4 f. An earlier suggestion, and perhaps a happier one, is that the heroes represent types of oratory, rather than of style. Cf. Carolus Reinhardt, "Qua vice Nestoris et Ulixidis personae in arte rhetorica functae sint," *Commentationes in honorem Francisci Buecheleri* (Soc. Philol., Bonn, 1873), pp. 12 ff.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Porphyry, *Schol. ad Odys.*, I, 1. The pertinent words may also be found in L. Radermacher's collection "Artium Scriptores" (*supra*, n. 8), pp. 121 f.

<sup>10</sup> The subtitle may, of course, be Alexandrian, or later, but is used

and which some scholars have regarded as a discussion of the three types of style.<sup>11</sup> This treatise on style is listed by Diogenes as the first section of a book of writings which also included the declamations of Odysseus and Ajax, a defense of Orestes, a work comparing Lysias and Isocrates, and a reply to Isocrates' *Amartyros*. The first three and the last of these, and perhaps the fourth also, were cast in the form of speeches, which, it is tempting to believe, may have illustrated the stylistic characteristics which Antisthenes had discussed in the introductory essay. The preserved *Odysseus* and *Ajax* certainly differ greatly in tone as a result of the character of the speaker and might be taken to represent the technique of ἡθοποιία, which was being studied in the time of Antisthenes.<sup>12</sup> If the essay on style discussed the characteristics of individuals and related them to their style of speaking, it would have been dealing with a subject of contemporary interest in which the fragment on πολύτροπος would not at all be out of place, since it takes its start from a discussion of moral character and leads to a discussion of stylistic character. At this early date there is certainly nothing to indicate the existence of a commonplace concerning the three orators, although we see that Homer was already being used as a source of philological research,<sup>13</sup> and the *Odysseus* and *Ajax* show the continuance of the tradition, begun by Gorgias, of epideictic oratory based on Homeric characters.

The identification of the styles of Odysseus, Nestor, and Menelaus with the three *genera dicendi* could not have been accepted until after the appearance of a theory of three styles, which, I have elsewhere<sup>14</sup> concluded, appeared in a clear form first in the *περὶ λέξεως* of Theophrastus, although certain earlier passages show the theory in formation. The topic is, therefore,

of style by Aristophanes (*Pax*, 220). Cf. A. Korte, "Χαρακτήρ," *Hermes*, LXIV (1929), pp. 69 ff., esp. 76.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. A. Rostagni, "Un Nuovo Capitolo della Retorica e delle Sofistica," *Stud. Ital.*, n. s. II (1922), pp. 150 ff.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. H. J. Lulofs, *De Antisthenis studiis rhetoricis* (Amsterdam, 1900), pp. 86 ff.

<sup>13</sup> Cf., e. g., *Cratylus*, 391 D where Homer is cited as an authority on names. On this whole subject cf. W. O. Friedel, "De sophistarum studiis Homericis," *Diss. Philol. Halensis*, 1873, pp. 130 ff.

<sup>14</sup> "Theophrastus and Stylistic Distinction," *H. S. C. P.*, LXII (1956).



primarily one of the Hellenistic age, and it is to that period and its schools that we must now turn.

What was the attitude of the philosophical schools toward rhetoric and when is it most likely that the discovery of rhetorical theory in the Homeric poems might have been used to disprove the contention that rhetoric was an art begun by Corax and Tisias?

Plato's opposition to rhetoric has been much stressed, both in ancient and modern times, on the basis of the *Gorgias*. Certainly he was unsympathetic with the standards of sophistic rhetoric, but the *Phaedrus* contains the outlines of a "philosophical" rhetoric which Aristotle later developed. There are no references even to an interest in rhetoric on the part of the earliest Academics, unless one includes Heraclides Ponticus, who deserted the Academy.<sup>15</sup> In the third century, however, Arcesilaus (scholarch 270-41) seems to have introduced some form of declamation into the exercises of the schools (cf. Cicero, *De Or.*, III, 80), probably in imitation of the similar declamations among the Peripatetics and Stoics. The Academics could hardly afford to ignore such a popular invention. It was not until the time of Carneades in the second century that the Academics took a firm stand against regarding rhetoric as an art<sup>16</sup> (cf. Cicero, *De Or.*, I, 45-6). This attack was carried on by Charmadas, who insisted *nullam artem esse dicendi* (cf. Cicero, *De Or.*, I, 90).

The vigorous Academic attack on rhetoric was not long-lived. Early in the first century Philo had begun *alio tempore rhetorum praecepta tradere, alio philosophorum* (cf. Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.*, II, 9) and from the middle of the century we have Cicero's *Partitiones Oratoriae* which he claims (139) to have drawn *e media nostra Academia*.

The Peripatetics had a much stronger rhetorical tradition. Originally Aristotle, under Platonic influence in the *Gryllus*, attacked the definition of rhetoric as an art (cf. Quintilian, II, 17, 14), but following the usual pattern of his development away from Plato he arrived at the position set forth in the three

<sup>15</sup> He wrote on rhetoric and poetics, cf. Diogenes Laertius, V, 6, 88.

<sup>16</sup> On the revival of the dispute between rhetoric and philosophy in the second century cf. Hans von Arnim, *Leben und Werke des Dio von Prusa* (Berlin, 1898), pp. 87 ff.

books of the extant *Rhetoric*, which do not actually define rhetoric as an art, but certainly treat it as one.<sup>17</sup> The interest in rhetoric among the Peripatetics was carried on by Theophrastus, Eudemus, and Demetrius of Phaleron, and in the third and second centuries B. C. showed an increasing concern with education and rhetorical declamation (cf. Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.*, II, 9), perhaps partly because of the loss of Aristotle's library of speculative works (cf. Strabo, XIII, 54).<sup>18</sup> But in the middle of the second century the Peripatetics, for the only time in their history, turned against the rhetoricians. Critolaus, their leader at the time, is specifically said to have attacked in detail the theory that rhetoric is an art (cf. Quintilian, II, 17, 15 and Sextus Empiricus, *Rhet.*, 12).

It is thus in the middle of the second century that the attack on the nature of rhetoric was made with the greatest intensity.<sup>19</sup> The Epicureans had never been supporters of rhetoric (cf. Quintilian, XII, 2, 24),<sup>20</sup> and even the Stoics, under Diogenes of Babylon, showed signs of hostility, not, it seems, by denying that rhetoric was an art, but by attempting to show that the philosophers were the only real rhetors (cf. Philodemus, I, p. 356 and II, p. 204 Sudhaus). Both before and after this period the Stoics were among the leaders in the development of rhetorical theory (cf. Diogenes Laertius, VII, 1, 42; Quintilian, II, 15, 20). Since the Stoics' grammatical interests and their allegorizing mythological views fostered the study of Homer, it may well have been they who first claimed, probably in the third century B. C., that rhetoric existed in Homer and who thus created an opportunity for an attack on logical consistency. Sudhaus<sup>21</sup>

<sup>17</sup> It is defined as a *δύναμις* (*Rhetoric*, I, 2, 1355b), but is described as *ἐντελεχος* (cf., e. g., I, 1, 1355a). The later rhetoricians regarded Aristotle as having seen the light (cf., e. g., Quintilian, II, 17, 14).

<sup>18</sup> Cf. von Arnim, *op. cit.* (*supra*, n. 16), p. 83.

<sup>19</sup> The reasons for the revival of the attack on rhetoric at this time are well set forth by von Arnim, *op. cit.* The expansion of rhetorical theory by Hermagoras and the increasing interest in rhetoric among the Romans alarmed the philosophers, who sought security in a return to dogmatism.

<sup>20</sup> Philodemus allowed only an art of epideictic, cf. H. M. Hubbell, "The Rhetoric of Philodemus," *Trans. of the Connecticut Acad. of Arts and Sciences*, XXIII (1920), pp. 251 ff.

<sup>21</sup> S. Sudhaus, *Philodemus, Vol. Rhetorica, Supplementum* (Leipzig, 1895), pp. xxxiii ff.

believed that the Philodemus passage above (cf. p. 26) may have been drawn from a dispute between Critolaus the Peripatetic and Diogenes of Babylon in which Diogenes tried to reconcile the existence of Homeric rhetoric and the later invention of the art.<sup>22</sup> If this is correct it may well have been Critolaus who originally conceived the objection. Philodemus regularly drew from second century sources, and in any event, the intellectual currents of the later second century are those which are most likely to have brought the topic to the fore. In the first century B. C. there is a tapering off in the dispute between the philosophers and rhetoricians, at least in regard to the nature of rhetoric. The definition of Atticism became the major bone of contention, and it in turn was displaced by the Theodorean-Apollodorean controversy.

We may now leave the philosophers and turn to the rhetoricians to examine their attitude toward Homeric rhetoric.

We know that the attacks of the philosophers were answered from time to time by the school rhetoricians. At the end of the second century, provoked by the criticism of philosophers, Apollonius of Alabanda *irrisit . . . philosophiam atque contempsit* (cf. Cicero, *De Or.*, I, 75), but we do not know exactly what he said. It is my belief that such replies denied the existence of formal rhetoric in the Homeric poems. It is hard to see what other answer was available. Certainly, despite the frequent references to Homeric rhetoric in later writers, there is no evidence

<sup>22</sup> The usual Stoic position seems to have been that rhetoric is the product of nature, practice, and art. This theory had been developed in sophistic times (cf. Paul Shorey, "*Φύσις, Μελέτη, 'Επιστήμη*," *T. A. P. A.*, XL [1909], pp. 185 ff.) and is the basis for the reconciliation of Homeric rhetoric and sophistic *ars* by Cicero and Quintilian. The best proof that it was held by the Stoics is its appearance in the introduction to the first book of Cicero's *De Inventione* where the progress of man is described as well as the recognition by the sage of the qualities innate in man and the development of rhetoric. It is there concluded (I, 5) that rhetoric is a result of nature, practice, and art. The reference to the sage shows Stoic influence and the whole passage seems to have been drawn from the account of human progress written by the Stoic philosopher Posidonius (cf. R. Philippson, "*Ciceroniana I, De inventione*," *N. J.*, CXXXIII, 6 [1886], pp. 417 ff.). The rhetorical theories of the *De Inventione* are derived from school rhetoricians, but the introduction is philosophical.

to indicate that any Hellenistic rhetorician regarded the history of rhetoric as beginning before the time of Corax and Tisias.

No handbook of rhetoric has been preserved from the third and second centuries B. C. The last extant work of the classical period in Greece is the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* which is innocent of any theory of Homeric rhetoric and refers only once, and that in the spurious introduction, to Corax. It does not include a history of rhetoric.

Of the Greek Hellenistic school rhetoricians only Hermagoras is at all well known, and the fragments of his work contain no hint of a history of rhetoric nor of any reference to Homer.

From the early first century we have the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, which is clearly a product of the rhetorical schools, but which also lacks an historical account of rhetoric. The author assumes a Latin pose and perhaps for that reason deliberately omits references to Greek authors, although he knows their theories and some of his quotations are translations of Greek. There are a few which are drawn from Homer, but the use of an Homeric line to illustrate a figure, especially when translated without comment into Latin, does not prove that the author believed that Homer was acquainted with the art of rhetoric.

More specific evidence may be found in Cicero's early *De Inventione*, which is also largely a product of school rhetoric as opposed to his later writings on the subject, which show a heavy philosophical influence. In the first book (I, 7) we are told that Gorgias was *antiquissimus fere rhetor*. There is not the slightest indication that rhetoric was to be found among the heroes and that Odysseus, Nestor, or Menelaus were "rhetors" in any sense of the word. This same position is found in the second book (II, 6): *Ac veteres quidem scriptores artis usque a principe illo atque inventore Tisia repetitos unum in locum conduxit Aristoteles. . . .* Rhetoric is thus regarded as an art which was invented in Sicily by Corax and Tisias on the authority of Aristotle's *Synagoge Technon*. The statement is in strong contrast to the view which had prevailed among the philosophers in the second half of the preceding century.

Cicero was aware that a difference of opinion existed and once, in the *Brutus* (46), makes an effort to reconcile the two traditions: *artem et praecepta Siculos Coracem et Tisiam con-*

*scripsisse—nam antea neminem solitum via nec arte, sed accurate tamen et descripte plerosque dicere—*. He is here probably influenced by the Stoic belief that rhetoric was a result of nature, practice, and art (cf. *supra*, n. 21), which he accepted in *De Oratore*, I, 113 and which was also accepted by Quintilian (III, 2, 1) and many other rhetoricians.

Quintilian includes an outline history of rhetoric in his third book (III, 1, 1 ff.). It seems to have been drawn from a school source which omitted the Homeric rhetoric so often mentioned in the other parts of the *Institutes* (cf. esp. X, 1, 46 ff.), but Quintilian makes a small addition to avoid the charge of inconsistency: *Nam primum post eos, quos poetae tradiderunt, movisse aliqua circa rhetoricen Empedocles dicitur.*<sup>23</sup> *Artium autem scriptores antiquissimi Corax et Tisias Siculi. . .*

This traditional school history of rhetoric seems usually derived from Aristotle, but when it appears in the *Prolegomena* it has been enriched and even changed by the addition of material about the Sicilian founders. Radermacher has traced the origin of this non-Aristotelian material to the fourth century Sicilian historian Timaeus.<sup>24</sup> Timaeus was a pupil of Isocrates and thus in the non-philosophical rhetorical tradition. He was a logical source for the rhetoricians when they sought to develop the account of the historical beginnings of rhetoric in their dispute with philosophers.

We may conclude this review with a look at Aristides' lengthy reply to Plato's criticism of rhetoric. The first third of this work accepts for the moment Plato's proposition that rhetoric is not an art, but asserts that eloquence is no less good for that reason and is, in fact, god-given. Examples of such eloquence are introduced from Homer, Hesiod, and Pindar. But Aristides is very careful not to use the word *τέχνη* of rhetoric in heroic and archaic times:

οὕτω δὲ ὅλον τοῦ δράματος ὥσπερ ἐξεπίτηδες καὶ διὰ πάντων τῶν ἀξιώχρων Ὅμηρος μαρτυρεῖ μὴ τὴν τέχνην εἶναι κυρίαν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, ἀλλὰ τὸ τῆς φύσεως κράτος καὶ τὸ δοκοῦν τῷ θεῷ

(ed. Dindorf, II, p. 31).

<sup>23</sup> The reference to Empedocles was drawn from Aristotle's *Sophist*, cf. Diogenes Laertius, VIII, 2, 57.

<sup>24</sup> L. Radermacher, "Timaeus und die Ueberlieferung ueber den Ursprung der Rhetorik" ("Studien zur Geschichte der griechischen Rhetorik"), *Rh. M.*, LII (1897), pp. 412 ff.



This does not mean, however, that rhetoric is really not an art. It was the natural ability for eloquence which, in turn, in historical times (Aristides does not specify when) invented the *techne*.

οὐ γὰρ αἱ τέχναι τὰς φύσεις ἐποίησαν, ἀλλ' αἱ κράτισται φύσεις τὰς βελτίστας τῶν τεχνῶν εὗρον . . . (ed. Dindorf, II, p. 33).

He continues with a sophistic demonstration of the fact that art is better than nature and its discoverers better than those who have natural eloquence.

We saw in the *Prolegomenon* a belief that the art was introduced as the result of some specific historical need.<sup>25</sup> Aristides seizes upon this belief in his rebuttal of Plato's claim that rhetoric is only an attempt to imitate justice:

γνοίη δ' ἂν τις εἰ σκέψαιτο τὴν φύσιν αὐτῆς καὶ ὑπερ τίνων καὶ πηλίκων τὸ κατ' ἀρχὰς εὐρέθη καὶ τί πράττει καὶ ποιεῖ διὰ τέλους (ed. Dindorf, II, p. 63).

It has not, so far as I know, been pointed out that Aristides is making use of a traditional reply to the philosophers which was developed by earlier rhetoricians,<sup>26</sup> but it is not surprising that he should do so. His defense of rhetoric is one of the most extensive that we have and represents the fullest development of one side of a debate which was then five hundred years old. Aristides does not, however, specifically mention the rhetoric of Odysseus, Nestor, and Menelaus, nor that of Corax and Tisias, nor does he specifically contrast the two types of eloquence. There was nothing in Plato's attack to require him to do so, and these specific details would be obvious, I believe, to his audience.

This account of the topic of Homeric rhetoric, which seems to me to accord with logic and with all the existing evidence, may be summarized as follows: the studies of the Stoic gram-

<sup>25</sup> It is perhaps partly against this same belief that Quintilian argues in III, 2, 2 when he denies that a need for defense brought forth the art of rhetoric, although he seems to have in mind some rhetoricians who said that an art of defense historically preceded an art of offense.

<sup>26</sup> André Boulanger, *Aelius Aristide* (Paris, 1923) contents himself (pp. 232 ff.) with pointing out certain similarities between the speech and points made by Isocrates and Cicero, among which he includes the divine origin of eloquence.



marians led them to note in the Homeric poems certain passages which bore a superficial similarity to later rhetorical theory. They thus concluded that the Homeric heroes should be regarded as rhetoricians, and Homer was thus the fount of still another virtue. The school rhetoricians had always regarded their art as having been invented by Corax and Tisias in the fifth century in Sicily. In the middle of the second century the philosophical schools became alarmed at the growing power of rhetorical studies and sought to disprove its claim that it was an art. In so doing they fixed on the belief that the Homeric heroes were rhetoricians and asked, "How, if rhetoric is an art, could it have existed before the art was invented?" The schoolmasters replied by denying the existence of rhetoric in Homer and insisting that the art was invented in the fifth century. This topic was still vital when Quintilian wrote in the late first century of our era; its logical basis, though not its specific details, is clearly seen in Aristides, and it still found a supporter in the author of the *Prolegomenon* at the very end of antiquity.

GEORGE A. KENNEDY.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

# ON I. G., II<sup>2</sup>, 3194.

The exact version of the formula in I. G., II<sup>2</sup>, 3194 may be confidently supplied from *P. Cattaoui*, III, where a decision in 117 A. D. of the Prefect of Egypt, M. Rutilius Lupus, begins Λούπος λαλήσας μετὰ τῶν φίλων εἶπεν. The usual phrase (see *A. J. P.*, LXIX [1948], pp. 438 f.) is σκεψάμενος μετὰ τῶν συνεδρεόντων ἀνέγνω ἀπόφασιν (or εἶπεν).

In line 4 of the Athenian inscription, accordingly, the missing seven-letter variant of σκεψάμενος emerges as λαλήσας. Since I. G., II<sup>2</sup>, 3194, though datable in or near A. D. 147/8, is nevertheless engraved in the Old Attic alphabet, lines 4-5 above the decision (of the imperial legate Aemilius Iuncus) read:

Ἰοῦγκ[ος λαλέσα]ς μ[ετ]ὰ τῶν συνεδρεόντο[ν]  
ἀνέγ[ν]ο [ἀπόφασιν].

JAMES H. OLIVER.

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY.

## SUNKEN IMAGERY IN SOPHOCLES' *OEDIPUS*.

That the ancient poetic image has been for the most part neglected<sup>1</sup> is nothing to be wondered at. The difficulties are numerous. And yet until this avenue is fully explored we cannot really be said to have understood Greek and Latin poetry. This can only be done by entering into the *vis imaginativa* of the ancient poet and showing how symbols were actually created. Indeed several schools of modern literary criticism<sup>2</sup> have provided us with what constitutes a veritable arsenal of technical equipment. It only remains to be fully exploited in the field of ancient poetry.

It should be said by way of preface that every artistic creation is inextricably bound up with the artist's concrete spatio-temporal environment. And very often the more ancient a piece of poetry is, the more difficult it becomes to re-create the relationships which the poet had with his prospective audience and with the life of his times. Most often we have nothing but the dead letter on the page—and Plato in the *Phaedrus*<sup>3</sup> has warned us of the deception of the word once it falls from the pen—and we must work from there. For the ancient poet knew how to make his communication, the presentation of his feelings and experiences, capture the sympathy of the audience for which he wrote; he is hardly to be blamed for being unaware of the particular sort of imagery, compression of ideas and poetic logic which might appeal to future literary critics. That what he says

<sup>1</sup> But see, however, Walter Porzig, *Die attische Tragödie des Aischylos* (Leipzig, 1926), esp. pp. 55-72; F. R. Earp, *The Style of Sophocles* (Cambridge, 1944), and *The Style of Aeschylus* (Cambridge, 1948), esp. pp. 99 ff.; R. F. Goheen, *The Imagery of Sophocles' Antigone* (Princeton, 1951); F. J. H. Letters, *The Life and Work of Sophocles* (London, 1951); cf. also Gilbert Norwood, *Pindar* (Berkeley, 1945).

<sup>2</sup> E. g., William Empson, *Seven Types of Ambiguity* (London, 1953<sup>a</sup>); Rosamund Tuve, *Elizabethan and Metaphysical Imagery: Renaissance Poetic and Twentieth-Century Critics* (Chicago, 1947); René Wellek and Austin Warren, *Theory of Literature* (London, 1949; repr. 1954), esp. pp. 190 ff.; W. K. Wimsatt, Jr., and M. C. Beardsley, *The Verbal Icon: Studies in the Meaning of Poetry* (University of Kentucky, 1954). Cf. also the bibliography listed by Goheen, *op. cit.*, pp. 158-65.

<sup>3</sup> *Phaedr.*, 275 C-E.

does, often enough, "involve" a modern trained reader is surely a sign of special power; and that his poetic textures and his meaning-sequences sometimes fail to interest us should hardly cause us to wonder.

Even though I risk the wrath of modern critics, I should like to suggest four important qualities which have been found in ancient as well as modern poetry in varying degrees. They are i) the prosodic element (rhythm, rhyme, assonance, etc.), ii) a peculiar compression of ideas (which avoids the complete exposition of ordinary prose), iii) a kind of image-logic based on analogy and association, and iv) a special choice of words (again in a way that avoids the suggestion of prose). Now it would appear that, apart from other differences, the ancient poet made very much of element i; and allowing, too, that ancient poetry could, by convention, be much more "didactic" than our own, the ancient poet apparently felt that he had completed his work if he simply put moral lessons, philosophy, astronomy, an art of composition into *certi pedes modique*. Horace, it is true, follows Aristotle's point of view in suggesting that more than mere meter is necessary: there has to be *acer spiritus ac vis*;

ingenium cui sit, cui mens divinior atque os  
magna sonaturum, des nominis huius honorem.<sup>4</sup>

But Horace contradicts his own doctrine; and surely nothing is to be gained by calling his *Sermones* (and even some of the *carmina*) *sermo merus*, "mere prose." For when all is said, so much of ancient poetry (and Horace is not excluded) seems to have consisted of little crumbs from the philosopher's table, put in less technical language and served up in stichic or non-stichic verse. But, as I have suggested, the reason for this is to be sought not always in the poet's lack of genius or imagination (although this may at times be the case) but rather in the particular, concrete artistic obligations which the poet experienced in relation to his audience.

Of elements i and iv in Sophocles perhaps too much has been said. Here I should like to take up element iii, the poet's use of imagery, particularly as it occurs in the *Oedipus*. And it should be noted that the particular fallacy which is committed

<sup>4</sup> *Serm.*, I, 4, 45 f.; for a comment, see L. P. Wilkinson, *Horace and His Lyric Poetry* (Cambridge, 1951<sup>2</sup>), pp. 102 ff.

in this matter is the fallacy of "image-counting," of noting the number of times an image occurs, or the number of lines devoted to it, or (worst of all) the various categories of ancient life and culture from which the images have been drawn. The truth is that the most important thing to be sought for is the effectiveness of the image, i. e., the relationship between the symbol and what is symbolized, the degree of interpenetration between the sensuous part (or what I. A. Richards has called the *vehicle*) and the "doctrinal" element (or the *tenor*); and, finally, the specific significance which the symbol or image has for the meaning of the poem. It is thus the artistic function of the image, in the fullest sense of the word, which is the most important element of this sort of analysis.

Now in the *Oedipus* Sophocles proceeds by laying down a series of fundamental images; then, in the course of the play, the most important of these (the predominant or leading images) are taken up and developed like musical themes and allowed to acquire deeper connotations as the play comes to a close. It is this developmental process, and particularly Sophocles' use of predominant images, which we wish to illustrate here.

In the first part of the play, up till the end of the *Parodos*, the chief image would appear to be that of the great plague; and in Sophocles' hands it is not only an image but also a symbol. Further, it should be recalled that for the Greeks as well as the Romans the word "plague" (*λοιμός*) had no definite pathological denotation, and the vague definition given by Caelius Aurelianus, *declivitas in aegritudinem prona atque celeberrima, communibus antecedentibus causis*,<sup>5</sup> remained dominant for a long time. In any case, how far Sophocles in the *Oedipus* incorporated the actual symptoms of the great Athenian plague, or what was the real nature of the plague as described by Thucydides, need not concern us here.<sup>6</sup> But it may perhaps

<sup>5</sup> Caelius Aurelianus, *On Acute Diseases*, and *On Chronic Diseases* (edited and translated by I. E. Drabkin [Chicago, 1950]), I, 12, p. 8.

<sup>6</sup> Besides the general fact of serious epidemic, the only details common to Thucydides' account of the plague and Sophocles' *Oedipus* are the fever (*O. T.*, 25, 191; cf. Thuc., II, 49, 8) and the numerous unburied bodies bearing contagion (*O. T.*, 180; cf. Thuc., II, 50). In the Hippocratic work, *Epidemics*, I, 16 (ed. W. H. S. Jones [Loeb Library, I, 1939]), we find the complication of puerperal fever accompanying an

be important to note that the Theban plague created by Sophocles is not only what we today would call an epidemic (affecting human beings); there is, as well, a blight on plants (*O. T.*, 25, 254), and an epizootic among the cattle (*O. T.*, 26). Further, the symptoms of the epidemic are complicated by the occurrence of what would seem to be puerperal fever (*O. T.*, 26, 173-4), affecting, therefore, merely the women in childbirth. Now whether or not we may find historical examples of such a coincidence, the additional details of the blight and the puerperal fever are, I think, significant for the symbolism. For it would appear that Sophocles has conceived of the divinely sent plague as a daemonic force attacking the very sources of life—and here the word *καρπός* (254), both fruit and offspring, is important—for Oedipus' unwitting crime has, for the Greek mind at least, caused a profound disturbance in those laws which govern relationships between parents and offspring. For this he has incurred a ritual defilement, a *μίασμα*, and it was only fitting that the penalty inflicted on Thebes should somehow symbolize the nature of the crime.

It is a commonplace that the Greek notion of *μίασμα* is for modern Western minds an extremely difficult one. For it was, in a sense, a kind of moral guilt without implying the full knowledge and culpability which we demand with our Western, or perhaps more Roman, approach to moral problems. But perhaps the best analogy may be taken from medicine. *μίασμα* is incurred as though it were a disease, without full awareness being necessary; it is infectious and can defile a family and an entire city, and even perhaps be transmitted by heredity; and it may be cured by isolating the defiled individual from the com-

epidemic. For the best discussion of the entire problem of the Athenian plague, see D. L. Page, "Thucydides' Description of the Great Plague at Athens," *C. Q.*, XLVII (= N. S. III) (1953), pp. 96-119. Page's view, that the plague was a peculiarly virulent form of measles has not yet won general acceptance; and the older view (holding that it was a typhus epidemic) is defended by Sir William P. MacArthur in *C. Q.*, XLVIII (= IV) (1954), pp. 171-4. Bernard M. W. Knox, "The Date of the *Oedipus Tyrannus* of Sophocles," *A. J. P.*, LXXVII (1956), pp. 132-47 makes excellent use of the technical details of the Athenian plague in order to arrive at a revision of the play's traditional dating; but his correlation remains difficult in view of Sophocles' use of poetic symbolism in some, at least, of the symptoms which he uses in the play.

munity and having him undergo certain ritual purifications imposed by the god offended or by his legitimate ministers.<sup>7</sup> It is only, of course, an analogy: but it was perhaps some such association of ideas which for Sophocles made the Athenian plague (with the various changes which Sophocles adopted) an extremely suggestive symbol for the opening movement of the *Oedipus*.

From the plague-symbolism we pass on to the symbolism of the ship. The origins of the ship-metaphor to describe the city-state (or even a political faction within the community, as we find it in Alcaeus) need not concern us here.<sup>8</sup> For Sophocles it is, all through the play, a kind of "sunken metaphor" not always explicitly coming to the surface. It first appears in the speech of the priest of Zeus, who says that

the city, as you are aware, is already dangerously tossing, and it cannot raise its prow from the depths of the empurpled swell (21-3).

In *phóivos* (really "blood-red") we have the point of fusion between the ship-imagery and that of the destructive plague. It is clear throughout that Thebes is the ship now becoming "empty of crew" (55-6); it is "blood that is causing the stormy weather" (101). Oedipus, of course, is the captain or pilot, who in the past has steered according to course (104, 695-6); his "crew" become terrified to see him frightened (922-3), for they had been accustomed to sleep peacefully under his guidance (1221-2; 586?). And the path that Oedipus eventually adopts is, he feels, the "only cure" for his ailing subjects (68, 60-1); he thinks that his own sickness is one of sympathy (61), but he is unaware how ironically true it is that no one of his people is as sick as he.

Intimately connected with the ship-metaphor is that of the harbor-haven symbolism which is first applied to Oedipus by the mouth of Teiresias (421-3):

<sup>7</sup> See the classic treatment by Erwin Rohde, *Psyche: Seelencult und Unsterblichkeitsglaube der Griechen* (2 vols., Tübingen, 1925<sup>9</sup>), II, pp. 75 ff. See also W. K. C. Guthrie, *The Greeks and Their Gods* (London, 1954), and M. P. Nilsson, *Geschichte der griechischen Religion* (Munich, 1941), I, pp. 83 f.

<sup>8</sup> On Alcaeus, see Denys Page, *Sappho and Alcaeus* (Oxford, 1955), pp. 179 ff.



What haven (λιμήν) will there not be to receive your cry . . . when you become aware of the marriage into which you have sailed as into a harborless (haven), although you had a fair voyage!

Actually the idea of an "inhospitable harbor" had first been put forward by the Chorus in their petition in the *Parodos* (196 f.), where they prayed that the plague-god Ares might be dispatched ἐς τὸν ἀπόξενον ὄρμον, the savage region of the Euxine sea. They are unaware that they are really praying for the exile of Oedipus himself. Again, in the *stasimon* which follows the great revelation (Aristotle's *peripeteia* and *anagnorisis*), the Chorus pictures the marriage of Oedipus and Jocasta as a harbor-haven (1208-10):

The same great harbor (λιμήν) sufficed for you as son, as it did your father, to enter as bridegroom.

Here is a passage full of ambiguities: for the Greek may well mean that it sufficed for Oedipus "both as a father and as a son" (as Jebb takes it), but I think both levels of meaning are involved. Further, the word I translate "enter" (πρσεῖν) to fit the context, means, of course, "to fall" and this may have various connotations: to fall into someone's arms, to fall as to one's lot, to be ruined, and, finally, to fall as a new-born baby.<sup>9</sup> And λιμήν is an obvious symbol for the womb. Thus in this one choral passage, the image of the ship, the harbor, and the mystery of fate and human birth are interwoven. Further, it is immediately followed by the symbolism of the plough and the field (1210-11) which is familiar to us from other ancient sources.<sup>10</sup> The ploughed and planted field is another symbolic undercurrent in the play (cf. 1257, 1485, 1497 f.); Oedipus

<sup>9</sup> See *L. S. J.*, s. vv. πίπτω and λιμήν (where Empedocles, B 98, 3 [Diels-Kranz<sup>2</sup>, I, 346, 21] is cited). On the connection between water and fertility images, see also R. B. Onians, *The Origins of European Thought about the Body, the Mind, the Soul, the World, Time, and Fate* (Cambridge, 1954<sup>2</sup>), pp. 272 ff., although his conclusions are not all equally acceptable.

<sup>10</sup> Cf., e. g., *Antigone*, 569; and see *L. S. J.*, s. v. ἀρόω and its cognates. Cf. also the ceremony of the carrying of the Plough in Alcman, *Partheneion*, 61 ff., on which see Page's commentary (Oxford, 1951), pp. 78 f., together with my suggestion on the interpretation of this image as a fertility symbol in *C. W.*, XLVI (1953), p. 240.

had used the word even before he was aware of his own birth (*ἑμόςσπορος*, 260 and 460, with obvious irony); and I am not sure that his curse upon the criminal's harvest and progeny (270-1) are not part of the same texture.

In any case it is clear how the imagery has shifted. For now instead of being the pilot of the ship of State, Oedipus becomes, as it were, the ship itself. His life up till now, as slayer of the Sphinx and savior of Thebes, has been a "fair voyage" (*εὐπλοία*). But the harbor to which he has at last returned, his mother's womb, is no harbor at all—or at least it is one in which he should never have sought a haven. The marriage which for Greek men would have been the climax of their career was, in this case, one forbidden by the laws of gods and men.

From the ship-metaphor on its second level we can also perhaps see how the poet has passed almost imperceptibly to the metaphor of the plough and the arable land: the obvious analogy between the motion of a ship over the sea and that of the plough over the field leaving a furrow behind it. In Sophocles, of course, the connection is not explicit. In fact, as Rudolf Pfeiffer has said, the ship-plough image is not certain until we find, in a fragment of Callimachus, sailors referred to as "ploughmen of the sea."<sup>11</sup> But in Sophocles the suggestion is, I feel, nonetheless present.

The infectious plague, the rocking ship, the womb-haven of Oedipus and the mysteries of procreation suggested by the ploughed field—this is the image-chain which, it would appear, is predominant throughout the *Oedipus*. There are, however, a number of other images which, though not so extensive, are in their place important. There is the bipolar image vision-blindness, which seems also to be connected with the ideas of wit-stupidity (particularly in connection with the solving of the riddle), revelation-darkness.

Oedipus' wit or intelligence first occurs in the Priest's praise for his crushing of the Sphinx (37-9); it is obviously the same talent which, in the play, he is going to use to solve the murder of Laius (120-1), and he will scrutinize every possible clue (220-1, 291); it is here, says Teiresias (440), that Oedipus is most skilled, and it is precisely this that will damn him (442).<sup>12</sup>

<sup>11</sup> Callimachus, fr. 572 (Pfeiffer, I, p. 401), and the literature cited.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. also the punning "know-nothing Oedipus" (*O. T.*, 397), which

But here we have the familiar antinomy: in his vision, Oedipus is blind (367), whereas Teiresias, though blind, can see. In the enigmatic lines, Oedipus taunts Teiresias:

Night alone is your nurse, and hence you cannot harm me  
or anyone who sees the light (374-5).

The reference here is difficult: Oedipus apparently suggests that Teiresias is like a child that still must be protected by the women; as a child is kept in the women's part of the household, so Teiresias is kept from the truth, in Oedipus' view, by a perpetual night. He thus cannot harm those who see the light: but the irony of the line is that Oedipus does not really see the light, and his physical self-blinding at the end of the play is merely the outward symbol of his earlier self-delusion. There are many other references throughout to this vision-blindness motif, but they ultimately revolve about this central paradox. I should like to think, too, that Sophocles is here suggesting the deeper problem of man's vision of the world and of its meaning: that what counts for blindness and narrowness on earth is perhaps the deeper vision into the forces which rule the world. But it may be that Sophocles is, after all, merely playing with paradoxes and we cannot be sure.

Another image train which is subordinate to the wit-stupidity theme is the hunting or tracking metaphor. This first emerges in Oedipus' reference to "the obscure trace of such an ancient crime" (109; and cf. 220-1, where he solicits help), with Creon's sententious reply, that "what is searched for is found" (110-11). Here, of course, on the first level the reference is to the death of Laius; but the line can also be taken to refer to the "ancient crime" or, rather, mystery surrounding Oedipus' birth. The hunting theme is taken up by the Chorus in the first *stasimon*, as they picture Apollo and the *Keres* unerringly following the criminal (469 ff.); here the murderer, in a passage which has not yet found a satisfactory solution (475 ff.), is pictured as a frantic beast, separated from the herd, stumbling among rocks and wild underbrush in an attempt to escape its pursuers.

is perhaps also to be taken as a denial of the title *εὖ εἰδώς* used of seers and prophets (on which see E. Fraenkel, *Agamemnon* [Oxford, 1950], p. 422), and the reference in the trochaic lines at the play's end (1525), if these are authentic. On the Riddle of the Sphinx, cf. also Fraenkel's remarks, *Agamemnon*, pp. 581 f.

But the tracking image is, apparently, soon dropped, and it is perhaps mere speculation to connect it with the Chorus' words in the last *stasimon*: "Time that sees all has found you out against your will" (1213), or yet in Oedipus' reference to the *daimon* that sprang upon him (1311). The latter is more probably connected with the obscure imagery (perhaps taken from jumping contests) used by the Chorus as they first see the blind Oedipus coming forth from the palace:

Poor man, what madness has attacked you? What *daimon* has leaped upon your unhappy life with a surpassing great bound? (1299-1302.)

There are indeed other metaphors connected with ancient athletics, such as the "wrestling-lock" that is favorable for the city, and the hold that the Chorus claims to have upon the champion god (879-81). I think that there are here overtones of the same sort of religious thinking which we find in the story of Jacob wrestling with the angel in Genesis 32, 24-6, but the imagery is hardly important for the fundamental theme of the play. There is also Oedipus' superior bowmanship which the Chorus speaks of (1197 f.), but the image seems to be purely decorative without further significance. There is the image of the walled city (56); Oedipus, in fact, had stood, says the Chorus, as a "fortified wall against death" (1200 f.). In fact, the familiar image of the climbing and falling of *Hybris* to the deepest ruin (874 ff.) probably refers to the scaling of a city wall during a siege. In fact, one is inevitably reminded of the fall of the Argive Capaneus that forms such a vivid picture in the *Parodos* of the *Antigone*.<sup>13</sup> The concrete imagery here would seem to foreshadow the more abstract statement of the Chorus later on (1189-96) about the rise and fall of Oedipus; but this we will consider further on.

It is not our intention to consider here all the metaphorical words and expressions used in the play. In some cases, particularly in ancient poetry, it is not always clear how far an original metaphor remains semantically operative. In other cases the symbolism is clearly of a minor sort. For example, in the *Oedipus* there is the interesting image of the *βάσανος*, the slate-like piece of rock or basanite which the ancient used for testing

<sup>13</sup> *Antigone*, 131 ff.

the purity of gold and silver by noting the color of the streak left on the basanite by the metal to be tested. The Chorus in the first *stasimon* (494 ff.) wishes that it had some such tangible "touchstone" to determine the issue between Oedipus and Teiresias. On a deeper level, perhaps, they are asking for a criterion of truth and falsity, between moral good and evil (cf. 895 f.); and Sophocles would appear to be suggesting that human issues are never of the sort that can be solved by such simple empirical means. But it may be that I am pressing the symbolism too far.

Another minor image which should not escape us is that of the scales which incline towards Oedipus' guilt (847; and cf. perhaps 961, the *ροπή* or "tilt" which puts old men to sleep). One is perhaps reminded of the so-called *Kerostasia*, or the Homeric image of Zeus weighing the *Keres*; <sup>14</sup> but perhaps the metaphor had already become somewhat otiose.

But in image-analyses the temptation is usually to ignore or to underestimate those ideas which are put forward with little or no demonstrable imagery. And yet it may be that, contrary to the principle which usually operates in modern poetry, the ancient poet's most important ideas were not developed by means of imagery or symbolism. If this is true, too close a scrutiny of the ancient poetic image might lead us away from what the ancients considered the most important element of their poetry. Again, very often it is impossible for us to recapture the actual sensuous object which the ancient poet meant to portray. In the *Oedipus*, for example, one of the most striking passages of the play, the opening of the second *stasimon*, remains tantalizingly obscure. There the Chorus of Theban elders sings of the "high-footed laws" (*νόμοι ὑψίποδες*), who are sons of Olympus born in the highest region of the heavens, the *aither*, and having within them "a divine nature which can never be put to sleep by Lethe and can never grow old" (865 ff.). Here the poet would seem to be creating a new form of divine spirits that walk or live in the upper regions of heaven, emanating by some mysterious birth from the gods themselves. Nor are they born of a particular god: rather it is Olympus, the vague heavenly region which was the god's dwelling place, which is called their father. Here we have a language that is not directly sensuous;

<sup>14</sup> Cf. Nilsson, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 206 f.



it is in fact pre-philosophic. And yet it represents perhaps one of the most important phases of Sophocles' poetic thought: for here ultimately is the suprahuman, even supra-Olympian, level of reality which is the cause of the world's moral order and against which, by an inscrutable law, Oedipus has grievously offended.

Our feeling here is perhaps supported by another passage which, on any reading of the play, is surely important: it is the well-known Solonic section of the last *stasimon* (1189-96):

What man, what man is there that ever enjoys more than  
a mere semblance of happiness, and after his period of  
deception fades away? Taking a lesson from your *daimon*,  
Oedipus, from your fate, how can I call any mortal creature  
blessed?

Now whether or not we consider this passage in conjunction with the so-called trochaic *epimythion* at the end of the play (1524-30),<sup>15</sup> it is clear that the Solonic dictum, "Call no man happy until he is dead,"<sup>16</sup> is eminently exemplified in the person of

<sup>15</sup> Despite the number of scholars who have accepted the last six trochaic lines of the play, I must agree with those who have rejected them since the time of H. van Herwerden (1851), F. Ritter (1870), the edition of Schneidewin-Nauck-Bruhn (1910), and A. C. Pearson (Oxford, 1924; repr. 1953). In spite of the numerous emendations suggested (e.g., by Martin, Musgrave, Ellendt, Stanley, and others), it is difficult to reconcile the grammatical inconsistencies; and Wal-dock's excuse for them, "a piece of scrollwork absently drawn . . . hardly meant to be listened to but to be drowned in the rustle of departure" (*Sophocles the Dramatist* [Cambridge, 1951], p. 157) only serves, for all its wit, to point up the difficulty. As the lines stand, the address to the citizens of Thebes cannot logically be put into the mouth of the chorus-leader; and thus, despite the obvious weakness of the lines, the Scholiast has assigned them to Oedipus. This would seem the most reasonable position, if the lines are at all to be accepted, and has been followed, e.g., by J. Hartung (1850-1), F. H. M. Blaydes (1859), Wilamowitz (cf. *Hermes*, XXXIII [1899], pp. 55 ff.), M. Pohlenz (*Die griechische Tragödie* [Göttingen, 1954], p. 215), and E. Fraenkel (*Agamemnon*, pp. 803 f.), and allowed as a possibility by Bowra (*Sophoclean Tragedy* [Oxford, 1944], p. 175). But any solution of the problem seems unsatisfactory and the passage must be abandoned as a *locus desperatus*.

<sup>16</sup> See the entire passage in Herodotus, I, 26 ff. describing Solon's visit to King Croesus. It is possible that Jocasta's description of Oedipus' anxiety, "he does not judge the old in accordance with the



Oedipus. For Solon the happy life, on which a μακαρισμός may be pronounced after death, is the ordinary life of the Greek of moderate circumstances, who has enjoyed good health and the blessings of a family without necessarily attaining wealth or political eminence. But Solon's doctrine on the divine "envy" and the confusion into which the gods delight in throwing the prosperous is not certainly explicit in the Sophoclean play. In any case, the Solonic idea, which is undoubtedly a reflection of a commonplace Athenian way of consoling good folk who did not enjoy the "blessings" of wealth or fame, must be taken into account in any interpretation of the *Oedipus*; and yet, as I have suggested, it is not an idea which can be adequately treated in a study which restricts its interpretation merely to what is expressed in directly sensuous imagery.

One final element of the play remains to be mentioned,<sup>17</sup> the conflict that the poet sets up between the oracles on the one side

new" (*O. T.*, 916), reflects another saying attributed to Solon: τὰ ἀφανῆ τοῖς φανεροῖς τεκμαίρου (n. 20 in Diels-Kranz,<sup>6</sup> I, 63, 22 f.). It may be noted that Creon's attitude at the end of the play (e. g. 1422 ff.) fits in with the commonsense dictum attributed to Pittacus of Lesbos, "Do not revile the unfortunate" (n. 5, Diels-Kranz<sup>6</sup>, I, 64, 13 f.), and with the general Solonic advice on prudence in speech (cf. Diels-Kranz<sup>6</sup>, I, 63, 21 f.). On the other hand, Laius in his attack on the traveller Oedipus (*O. T.*, 804 ff.) offended against the Greek code of courtesy on the road as laid down, reportedly, by Chilon of Sparta (n. 17, Diels-Kranz<sup>6</sup>, I, 63, 33 f.).

<sup>17</sup> I have not thought it necessary to comment on the great curse which Oedipus pronounces upon himself (249-51), which becomes an important element in the play from a dramatic point of view. Like a *defixio*, it has an almost magical effect which remains irreversible and operates even against the will of the one who has pronounced it (cf. *O. T.*, 350 ff., 816 ff., 1381 f.). Cf. Nilsson, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 758 f., with the literature there cited. A minor image (or element) which I have not treated because of its obscurity, is Oedipus' reference to himself as a child of Fortune (1080 ff.) and his relatives, "the months, who have made me great and small." My tentative view of this passage is that it contains a reference to primitive astrology. The months, with a reference to the waxing and waning of the moon, represent the twelve houses of the Zodiac. Certainly in later astrological authors (cf. *L. S. J.*, v. s. Τυχὴ V), Fortune is used of the sun, the moon, and even of some of the zodiacal houses. In any case, the passage reflects Oedipus' complete rejection of what might be called orthodox Greek piety and his abandonment to the blind forces symbolized by the constellations and the heavenly bodies.

and Oedipus and Jocasta on the other. Though Zeus and his son, Apollo, are *ἐννεοί* (499), the attitude of Jocasta and Oedipus is quite human and understandable. They fear that the replies will come true, while they attempt to frustrate them or even interpret them in non-literal ways. Thus, in the case of Polybus, Oedipus interprets the oracle's words (e.g., "Oedipus will murder his father") as referring to death "out of longing" for his son (969-70); and Oedipus' marriage with his mother is interpreted by Jocasta as referring to a common dream (981-4) which is not taken seriously by men. The material is handled skilfully by Sophocles and fits in with the previously mentioned imagery of wit-stupidity and blindness-darkness, particularly since Teiresias is represented as the concrete embodiment of the implacable infallibility of the divine decrees. The oracles are, after all, a grimmer and, for men, a more tangible aspect of the "laws that walk on high." But their importance in the play, especially if taken in isolation, should not be overstressed. Very often, it would seem, the Athenian playwright had recourse to oracles as a convenient device in the machinery of plot motivation. Though I am far from saying that this is the sole function of the oracles in the *Oedipus*, it remains true that it would seem to be reading too much into our text to understand the play as a piece of religious propaganda, a religious tract in defence of Delphi.

It is not my intention here to criticize the profound analyses of the play that have been given to us by Bowra, Waldo, and Whitman, to name only a few in the English-speaking world,<sup>18</sup> but merely to discuss what information could be gathered from image-analysis, or (to use a barbaric word which has gained currency) the technique of iconics. Thus my discussion may be summarized by the following list (though lists are always inadequate) of the five dominant images of the play, the six minor ones and the four important non-imagist elements (with various sublevels of meaning indicated):

---

<sup>18</sup> For a recent bibliography, see J. O. Opstelten, *Sophocles and Greek Pessimism* (transl. by J. A. Ross [Amsterdam, 1952]), esp. pp. 240-3, and add the Sophoclean references listed by T. B. L. Webster, "Greek Tragedy," in *Fifty Years of Classical Scholarship* (ed. by M. Platnauer [Oxford, 1954]), pp. 71-95, with the additions and comments of G. F. Else, *C. W.*, XLIX (1956), pp. 121-5.

A) *The Dominant Images:*

- A1. The plague = 1. the god-sent punishment  
2. the *μίασμα* emanating from Oedipus
- A2. The ship = 1. the city of Thebes under King Oedipus as pilot  
2. Oedipus himself
- A3. The havenless harbor = 1. the Euxine Sea  
2. the marriage of Oedipus and Jocasta  
3. Jocasta's maternal womb
- A4. The plough and field = 1. the marriage of Laius and Jocasta  
2. the marriage of Oedipus and Jocasta
- A5. Vision-blindness (Wit-stupidity) = 1. Oedipus' solving of the riddle of the Sphinx and Teiresias' apparent failure  
2. Oedipus' physical sight and Teiresias' blindness  
3. Oedipus' unawareness of the truth and Teiresias' innate gift  
4. Oedipus' final vision which leads to his self-inflicted blindness

B) *The Minor Images:*

- B1. The animal hunt = 1. Oedipus' attempt to "track" the murderer with the help of the Thebans (esp. by means of the Curse: cf. non-imagist element 3)  
2. the pursuit of the guilty (Oedipus) by Apollo and the *Keres*
- B2. The basanite touchstone = 1. a clue to the conflict between Laius and Oedipus  
2. a criterion to decide between the wisdom of Oedipus and that of Teiresias  
3. a general criterion between real and apparent prosperity (cf. non-imagist element 4), a general solution for all religious and moral truth (?)

- B3. City walls = 1. Oedipus is Thebes' fortress against death  
 2. Hybris' vain attempt to scale the walls (like Capaneus?)  
 3. Oedipus' apparent climb and actual fall (? cf. non-imagist element 4)
- B4. Athletic competition  
 4a. prowess in bowmanship = Oedipus as a superior city-ruler  
 4b. prowess in leaping = the superior leap of the *daimon* upon Oedipus
- B5. Wrestling = 1. clinging to the god who is protector and champion  
 2. not disturbing a conflict between classes that is healthy for the city
- B6. Inclination of the scales = 1. the suspicion of Oedipus' guilt  
 2. the "tilt" that kills the elderly (= the "tilt" that killed Laius?)  
 3. the sinking of the *Keres* against Oedipus (?)

C) *The Non-Imagist (Non-Symbolic) Elements:*

- C1. The world of human morality ultimately depends upon the divine *Nomoi* who live in the upper regions of heaven.
- C2a. The conflict between the infallibility of Delphi and the fear and suspicions of men;  
 2b. the unbending attitude of the god's ministers and men's distrust;  
 2c. the conflict between the divine ordination and men's actions.
- C3. The irreversible effect of Oedipus' solemn curse.
- C4a. The Solonic doctrine of avoiding untimely *μακαρισμός* is illustrated (as in a *παράδειγμα*) in Oedipus;  
 4b. Solon's implicit praise for the simple life of moderation;  
 4c. the avoidance of the divine *φθόνος* (?).

It is clear that these headings with their subdivisions do not pretend to exhaust all the possible sublevels of meaning and ambiguity, but they may perhaps serve as a foundation for further study.

By way of conclusion it may be said that, on the basis of our analysis, it would appear impossible to suggest a single center or focal point for the play taken as a whole. Rather it is like an ancient narrative frieze which, for all its charm, would not have a unified light-source or a single perspective point; or perhaps one might compare a piece of ancient Greek music enriched with many different rhythms and melodic phrases, without necessarily being dominated by a single theme in our modern sense of the word.

From the point of view of image-analysis, the most important element is clearly the interlocking image-sequence which begins with the plague and enfolds, like the solving of an ancient *γρίφος* (or perhaps the revelation of a mystery ritual), with the gradual revelation of the nature of Oedipus' awful defilement. But even this image-chain cannot be fully understood apart from the non-symbolic elements of the play. It may be that modern criticism has overestimated the importance of finding a unified interpretation in a work of literature. And I would therefore suggest that to search for a single dominant theme, whether it be religious (as in the case of Bowra's brilliant paedagogic theory of the play) or non-religious (as it has been developed by Waldock and others), is perhaps to look for a will-o'-the-wisp. It is a false search, motivated by a false problem: for it is not clear that any particular dominant motif was intended by the poet (or expected by his audience) as the source of unity for all the elements and symbols of the play. And thus it may be said that the *Oedipus*, in a sense, has no interpretation. It remains exactly what it is. And its unity is nothing more or less than the highly contrived tissue of limit-situations, with their peculiar motifs and images, in which Sophocles created his characters to live and move. Only when we have approached the problem in this phenomenological way can we begin to understand the ancient art of poetic composition.

HERBERT MUSURILLO, S. J.

BELLARMINE COLLEGE  
PLATTSBURGH, N. Y.

## ROMAN IMPERIAL TROOPS IN MACEDONIA AND ACHAEA.

Very early in his reign Augustus realized that the effective control of the Balkan peninsula had to be given top priority in his plan of strengthening the northern provinces of the empire. This meant Illyricum and all the lands of the Danube basin to the Black Sea. After the opening campaigns of 35-33 B. C. punishing blows were struck against the Moesians, Thracians, and Getans by M. Licinius Crassus in 29-28 B. C. Then we hear of further expeditions and wars under the commands of M. Lollius, L. Tarius Rufus, Sex. Aelius Catus, Cn. Cornelius Lentulus, M. Vinicius, and others. Details of chronology and the extent of the operations are often obscured by the brief sentences devoted to these men in the sources. But by the beginning of the Christian era the general picture begins to take on some outline and order. Separate provinces of Dalmatia and Pannonia are formed out of Illyricum, and about A. D. 2-3 or soon thereafter Moesia received independent provincial status.<sup>1</sup> This marked the end of an era for Macedonia.

The gradual advance over the Save and Drave Rivers to the Danube, the cooperation of the Thracian princes, and the pacification of Moesia relieved the Macedonian governors of the task of maintaining heavy military forces within their borders. Their legions were moved to the north to form the new army of Moesia. By the death of Augustus at the very latest Macedonia as well as Achaëa was a *provincia inermis*.<sup>2</sup> This did not mean, of course,

<sup>1</sup> The history of Macedonia under the Empire has not yet been written. The account of Geyer in *R.-E.*, s. v. "Macedonia," is excellent for the Republican period but extremely sketchy for the Imperial. Valuable information will be found in J. A. O. Larsen, *An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome*, IV (Baltimore, 1938), pp. 436 ff. and in J. Keil, "The Greek Provinces," *Cambridge Ancient History*, XI (Cambridge, 1936), pp. 565 ff. For the Augustan wars and the provincial arrangement see the article by Ronald Syme, "Lentulus and the Origin of Moesia," *J. R. S.*, XXIV (1934), pp. 113 ff. Also instructive is the first part of Arthur Stein's *Die Legaten von Moesien (Dissertationes Pannonicae, Ser. I, Fasc. 11 [Budapest, 1940])*, pp. 9-17 and the review of his book by Syme in *J. R. S.*, XXXV (1945), pp. 108 ff.

<sup>2</sup> See the present writer in *A. J. P.*, LXXVI (1955), pp. 400 ff. for a sketch of the troops in the unarmed provinces of Asia Minor.



the complete stripping of all military personnel from the province, for even the governors of "unarmed" provinces had need of small units and detached soldiers to conduct the business of administration and security. Let us see what troops were marked for active service in the two provinces of Macedonia and Achaëa, remembering that we are concerned only with units and soldiers assigned on a permanent basis. The Balkans served as a real highway between the east and west, and the great Via Egnatia must have witnessed at times a steady flow of troops from one theater of operations to another. Military inscriptions from these provinces therefore must be studied very carefully before any definite conclusions are based on them.

*Macedonia.* After the departure of the legions for the new frontiers to the north some auxiliary units and detached personnel must have been left for internal affairs. Our sources tell us nothing, however. The only hint that auxilia may have been left in Macedonia is seen in the name of the *cohors II Gallorum Macedonica equitata*.<sup>3</sup> The epithet "Macedonica" is sufficient to postulate service in the province at some time. Since this cohort already held the epithet in A. D. 93 while serving in Upper Moesia (*C. I. L.*, XVI, 39), it is clear that it had served in Macedonia before that date. Josephus (*B. J.*, II, 365) tells us that Macedonia was held in subjection by the Romans with only the six lictors of the proconsul, i. e. no garrisons or large units. The cohort must have already left Macedonia by that time (very early in the reign of Vespasian) or arrived after Josephus gathered his information on the troops in the empire. I would hazard the suggestion that it might have been stationed there as far back as Tiberius or Augustus. I can find no other evidence connected with its Macedonian service.

Positive information on the presence of imperial troops does not appear until the reign of Trajan. A military diploma of A. D. 120 places the *cohors I Flavia Bessorum* somewhere in Macedonia.<sup>4</sup> Since this cohort is known to have been in Upper

<sup>3</sup> For the full history of this unit see W. Wagner, *Die Dislokation der römischen Auxiliarformationen in den Provinzen Noricum, Pannonien, Moesien und Dakien von Augustus bis Gallienus* (Berlin, 1938), pp. 136-7.

<sup>4</sup> *C. I. L.*, XVI, 67. The unit was in Moesia in A. D. 100 according to diploma no. 46; cf. Wagner, *op. cit.*, p. 96.

Moesia in A. D. 100 it must have marched to Macedonia sometime after that date, but probably not until after the Dacian wars of Trajan. It is not known at what garrison city or locality it stayed, nor is anything further known of it. The importance of this information lies not merely in the identification of a unit on active service but also in the fact that it was felt necessary at such a period to keep auxilia inside the province. For, if it was there under Hadrian, as the diploma shows, in a time of comparative peace in the Balkans, then surely it must have remained there for many years afterward.

During the reign of Marcus in the second century there is evidence that larger forces were moved into the area. This increase came about as the direct result of the invasion of the Costoboci in A. D. 170. These Sarmatian brigands pillaged the rich cities and countryside of the southern Balkans and then retreated across the Danube.<sup>5</sup> A highly successful equestrian officer, L. Iulius Vehilius Gratus Iulianus, was immediately sent there to deal with the problem. His title was: [*proc. Augg. e*]t pra[ep.] vexillationis per Achaïam et Macedoniam et in Hispanias adversus Castabocas et Mauros rebelles.<sup>6</sup> The exact strength and composition of this vexillatio are not known with certainty, although one noteworthy assumption has been made.<sup>7</sup> The most we may assume is that this invasion must have been

<sup>5</sup> The most important work on the Costoboci is the one by von Premerstein in *Klio*, XII (1912), pp. 145 ff. See also H. A. Ormerod, *Piracy in the Ancient World* (Liverpool, 1924), p. 259. For a new text perhaps to be connected with the Costoboci, see *S. E. G.*, XI, 486.

<sup>6</sup> *C. I. L.*, VI, 31856 (*I. L. S.*, 1327).

<sup>7</sup> Commentary by von Premerstein, *op. cit.*, pp. 159 ff. Von Premerstein believes that the *ala I Thracum Herculiana* formed part of this vexillatio, and there is a possibility that this cohort was stationed in Macedonia. The evidence, however, is very slim and inconclusive. It all hinges on the geographical expression found in *I. L. S.*, 8868 = *I. G. R. R.*, III, 1420, where an equestrian officer is described as [ἐπαρχος ἐ]ν Περωνία [ἴλ]ης α' Θρακῶν. Von Premerstein believed that Pannonia was not the region meant, but rather Paeonia in northern Macedonia. One might cite a new inscription in this regard: *A. E.*, 1948, 51, which mentions an ἐπίτροπος Παονίας καὶ Ἀχαιίας. This is possible in my opinion but far from certain. For the *ala I Thracum Herculiana* see J. Lesquier, *L'Armée romaine d'Égypte d'Auguste à Dioclétien* (Cairo, 1918), pp. 78 ff. Additional material on the *ala* now is available in *A. E.*, 1940, 166; 1947, 173; 1952, 236.

serious enough to have drawn attention to the vital need of protecting Macedonia against further danger from the north. And accordingly the existing provincial auxilia would have remained permanently strengthened.

The increased attention to Macedonia's security may be seen in connection with the Via Egnatia. After winding its way through the high mountain passes into the interior this old road reaches the important city of Heraclea (the modern Bitolj).<sup>8</sup> Here was a road-junction: the main route continued on to Thessalonica and Philippi, but another stretched northward to Stobi and the Danubian provinces. Municipal liturgies compelling the citizens of Heraclea to pave the highway attest the great importance of the road and the junction.<sup>9</sup> It is at or near such a place that we should expect to find imperial troops on duty. And proof is not lacking.

About 25 miles north of Heraclea, in a low valley, an inscription has been found in a church in the settlement called Ruvce which would seem to place all or part of a *cohors Hispanorum* in this area.<sup>10</sup>

\*Ετος ΖC  
(picture of a horseman)  
Θεοῖς δαίμοσιν (leaf)  
Φλαυρίου [Κ]απίτωνος  
Ῥανώτου σπείρης Ἴσ[π]-  
άνης ἐστράτευ -  
σιν ἐξήσεν  
ΟCEPMAATΔ[---].

Notes on the text: first published by M. G. Demitsas in the *Bulletin de correspondance hellénique*, IV (1880), pp. 103-4, no. 5. The same text repeated in the same author's *Ἡ Μακεδονία ἐν λίθοις φθεγγομένοις* (Athens, 1896), p. 308, no. 267. Its dimensions are not given exactly, but it is of great size: two meters high and one meter wide. The lettering, as shown by Demitsas, is clear and legible, agreeing in form with other specimens from

<sup>8</sup> This city has usually been called Heraclea Lyncestis, but better is Heraclea Lyncei: see Charles Edson in *C. P.*, XLVI (1951), p. 12, n. 7.

<sup>9</sup> First published by Perdrizet in *B. C. H.*, 1897, pp. 161-4. Cf. L. Robert in *R. E. G.*, 1934, pp. 31-6 and Larsen, *op. cit.*, pp. 458-9, n. 23.

<sup>10</sup> A closer spelling of the settlement's name might be Ruftsi, but I have followed the spelling given on the military map published by Her Britannic Majesty's Stationary Office (*The Balkans* 1: 250,000), sheet G 1.

the same area belonging to the second century. The revised text here given differs from that of Demitsas in the crucial fourth and fifth lines. Demitsas failed to see that an auxiliary cohort was named, for he read only: *σπείρησις* | ANHC. Because of the rarity of the name *Ῥανώτας* I cannot help thinking it is a corruption of *στρατιώτης*. In line six we would normally expect two sets of numerals, one for the number of years service and another for the soldier's age at death. In both copies Demitsas fails to indicate any trace of them, and therefore I have left the line exactly as he gave it.

The date is the 207th year of the Macedonian era. But is this the provincial era of 148 B. C. or the Actian of 32 B. C.? The provincial era would give us A. D. 59, which is somewhat early for the use of the name Flavius and the presence of the leaf on the stone. The Actian era (the year of the battle in 31 B. C. being counted as the first year) would give us A. D. 175/76, which must be the correct one.<sup>11</sup>

At Krusjani near Ruvce another inscription has been found which might be connected with this same cohort.<sup>12</sup> Although the seven letters of the text are meaningless, the picture of a horseman on the stone is significant. He must have been a cavalryman. At Thessalonica we hear of the same cohort again. In A. D. 141 a certain Herennius left provision in his will for gladiatorial shows. He seems to have served somewhere in a *cohors Hispanorum*.<sup>13</sup> Could it have been in Macedonia?

The final piece of evidence concerning this cohort is much more important and revealing but at the same time more difficult to interpret. In 1925 A. S. Hunt published an Egyptian papyrus which places the *cohors I Hispanorum veterana quingenaria equitata* at Stobi in Macedonia.<sup>14</sup> The document is a

<sup>11</sup> Demitsas gives the date as A. D. 161, which must be an error for A. D. 61 when using the provincial era of 146 B. C. But M. N. Tod in his article "The Macedonian Era," *Annual of the British School at Athens*, XXIII (1918-1919), pp. 206-17, and XXIV (1919-1920; 1920-1921), pp. 54-67, has shown that the era began in 148 B. C. Hence the date of the inscription can be only A. D. 59 or 175/76.

<sup>12</sup> Demitsas, *Macedonia*, p. 309, no. 268.

<sup>13</sup> Le Bas, II, 1359 = L. Robert, *Les Gladiateurs dans l'Orient Grec* (Paris, 1940), p. 78-9, no. 11.

<sup>14</sup> *Raccolta di scritti in onore di Giacomo Lumbroso* (Milan, 1925), pp. 265-72. On the *pridianum* see Cantacuzène in *Aegyptus*, IX (1928), pp. 63 ff. For the full history of the cohort see W. Wagner, *op. cit.*, pp.

*pridianum* recording temporary or permanent decreases in the unit's strength. The area of activity is clearly the Danube. Since at least one soldier in the unit began his military career in the eighth consulship of Vespasian (A. D. 77) the conditions and details described must have taken place under Trajan. It is definitely attested in Moesia inferior in A. D. 99 and in Egypt about A. D. 116. Since the papyrus was found in Egypt the period of its activity at Stobi must be placed approximately between those two dates. Hunt has suggested that its stay in the area of Stobi was only temporary, a stop on its way south to Egypt. This could very well have been the case. The reason for its march to Egypt was, as Hunt originally assumed, to aid in the suppression of the Jewish revolt of A. D. 116. When the revolt was finally crushed, early in the reign of Hadrian, it marched back to the Danube Valley. In A. D. 129 we find it in Dacia inferior. With its return it is tempting to assume that a detachment or small *vezillatio* was placed at Stobi for permanent supervision of the highway system leading north from Heraclea. If that be true—and it is only an assumption at best—then the Ruvce and Krusjani horsemen of a later period could have belonged to this same *cohors I Hispanorum veterana quingenaria equitata*. The similarity of name and the fact that both units were *equitata* seem conclusive to the present writer that they refer to one and the same unit. Stobi must have been a garrison town. In the fourth century the *Notitia Dignitatum* (Or. VIII, 44) attests the *Lanciarrii Stobenses*.

There can be no doubt that a *cohors Hispanorum equitata* or a detachment of it was on duty in A.D. 175 north of Heraclea on or near the road leading to Stobi.<sup>15</sup> The evidence of the Thessalonica inscription and Hunt's *pridianum* perhaps allow us to

148 ff. Cf. also the note in K. Kraft, *Zur Rekrutierung der Alen und Kohorten an Rhein und Donau* (*Dissertationes Bernenses*, Ser. I, Fasc. 3 [Bern, 1951]), p. 177.

<sup>15</sup> For legionary veterans in the area of Heraclea see: *A. E.*, 1934, 180 and 206; Demitsas, *Macedonia*, p. 318, no. 282. The epitaph of a legionary soldier (on active duty?) of either the *IV Flavia* or the *IV Scythica* is in *A. E.*, 1914, 215. The epitaph of an *eques singularis Augusti* is to be found in *C. I. L.*, III, 7317. Near Ruvce itself is buried a soldier of the *cohors urbana XIII* from the second century: *C. I. L.*, III, 7318. At Stobi are two veterans: *C. I. L.*, III, 630 and *A. E.*, 1934, 128. And at Veles, near Stobi, are two others: *Srpska Kraljevska Akademija*, Spomenik 71 (1931), nos. 53 and 66.



push its activity in Macedonia back to the first half of the second century.

At the end of the second century Septimius Severus brought an entire legion into the south Balkans to prevent Pescennius Niger from gaining a foothold in Macedonia or Achaëa.<sup>16</sup> But this was only a temporary condition and does not enter into our investigation.

In the calamitous third century began those northern invasions which eventually led to the overthrow of the Western Empire. It was in A. D. 252 that the Goths and other northern tribes for the first time crossed the Danube in large numbers.<sup>17</sup> In the years that followed they came by sea and land. Asia Minor was ravaged, the Balkans plundered. Under Gallienus (A. D. 253-268), during the height of these first invasions, legionary *vexillationes* from the *II Parthica* (Italy) and the *III Augusta* (Africa) appear at Lychnidus in Macedonia.<sup>18</sup> That these were of considerable size may be gathered from the rank of one of their commanders: Aurelius Augustianus was the *dux iustissimus*. His subordinate, Synforianus, was the *praepositus vexillatio[num]*. These forces may have remained permanently in the province, for in view of the terrible upheavals along the Danube we may assume that all the Macedonian forts were kept at full strength. But no legions ever made the province their headquarters.

To sum up briefly: in the second century there seem to have been two auxiliary cohorts on duty in Macedonia. This number must have been present also in the third century, for that was a time of greater insecurity and danger than the second century. Then, in addition, much stronger forces—*vexillationes* from two legions—were moved into the province under Gallienus, very likely to remain there permanently. The rigid frontier defense

<sup>16</sup> *S. H. A., Severus*, 8, 12. See *C. A. H.*, XII (Cambridge, 1939), pp. 6-7.

<sup>17</sup> See A. Alföldi in *C. A. H.*, XII, Chapter V and the notes on pp. 721 ff. His attempt to combine the invasions of A. D. 268 and 269 into a single year (268) has been discounted by Chester G. Starr, *The Roman Imperial Navy* (Cornell Univ. Press, 1941), pp. 194 ff. and by H. Bengtson, *Griechische Geschichte* (Munich, 1950), pp. 521-2.

<sup>18</sup> See the important inscription published by N. Vulić in the *Srpska Kraljevska Akademija*, *Spomenik* 75 (1933), no. 176. It has been re-published in *A. E.*, 1934, 193. It is discussed by Balduin Saria in *Klio*, XXX (1937), pp. 352 ff.



of the second century slowly gave way to the new method of defense in depth and the use of more mobile forces well behind the frontiers. During the last half of the third century the Roman army became more cavalry-conscious, and greater forces were being shifted from the frontiers to the interior provinces.<sup>19</sup> Hence, the  *vexillationes*  tended to remain more or less fixed at strategic points in the zones of the interior.

When we consider smaller units and detached personnel our sources are almost completely silent. Two cities attract our attention, the thriving and populous Philippi and Thessalonica. The status of Philippi as a Roman colony may be traced all the way back to the days of Antony, when his veterans were settled there.<sup>20</sup> And Thessalonica was a free city as well as the seat of the provincial administration. The strategic position of both cities brought a large number of soldiers into the area, but it is not always possible to detect the retired soldier or the transient. Certainly such a large and important city as Philippi had some troops stationed in its vicinity to keep the transient troops out of trouble, but I am unable to cite any text which would prove it conclusively. Thessalonica, being a free city, could only have had civic police within its borders. But the only evidence of such police is found at Beroea, when one inscription mentions an *eirenarch*.<sup>21</sup> Nevertheless there are some aspects of the Roman provincial administration which we may assume to be present even when they are not mentioned, and these include a military escort for the governor (*equites singulares*), military police at important road junctions (*stationarii*), and municipal police in the larger cities.<sup>22</sup>

In addition to the early military colonies of Philippi and Cassandrea legionary veterans are buried at Dium (*IV Scy-*

<sup>19</sup> See the clear description of Alföldi, *op. cit.*, pp. 208 ff.

<sup>20</sup> The standard work on Philippi is the admirable *Philippe ville de Macédoine* (*École française d'Athènes, Travaux et Mémoires*, Fasc. V [Paris, 1937]), by Paul Collart. Military inscriptions on pp. 293 ff.

<sup>21</sup> *Annual of the British School at Athens*, XVIII (1911-1912), pp. 148-9, no. 7. Near Beroea there also has been found the epitaph of a soldier (on active duty?) of the *legio XVI F(lavia) f(irma)*: first published by J. M. R. Cormack in *J. R. S.*, XXXI (1941), pp. 24-5, and later republished in *A. E.*, 1947, 102.

<sup>22</sup> For *stationarii* we may cite Tertullian, *Apol.*, 2: *latronibus vestigandis per universas provincias militaris statio sortitur.*

*thica*), Stobi (*IV Scythica* and *VIII Augusta*), and Heraclea (*IV Scythica* and *VII Claudia*).<sup>23</sup> The *legio IV Scythica* was stationed in Moesia until about A. D. 56, when it marched to Syria. These colonies and veterans could be called emergency forces ready for limited and local action during the first century.

Individual soldiers on detached service are rarely mentioned, but three cases are worthy of note. Aurelius Mucianus [*centurio*] *de[p]utatus* was buried at Thessalonica, presumably on official duty in the province when he died.<sup>24</sup> M. Iulius Severus *πριμίπιλ[ος]* was honored by the *koinon* of the *Δοστωνεῖς* as a benefactor of the people.<sup>25</sup> And at Thessalonica was found an epitaph of one Aurelius Agathemeris *στρατιώτης ἱππεὺς [ἀ]λάριος στρατευσάμενος ἔτη [.] γ'.*<sup>26</sup> It is not indicated whether he served in Macedonia. Our survey does not go beyond the reign of Diocletian.

*Achaea*. The province of Achaea under the Empire was peaceful and unarmed, enjoying a wide reputation as the intellectual and cultural center of the civilized world.<sup>27</sup> And although special circumstances caused the formation of a huge complex of Moesia-Achaea-Macedonia from A. D. 15 to 44, the number of imperial troops required within her borders for internal security was always very small. Only such soldiers as were necessary to form the governor's escort, supervise government mines, and aid in highway construction were needed.

Athens was a free city, and therefore not burdened with the usual presence of authorized Roman officials. But there is a large number of military inscriptions from the city itself and the vicinity, indicating the temporary presence of Roman troops.<sup>28</sup> It has been conjectured that these troops were merely on their way to the eastern front under Trajan.<sup>29</sup> This seems highly probable. And the Piraeus was always an important port of call where we should expect to find sailors of many kinds. One

<sup>23</sup> For the veterans at Heraclea and Stobi see above, note 15. At Dium: *C. I. L.*, III, 592.

<sup>24</sup> *C. I. L.*, III, 7326.

<sup>25</sup> *S. E. G.*, II, 434.

<sup>26</sup> Demitsas, *Macedonia*, p. 467, no. 419.

<sup>27</sup> For an excellent sketch of Achaea under the Empire see the recent work of H. Bengtson, *op. cit.*, pp. 490 ff.

<sup>28</sup> For a list of the military inscriptions see J. H. Oliver in *Hesperia*, X (1941), pp. 244 ff. and the additions in *Hesperia*, XI (1942), p. 90. The naval inscriptions are discussed by Starr, *op. cit.*, pp. 19-20.

<sup>29</sup> Oliver, *loc. cit.*

soldier, however, ought to be separated from such transients (C. I. L., III, 6108): *P. Aelius Annianus mil. frumentaris leg. X Fretensis. [H]eres fecit.* He was most likely on official duty in the province as a courier from Rome.

Problems of law and order in the Athens area would have been handled by the local police. Some of them may have been housed in the fort on the western end of the Acropolis.<sup>30</sup> This fort was re-built and re-occupied in the middle of the third century as a result of the northern invasions. Thus, after many centuries, the ancient citadel becomes once more active against a real enemy. The menace from brigands would have certainly demanded police action, not to speak of more dangerous enemies from the north.<sup>31</sup> Local protection may also be assumed for the post-stations of the imperial *cursus publicus*, but we have no information on this matter from Achaea itself.<sup>32</sup>

The largest military unit on duty was the *cohors equestris* mentioned on one stone from Taenarum in Laconia: *Αυφίδιος Μακεδών στρατι(ώτης) σπέρης ἐκουέστρης > Οὐαλερίου Βάσ[σο]υ.*<sup>33</sup> Both its date and full name are unknown. Perhaps only detached personnel were sent to Taenarum rather than the entire unit.

Legionary *centuriones* worked at the government mine at Carystus on Euboea,<sup>34</sup> and a *frumentarius* was in charge of construction at Delphi under Hadrian.<sup>35</sup>

During the desperate years of the third century greater attention was certainly given to the military needs of Achaea, and we do hear of a detachment being sent there. The source which

<sup>30</sup> *I. G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 3193. It must have been about the same time that the Athenians repaired the city walls: see John Day, *An Economic History of Athens Under Roman Domination* (New York, 1942), p. 253, n. 4. The office of eirenarch is known in Thessaly: *I. G.*, IX, 2, 1077.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. Lucianus, *Navig.*, 28 ff.

<sup>32</sup> See the present writer in *A. J. P.*, LXXVI (1955), p. 413, n. 57.

<sup>33</sup> *I. G.*, V, 1, 1268. Strabo (VIII, 367) mentions a marble quarry in the area. It is just possible that this was the reason for the presence of the cohort or personnel detached from it. Old post-stations, however, from earlier days may continue to have been used in the imperial period, and the cavalry would then have been needed to keep them safe from any brigandage. For these stations in the Peloponnesus see *I. G.*, V, 1, 7 and 869. For the burdens imposed on the citizens by the *cursus publicus* at Tegea see *I. L. S.*, 214.

<sup>34</sup> *I. L. S.*, 8717 (cf. Larsen, *op. cit.*, p. 463) and *C. I. L.*, III, 12286.

<sup>35</sup> *I. L. S.*, 9473 = *S. I. G.*<sup>2</sup>, 830. For another *frumentarius* see *Fouilles de Delphes*, III, 1, 205.

mentions it, however, is hardly above suspicion.<sup>36</sup> It was in A. D. 267 when Goths and Herulians captured Athens and entered the Peloponnesus. A small band of Athenians under Dexippus fought gallantly, but to no avail.<sup>37</sup> Nowhere at this time do we hear of Roman troops coming forward in the vicinity of Athens to aid the stricken city. But the intention of the invaders was not to seize and hold the province, but only to plunder and then return to their homes in the north as quickly as possible. Before they were able to return Gallienus caught them at Naissus in Moesia and inflicted a heavy defeat upon their combined forces.

We must assume that the number of Roman soldiers and troop units in Achaea up to this time had been very small, perhaps even non-existent if the Laconian *cohors equestris* was not present in full strength. Its personnel may have been only a few detached cavalymen to protect the highways.

We should expect to find an *officium* of the governor in every province of the empire.<sup>38</sup> There is, however, only one possible reference to it in Achaea: *Nemesi Augustae sacrum Aurelius Nestor optio leg. IIII Fl. fel. ex voto*. It was found in Corinth, seat of the administration.<sup>39</sup> The text furnishes no clue to the reason for the man's presence in the city, but very likely he was detached from the Danubian army and sent there as an assistant in the governor's *officium*.

ROBERT K. SHERK.

UNIVERSITY OF MAINE.

<sup>36</sup> *S. H. A.*, *Claudius*, 16. Although Larsen, *op. cit.*, p. 494, seems to accept this report as historical I view it with extreme scepticism. It purports to be a letter from the Emperor Decius to the governor of Achaea requesting him to put a small band of soldiers under the orders of the young Claudius. Such letters, as reported in the *S. H. A.*, should not be treated with uncritical acceptance.

<sup>37</sup> Alföldi, *op. cit.*, pp. 149 ff.

<sup>38</sup> Since every governor had an escort of soldiers and since every province had Roman troops of some nature on duty, we must postulate an *officium* in the provincial capital.

<sup>39</sup> *A. E.*, 1923, 9. It has been republished in *Corinth, Results of Excavations Conducted by the American School of Classical Studies at Athens*, VIII, Part II (Harvard University Press, 1931), p. 10, no. 10. Such an assistant is called the *optio praetorii*: see *C. I. L.*, III, 1094 (*I. L. S.*, 2439) and *C. I. L.*, XIII, 5970 (*I. L. S.*, 2444). For the governor's *officium* see Domaszewski in *Bonner Jahrbücher*, CXVII (1908), pp. 29 ff. and Ernst Stein, *Die kaiserlichen Beamten und Truppenkörper im römischen Deutschland unter dem Prinzipat* (*Beiträge zur Verwaltungs- und Heeresgeschichte von Gallien und Germanien*, I [Wien, 1932]), pp. 73 ff.

## THE STOIC CATEGORIES.

In spite of the important work on the Stoic categories which has been done by Rieth, De Lacy, and Pohlenz, and the excellent monograph on Stoic Logic by Mates, I feel that certain aspects of the topic can be still further elaborated.<sup>1</sup> So far as I know, the names of the four categories, substratum (*ὑποκείμενον*) qualified (*ποιός*), disposition (*πὼς ἔχον*), and relative disposition (*πρὸς τί πὼς ἔχον*), are not listed together in any writers earlier than Simplicius and Plotinus.<sup>2</sup> Unfortunately, these late writers provide little evidence for their use. The categories, however, are found separately in various fragments of Zeno, Aristo, and Chrysippus. This in itself is not surprising since Chrysippus was the founder of Stoic Logic, and the philosophers of the Middle and New Stoa were concerned almost entirely with Ethics. The first part of my paper will deal with problems related to the use of the categories by the Old Stoa; the second part will include an analysis of the relevant passages in Simplicius and Plotinus.

Very little evidence related to the four categories is to be found in the fragments of Zeno's philosophy. That "qualified" (*ποιός*) and "quality" (*ποιότης*), however, played some part in his Metaphysics can be seen from his etymology of the name of the Titan Coeus. A scholiast, who is dated by Flach to the first

<sup>1</sup> For further discussion of the Stoic categories see O. Rieth, *Grundbegriffe der Stoischen Ethik* (Berlin, 1933); P. De Lacy, "The Stoic Categories as Methodological Principles," *T. A. P. A.*, LXXVI (1945), pp. 246-63; M. Pohlenz, "Die Begründung der abendländischen Sprachlehre durch die Stoa," *Gött. Nachr.*, III (1939), pp. 185-8; M. Pohlenz, "Zenon und Chrysippus," *Gött. Nachr.*, II (1938), pp. 182-5; M. Pohlenz, *Die Stoa*, I (Göttingen, 1948), pp. 69-70 and II (Göttingen, 1949), pp. 39-42; B. Mates, *Stoic Logic* (Univ. of California Press, 1953). For the fragments of the Old Stoa I have used H. von Arnim, *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* (Berlin, 1905), and I have referred to this collection by the number of the book and fragment e.g. II, 453. All references to Simplicius refer to C. Kalbfleisch, *Simplicii in Aristotelis Categorias Commentarium* (Berlin, 1907) and references to Plotinus to *Plotini Enneades*, II (Leipzig, 1884), edited by R. Volkmann.

<sup>2</sup> Simpl., *In Arist. Cat.*, 67, 1-2 = II, 369 and Plot., VI, 1, 25 = II, 371. Simplicius used as his source Porphyry's commentary on Aristotle's *Categories*. On this point see Rieth (above, note 1), p. 6.



century of this era, quotes Zeno as stating that the Titans were the elements of the universe, and Coeus was the quality (Κοῖον γὰρ λέγει τὴν ποιότητα κατὰ τροπὴν Αἰολικὴν τοῦ π πρὸς τὸ Κ).<sup>3</sup> We have his etymologies of the names of the other three Titans also. Creius is called the royal and ruling power, Hyperion the upward movement, and Iapetus the downward movement. Perhaps quality in this passage was synonymous with life or power. It seems probable also that he regarded the quality as inhering in a substratum since he referred to colors as the first configurations of matter (I, 91).

The concept of internal relation appears to be implicit in Zeno's treatment of the virtues.<sup>4</sup> Plutarch writes that Zeno recognized four virtues, wisdom, courage, moderation, and justice, and regarded them as several according to difference (πλείονας κατὰ διαφοράς) but inseparable (ἀχώριστοι, I, 200). He defined them in terms of wisdom (φρόνησις), and argued, for instance, that courage is wisdom in things to be endured, and justice is wisdom in things to be distributed (I, 200; cf. 201). They were one virtue, seeming to differ according to their powers in relation to external entities (ὡς μίαν οὖσαν ἀρετὴν, ταῖς δὲ πρὸς τὰ πράγματα σχέσει κατὰ τὰς ἐνεργείας διαφέρειν δοκοῦσαν, I, 200). The virtues seem to have been related internally to the sphere in which they were active, since wisdom, for example, was justice only when it acted in regard to things to be distributed.

The use of internal relation in the philosophy of Aristo of Chios has been discussed at length by Rieth.<sup>5</sup> According to Plutarch, Aristo made virtue one in substance and called it health, but regarded the virtues as differentiated and several

<sup>3</sup> Hans Flach, *Glossen und Scholien zur Hesiodischen Theogonie* (Leipzig, 1876), p. 32. The passage is published as scholia number 134, page 223 in Flach's edition, and again in Arnim I, 100. The importance of this passage was called to my attention by Dr. F. Solmsen of Cornell University.

<sup>4</sup> I use the modern term internal relation to describe any relation which is such that a change in that to which the entity is related would affect the entity itself. For example, Whitehead's philosophy was internally related to Plato's philosophy, since, if Plato had not lived, Whitehead's philosophy would have been, of necessity, changed. On the other hand, Plato's philosophy was externally related to Whitehead's, since Plato's philosophy would not have been changed if Whitehead had not lived.

<sup>5</sup> Rieth, *op. cit.*, pp. 84-5.



because of their relation ( $\tau\tilde{\omega}$  πρὸς τί πως διαφόρους καὶ πλείονας), just as if one should call the seeing of white, white-seeing (λευκοθέα), and the seeing of black, black-seeing (μελανθέα). For instance, virtue which considers that which should be done and not be done is wisdom (φρόνησις); virtue restraining desire is moderation (I, 375). Galen's account of virtue in Aristo's philosophy differs slightly from that of Plutarch. He speaks of one virtue of the soul, the knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) of good and evil, and regards each of the virtues as knowledge employed in a certain sphere (I, 374). He believes that Aristo recognized one virtue called by several names according to their relation (κατὰ τὴν πρὸς τι σχέσιν, III, 259; cf. I, 351). The virtues appear to have been internally related to that to which they were applied, and the term relative disposition seems to mean internal relation.<sup>6</sup>

Can we assume that the virtues in Zeno's philosophy were qualities, and that consequently all qualities were internally related? Here the evidence fails us. We know only that the virtues were corporeal causes. Zeno defined cause as that because of which something happens, and argued that cause was corporeal (σῶμα I, 89). He stated that wisdom (φρόνησις) was the cause of acting wisely (τὸ φρονεῖν), soul of living, and moderation (σωφροσύνη) of acting moderately (τὸ σωφρονεῖν). In Chrysippus' philosophy, however, the virtues were one aspect of the logos (II, 449), and, as such, both corporeal and qualities.<sup>7</sup> It is possible that Zeno's concept of virtue was essentially the same as that of Chrysippus, and that the virtues for Zeno also were qualities.

In his concept of relation Zeno was following the philosophic pattern of the time. Aristotle himself had conceived of relations as internal,<sup>8</sup> and Speusippus held that an entity was simply the sum of its relations.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>6</sup> Cleanthes' interpretation of the virtues was probably similar to that of Zeno and Aristo, cf. I, 563. For the virtues as qualities see my previous article, "The Stoic Concept of Quality," *A.J.P.*, LXXV (1954), p. 41.

<sup>7</sup> See my previous article, pp. 41-3.

<sup>8</sup> Aristotle argued that a change of relation could be brought about by the change of one term only. If one of the two terms were changed, the second, although itself unchanged, might become larger, smaller, or equal (1088 a 34-5; cf. 225 b 11-13).

<sup>9</sup> Arist., *Post. Anal.*, 97 a 6-22. See H. Cherniss, *The Riddle of the*

In Chrysippus' treatment of possibility there is clear evidence that he rejected internal relation.<sup>10</sup> He wrote that all that is capable of being, even if it is not going to be, is possible (II, 202).<sup>11</sup> His point of view is stated in a passage in Cicero which may be translated as follows: "You say that that which is not going to happen can happen, so that this precious stone may be broken, even if it will never be broken, and that it was not necessary for Cypselus to reign at Corinth, although this was stated by the oracle of Apollo a thousand years before."<sup>12</sup> "Being breakable" is a quality of the stone just as hot is a quality of fire, and cold of ice, and all quality is an aspect of the logos. The quality "being breakable" was externally related to its environment. It might be prevented by external circumstances from being actualized, but it was present in the entity whether it was actualized or not.

The second part of Cicero's statement is concerned with the problem of free will. Chrysippus distinguished between complete and initiating causes (II, 974, 994, and 997).<sup>13</sup> The former were connected with the disposition (*ἔξις*) of the entity, and controlled by the entity in which they were present (II, 974; cf. 991). The act of assent was regarded as a complete cause (II, 974; cf. 979 and 994). Cypselus was free to decide to rule or not to rule over Corinth; Oedipus was free to kill or not to kill Laius. It seems doubtful, however, whether Oedipus' power of deciding not to kill Laius was anything more than an unrealized possibility. The act of assent might never result in the action to which the assent was made because of outside circumstances (II, 991), since Cypselus, for example, might be prevented by his subjects from ruling over Corinth.

As Mates has pointed out in his monograph on Stoic Logic,

*Early Academy* (Univ. of California Press, 1945), p. 37, and *Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy* (Baltimore, 1944), I, pp. 59-62.

<sup>10</sup> For a discussion of possibility in Chrysippus, see Mates, *op. cit.*, pp. 40-1.

<sup>11</sup> II, 202: ἀλλὰ πᾶν τὸ ἐπιδεκτικὸν τοῦ γενέσθαι, καὶ μὴ μέλλῃ γενήσεσθαι, δυνατόν ἐστιν.

<sup>12</sup> Cic., *De Fato*, 13 = II, 954: *Tu et quae non sint futura, posse fieri dicis, ut frangi hanc gemmam, etiamsi id numquam futurum sit, neque necesse fuisse Cypselum regnare Corinthi, quamquam id millesimo ante anno Apollinis oraculo editum esset.*

<sup>13</sup> For the use of these terms see my previous article, pp. 43-4.

Chrysippus' theory of possibility appears to have been related to that of Philo of Megara.<sup>14</sup> Philo argued that a piece of wood at the bottom of the sea was combustible even if it would never be burned. Possibility was related to the nature of the entity.

Evidence regarding the Stoic categories of substratum and qualified is to be found in several fragments of Chrysippus dealing with the quality and the qualified entity. Substance (οὐσία) was the substratum, and two particular entities might be one substance. For instance, two doves were one substance but two qualified entities (Plut., *De Communibus Notitiis*, 1077 D-E = II, 396 and 1064).<sup>15</sup> The same interpretation seems to apply to psychology. According to Jamblichus, apprehension, the act of assent, impulse, and reason are qualities of the intelligence (II, 826).<sup>16</sup> Intelligence, therefore, was a substratum and substance qualified by apprehension, act of assent, impulse, and reason.

But a qualified entity such as an apple might be qualified by sweetness or fragrance (II, 826). Each qualified entity and each quality might be the substratum for another differentiation.

The virtues should, I believe, be interpreted in the same way. According to Galen, Chrysippus recognized only one faculty of the soul, reason (τὸ λογικόν, III, 259; cf. 257). It seems clear that this was the intelligence (τὸ ἡγεμονικόν). I think that we can assume that virtue was the intelligence in a certain disposition (ἡγεμονικόν πως ἔχον). This phrase is found in Sextus Empiricus (*Eth.*, II, 23), and we know that the concept was familiar to Chrysippus, since he described the soul as breath in a certain disposition (πνεῦμά πως ἔχον, II, 806). In that case, the intelligence was a substance qualified by each of the four virtues. All the virtues were one substance (τὸ ἡγεμονικόν), but each virtue, in turn, as a substance was qualified.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>14</sup> Mates, *op. cit.*, pp. 40-1.

<sup>15</sup> See my previous article, p. 46.

<sup>16</sup> II, 826: ἔναι δὲ ιδιότητι ποιότητος περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ὑποκείμενον ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ μῆλον ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ σώματι τὴν γλυκύτητα ἔχει καὶ τὴν εὐωδίαν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἡγεμονικόν ἐν ταύτῃ φαντασίαν, συγκατάθεσιν, ὁρμὴν, λόγον συνείληφε.

<sup>17</sup> A virtue was both a quality (ποιότης, III, 255; cf. 259) and a substance. In *Concerning the Differentiation of the Virtues*, Chrysippus is said to have argued that the number of virtues and vices was due not to their relation, but to their peculiar substances being changed according to their qualities (ἐν ταῖς οἰκείαις οὐσίαις ὑπαλλασσόμεναις κατὰ

What was the nature of the substratum? In the examples which I have mentioned, the substratum included dove, apple, and intelligence. All of these are species, and we are probably right in assuming that they are also common qualities. Chrysippus (II, 147), Diogenes of Babylon (III, 22), and Antipater of Tarsus (III, 22) recognized as parts of speech the particular name (*ὄνομα*) and the common name (*προσηγορία*). The common name was defined by Diogenes as a part of speech indicating a common quality (*κοινὴ ποιότης*) such as man or horse; the particular name was a part of speech denoting a particular quality (*ιδία ποιότης*) as, for example, Diogenes and Socrates.

Since, however, the substratum cannot exist apart from the quality, it is not surprising to find that the genus is regarded by Chrysippus as an intelligible (*νοητόν*, II, 81), and that the common quality according to Simplicius is said to end in conception and property (*εἰς ἐννόημα καὶ ιδιότητα ἀπολήγουσαν*, Simpl., *In Arist. Cat.*, 222, 30 = II, 378; cf. II, 278).

The term relative disposition (*πρὸς τί πως ἔχον*) designated a group of concepts which were internally related. It was applied by Chrysippus to the parts of the cosmos which are not complete in so far as they are in a certain relation to the whole (*τῷ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον πως ἔχειν*, II, 550), and was probably used for such terms as father, son, right, and left (II, 155). The concept of part was meaningless apart from that of whole, and father was meaningless without its correlative son. Since, as we have seen, the logos in Chrysippus' philosophy was externally related, I believe that relative disposition could never have been applied to quality in so far as it was a corporeal cause.<sup>18</sup>

*τὰς ποιότητας*, III, 259). We know also that in order to prove that the virtues were not one but many, Chrysippus argued in his book, *Concerning the Fact that the Virtues are Qualified*, that the verbal adjectives, to be chosen (*αἰρετέον*), to be done (*ποιητέον*), and to be confident (*θαρρητέον*) each indicated a different good (III, 256). According to a passage in Plutarch, probably from the same source, Chrysippus related each virtue to its corresponding qualified entity (*ποιός*). Each virtue is formed by its own quality according to the qualified (*κατὰ τὸ ποῖον ἀρετὴν ἰδίᾳ ποιότητι συνίστασθαι*, III, 255). For example, from manly (*ἀνδρείος*) Chrysippus derived manliness (*ἀνδρεία*), and from gentle (*πρᾶος*) gentleness (*πραότης*, III, 255). Two verbal adjectives or two qualified entities seem to have indicated the existence of separate qualities.

<sup>18</sup> In a passage in Sextus Empiricus (*Eth.*, 22-7 = III, 75, and *Eth.*,

"Relative disposition" seems to have had various uses. It was applied by both Chrysippus and Posidonius to the contradictories.<sup>19</sup> Both philosophers argued that good and evil could not exist apart from each other. It may have been used also to describe the relationship between contrasting entities in a diaeresis which are qualified according to the differentia (ποιοὶ κατὰ διαφοράν). A paradox found in the fragments of Chrysippus may be paraphrased as follows: (II, 397): "Let us suppose that Dion is whole-limbed and that Theon has lost his foot, but that Dion, in turn, loses his foot. Then Dion becomes Theon, but two particular qualified entities cannot have the same substratum. Therefore, Dion remains but Theon is destroyed." I pointed out in my earlier article on quality that Theon is destroyed because his essence was due to the fact that he lacked what Dion possessed.<sup>20</sup> When Dion lost that particular quality which distinguished him from Theon, Theon disappeared. We should notice that whole-limbed (ὁλόκληρος) was a permanent and complete qualified entity (ποιός), and that whole-limbed and footless were two contrasting entities qualified according to the differentia (ποιοὶ κατὰ διαφοράν). The existence of one entity qualified according to the differentia seems to have depended upon the existence of one or more contrasting entities qualified according to the differentia.

40 and 46) the relationship of virtue (i.e. ποιότης) to the virtuous man (i.e. ποιός) is said to be that of part to whole. The Stoics defined the good as benefit and that which is not without benefit. They included as benefit virtue and the good action, and as not other than benefit the good man and the friend. The good man and the friend cannot be called benefit or other than benefit. For the parts are not the same as the whole nor different from the whole, just as the hand is not the same as the whole man, nor different from the whole man, for the whole man with the hand is considered to be a man. Since virtue is a part of the good man and of the friend, but the parts are not the same as the whole, nor different from the whole, the good man and the friend have been said to be not without benefit. On this passage, see Rieth, *op. cit.*, pp. 32-5.

<sup>19</sup> Chrysippus, II, 1169. For Posidonius, see D. L., VII, 91 (published by L. Edelstein, "The Philosophical System of Posidonius," *A. J. P.*, LVII [1936], p. 312, n. 105) which reads εἶναι δὲ καὶ τὴν κακίαν ὑπαρκτὴν διὰ τὸ ἀντικεῖσθαι τῇ ἀρετῇ. The ἀντικείμενα in Aristotle which included opposites and relations (*Topics*, 105 b 34; cf. 109 b 17) were regarded as ἅμα τῇ φύσει (142 a 24).

<sup>20</sup> See my previous article, pp. 46-7.



The principle that one differentia cannot exist apart from another differentia is not original with the Stoics. It was used by Aristotle and termed by him "inseparable by nature" (*ἅμα τῇ φύσει*). This phrase is defined in the *Diaeresis of Aristotle* as indicating those things which destroy one another and are not able to exist without one another, such as the double and the half.<sup>21</sup> It is clear, however, from Aristotle's *Topics* that the use of the term was not confined to relations of the kind, double and half. Aristotle argued that every genus is divided by differentiae distinguished logically,<sup>22</sup> and, again, that all things distinguished logically from the same genus are inseparable by nature (*ἅμα τῇ φύσει*).<sup>23</sup>

In these passages from Chrysippus we have found evidence for the four Stoic categories, although it is perhaps incorrect to call them categories at this stage of Stoic philosophy. For instance, the two concepts of substratum and disposition (*πὺς ἔχον*) were required by Chrysippus' analysis of entities into a substratum in a certain disposition. The terms disposition and relative disposition referred to certain kinds of qualifications present in the substratum. Since relative dispositions were internally related, it is possible that disposition referred to any qualification which was externally related (e.g. sweet or three-sided). The word "qualified" (*ποιός*) seems to be used in Simplicius and Plotinus to indicate a particular qualified entity. Its meaning may depend ultimately upon Chrysippus' distinction between the common and the particular quality.<sup>24</sup>

Although the division between Logic and Metaphysics is clearly drawn in Stoic philosophy, the structure of Stoic Logic reflects that of their Metaphysics. For instance, the hierarchy of

<sup>21</sup> V. Rose, *Aristoteles Pseudepigraphus* (Leipzig, 1863), p. 694, ch. 66. On this passage see E. Hambruch, *Logische Regeln der Platonischen Schule in der Aristotelischen Topik* (*Wissenschaftliche Beilage zum Jahresberichte des Askanischen Gymnasiums zu Berlin*, 1904), pp. 6 and 11.

<sup>22</sup> *Topics*, 143 a 36: *πᾶν γένος διαιρεῖται ταῖς ἀντιδιηρημέναις διαφοραῖς*.

<sup>23</sup> *Topics*, 142 b 8: *ἅμα τῇ φύσει τὰ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γένους ἀντιδιηρημένα*; cf. *Cat.*, 14 b 33-9. On *ἅμα τῇ φύσει* see H. Cherniss, *Aristotle's Criticism*, I, p. 25, n. 19.

<sup>24</sup> For a further discussion of disposition see below, p. 81, and M. Pohlenz, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 69-70 and II, pp. 40-1; for disposition and relative disposition see below, pp. 77 and 82; for the qualified, see below, pp. 78 ff.



substrata and differentiae which is so obvious in their Metaphysics is apparent in their definition and diaeresis also.<sup>25</sup>

The definition was defined by Chrysippus as the stating of that which is characteristic (*ἡ τοῦ ἰδίου ἀπόδοσις*, II, 226; cf. Antipater, III, 24). There are obviously two types of definition. First, a definition such as, "Man is a rational, mortal animal" (II, 224). In this, man is the species, rational and mortal are differentiae (*ἰδία*), and animal is the genus or common quality. In other words, animal (the genus) is the substratum (*ὑποκείμενον*) qualified by the differentia mortal (*ἰδιος*). Again, we might have a definition such as, "Diogenes is a white man." Here, Diogenes is the particular (*ὄνομα*), white the differentia (*ἰδιος*) and man the species or common quality (*προσηγορία*). In this, the species (man) is the substratum qualified by the differentia white.

The Stoic definition and diaeresis are based on hypothetical and disjunctive propositions respectively. For example, according to Sextus Empiricus (II, 224), a sentence such as "Man is a mortal, rational animal" is the equivalent of "If anything is a man, it is a mortal, rational animal." Similarly, a sentence such as "of men some are Greeks, and others barbarians," becomes the disjunctive proposition, "If there are men, they are either Greeks or barbarians."<sup>26</sup>

Although the following example is not found in a fragment of Chrysippus, it is a good illustration of the nature of Stoic diaeresis (Sextus, *M.*, II, 242 = II, 65). "Of apprehensions . . . some are plausible, others implausible, others plausible and implausible, others neither plausible nor implausible. Plausible are those which produce a mild agreement in the soul, as, for example, that it is day now and I am talking. Implausible are those which are not of this kind but keep us from assent, for instance, "If it is day, there is not a sun above the earth," or "If there is darkness, it is day." Plausible and implausible are those which according to their relation are sometimes of such a kind, and sometimes of another kind, as, for example, riddles; but neither plausible nor implausible are, for instance, the ap-

<sup>25</sup> On Stoic definition and diaeresis, see Rieth, *op. cit.*, pp. 45-54.

<sup>26</sup> Compare II, 217 τὰς (sc. προτάσεις) κατὰ διαίρεσιν διεξευγμένα. For the distinction between diaeresis, antidiaeresis, and hypodiaeresis see Diogenes of Babylon (III, 25; cf. II, 224).

prehensions of such things as "The stars are even," or "The stars are odd." Of the plausible or implausible apprehensions some are true, other false, others true and false, others neither true nor false."

The diaeresis is based entirely on the disjunctive proposition (either—or). Negatives are used in making the division and the parts of the diaeresis are equated with definitions. The nominalistic character of the diaeresis is clear.

Since every division in the diaeresis is made by the use of disjunctive propositions, each step has ontologically a higher value than the one before. For instance, in the diaeresis above, we have in successive steps apprehensions (*φαντασίαι*), plausible apprehensions (*πιθανὰ φαντασίαι*), and true, plausible apprehensions (*ἀληθεῖς πιθανὰ φαντασίαι*). Each step adds a new differentia to that which is already differentiated. The structure of the diaeresis parallels the hierarchy of substrata and differentiations in Metaphysics.

I would like to turn now to a consideration of two long but important passages in Simplicius' *Commentary on Aristotle's Categories* (165, 32-166, 29 = II, 403 and 212, 12-213, 7 = II, 390).<sup>27</sup> For convenience, I shall include a translation of the text. The numbers refer to the line numbers in von Arnim's collection of the fragments, and are placed at the beginning of the line.<sup>28</sup>

Simpl., *In Arist. Cat.*, 165, 32-166, 29 = II, 403:

"The Stoics instead of one genus number two in this topic, placing some in relations (*ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τι*), others in relative dispositions (*ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τί πως ἔχουσι*). And they distinguish logically relations from the self-subsistent (*τοῖς καθ' αὐτά*), and relative dispositions from that which is according to the differentia (*τοῖς κατὰ διαφοράν*), calling relations the sweet and the bitter and whatever disposes in such a way,<sup>29</sup> and calling relative dispositions such things as right, father, etc. They term according to the differentia that which is characterized according to some species. Just as our own concept of the self-subsistent is different from our concept

<sup>27</sup> For a discussion of these passages see Rieth, *op. cit.*, pp. 22-9 and 70-84.

<sup>28</sup> On the manuscript tradition see Rieth, *op. cit.*, pp. 22 and 70.

<sup>29</sup> Von Arnim's text differs at several points from the later edition of Kalbfleisch. Von Arnim, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ ὅσα; Kalbfleisch, τὰ τοιαῦτα ὅσα.

of that which is according to the differentia, so relations are different from relative dispositions (30), but the order of the conjunctions is inverted (*ἀντεστραμμένη δέ ἐστι τῶν συζυγιῶν ἢ ἀκολουθία*). For that which is according to the differentia co-exists (*συνυπάρχει*) with the self-subsistent. The self-subsistent have some differentiations (*διαφοράς*), as, for example, white and black. Yet the self-subsistent do not co-exist with that which is according to the differentia. The sweet and bitter have differentiations according to which they are characterized, yet they are not self-subsistent but relations. Relative dispositions, which are contradictory (*ἀντίκειται*) to that which is according to the differentia (35), are at any rate relations also. For right and father are not only in a certain disposition (or in a relative disposition),<sup>30</sup> but are also relations. Sweet and bitter, being relations, are according to the differentia; but relative dispositions are contrary (*ἐναντία*) to that which is according to the differentia. For it was impossible for relative dispositions to be self-subsistent or according to the differentia, for they depended upon their relation to something else only (*ἐκ γὰρ τῆς πρὸς ἕτερον σχέσεως ἡρτῆται μόνης*) (40). Nevertheless, relations are not self-subsistent, for they are not separable, but will certainly be according to the differentia, for they are observed with some stamp (*χαρακτῆρος*). But if it is necessary to rephrase what has been said, they call relations those things, which, being disposed according to their own stamp, incline towards something else, and relative dispositions, those things which naturally happen (*συμβαίνειν*) and do not happen without any change and alteration concerning themselves (45), while having regard to the external, so that whenever anything disposed according to the differentia inclines towards something else, this will be relation only, as, for example, (p. 133, 1) disposition, science, and perception. But whenever it is observed not according to the existing differentia, but according to its bare relation to something else, it will be relative disposition, for son and right hand have need of something external for their existence (*πρὸς τὴν ὑπόστασιν*). Therefore, even if there were no change concerning them, father would no longer exist if the son were dead (5), nor would the right hand exist if the corresponding hand (*τοῦ παρακειμένου*) changed. But sweet and bitter would not be different, unless the power in them (*ἡ περὶ αὐτὰ δύναμις*) should change. If they change, although they

<sup>30</sup> Von Arnim and Kalbfleisch, *μετὰ τοῦ πῶς ἔχειν*; Rieth, *op. cit.*, p. 70 suggests *μετὰ τοῦ πρὸς τί πως ἔχειν*.

themselves are not affected in any way, according to the relation of something else to them, clearly they have their existence in their relation only, and not according to the differentia, I mean, relative dispositions."

Simpl., *In Arist. Cat.*, 212-12-213, 7 = II, 390 (p. 128, 31):

"Some of the Stoics, defining the qualified (*τὸ ποιόν*) in three ways, say that two kinds (i. e. of qualified) are wider than quality (*τῆς ποιότητος*); but they declare that one or part of one is commensurate with it (*συναπαρτίζειν αὐτῇ*). For they say that the qualified, described generally, is everything which is according to the differentia whether it is in a state of movement or rest (*εἴτε κινούμενον εἴτε ἐχόμενον*), and whether it is hard to analyze or easy to analyze (*καὶ εἴτε δυσαναλύτως εἴτε εὐαναλύτως ἔχει*). According to this, not only the wise man and the boxer, but the runner also is qualified. In their second classification they did not include movement, but only conditions (*τὰς σχέσεις*). They defined this as that which is in a certain condition according to the differentia (*τὸ ἰσχόμενον κατὰ διαφοράν*), as, for example the wise man and the man who has been posted in an advanced position. (But they introduced a third type of qualified, corresponding particularly to the species [*εἰδικώτατον ποιόν*], in which they did not include those who were not permanently disposed [*τοὺς μὴ ἐμμόνως ἰσχομένους*], nor were the boxer and the man who has been posted in an advanced position qualified according to them.)<sup>31</sup> And of those which were permanently disposed according to the differentia some are such in a manner commensurate with the expression and the concept (*οἱ μὲν ἀπηρτισμένως κατὰ τὴν ἐκφορὰν αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν ἐπινόιαν εἰσι τοιοῦτοι*), and others are not. They rejected the latter, but they called those which were commensurate and permanent according to the differentia qualified. . . . Although the qualified, therefore, is said to be of three kinds, the quality (*ποιότης*), according to the last kind of qualified, is commensurate with the qualified (*συναπαρτίζει πρὸς τὸ ποιόν*). Therefore, when they define the quality as a disposition of the qualified (*σχέσιν ποιού*), we must understand by this definition that the third kind of quality is meant. For in one way only the quality is described by the Stoics, but in three ways the qualified."

In the first passage which I translated above (II, 403), four classifications of being are mentioned, the self-subsistent (*τὰ καθ' αὐτά*), that which is according to the differentia (*τὰ κατὰ*

<sup>31</sup> The Greek for this sentence is printed by Kalbfleisch but is not in von Arnim.

διαφοράν), relations (τὰ πρὸς τι), and relative dispositions (τὰ πρὸς τί πως ἔχοντα). Although these are not categories, they cast light on the nature of the categories.

As Rieth has pointed out, the term self-subsistent (τὰ καθ' αὐτά) probably refers to the particular qualified entity.<sup>32</sup>

The phrase "that which is according to the differentia" (τὰ κατὰ διαφοράν) has a very wide application. It is defined as that which is characterized according to some species (II, 403, 27). As examples, Simplicius names differentiations such as white and black (31), and sweet and bitter (36), and qualities, as, for example, disposition, science, and perception (46). The last three are said to be disposed according to the differentia (κατὰ διαφοράν τι διακείμενον). Included in "that which is according to the differentia" also are the three kinds of particular qualified entities (ποιός, II, 390), which are classified as (1) that which is in a state of movement according to the differentia, e. g. the runner; (2) that which is in a certain condition according to the differentia, e. g. the man who has been posted in an advanced position; and (3) that which is permanent according to the differentia, e. g. the scholar. The third group alone is commensurate with the quality.<sup>33</sup>

The hierarchy of substrata and differentiae which we have already discussed in Chrysippus is found again in Simplicius (II, 403). Not only the self-subsistent (τὰ καθ' αὐτά) but such terms as sweet and bitter are said to have differentiae according to which they are characterized (33). What would be the differentia of sweet? Perhaps degrees of more or less or the peculiar sweetness of one species (e. g. sugar) as contrasted with that of another (e. g. honey).

According to Simplicius that which is according to the differentia co-exists with the self-subsistent, but the self-subsistent does not co-exist with that which is according to the differentia (II, 403, 30-2). The meaning of these sentences is clear. The self-subsistent may be white or black (i. e. have "that which is

<sup>32</sup> Rieth, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

<sup>33</sup> For further discussion of this passage see Rieth, pp. 22-9. A. Schmekel, *Die positive Philosophie in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung*, I (Berlin, 1938), p. 625, attributed the passage to Antipater of Tarsus. Compare Simpl., *In Arist. Cat.*, 214, 24-215, 2 = II, 391, where it is stated that all bodies are qualified but only bodies which are unified have quality.



according to the differentia"), but its existence does not depend upon its being white or black. White or black, on the other hand, cannot exist apart from that which is self-subsistent.

As examples of relation (*τὰ πρὸς τι*) Simplicius names sweet and bitter (25), disposition (*ἕξις*), science (*ἐπιστήμη*), and perception (*αἴσθησις*, 46). He states specifically that sweet and bitter are powers (*δυνάμεις*). They would not change unless their power should change (p. 133, 6; cf. p. 132, 25-6). Qualities had been recognized as powers by Chrysippus. They were corporeal causes of predicates. For example, moderation is the cause of acting moderately (Zeno, I, 89: *διὰ τὸ σωφροσύνην τὸ σωφρονεῖν*).<sup>34</sup> It is reasonable to suppose that sweet and bitter were powers because they were a cause affecting something external to themselves. Bitter was a sensible acting upon its opposite sweet. Relations of this kind were recognized by both Plato and Aristotle.<sup>35</sup>

Rieth has drawn attention to the words, "sweet and bitter and such things which dispose in such a way" (25: *τὸ γλυκὺ καὶ πικρὸν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὅσα τοῖσδε διατίθῃσι*), and has argued that they are relations (*πρὸς τι*) because they dispose the substratum in a certain way.<sup>36</sup> The whole passage, however, may be translated as follows: "calling relations sweet and bitter and such things which dispose in such a way, and relative dispositions such things as right hand and father." In other words, the first group are relations not because they qualify the substratum, but

<sup>34</sup> See my previous article, pp. 41-2.

<sup>35</sup> Plato referred to hot and cold as relations in *Rep.*, 438 C-D. Aristotle's classification of relation was threefold. He names as one class, that which is according to excess and deficiency (200 b 29), such as the double and the half, and generally the multiple and the divided (1020 b 26-8). A second division included the active and the passive (200 b 30-2), such as that which can heat and that which can be heated, and that which can cut and that which is cut (1020 b 29-30). This second class is said to be according to the *δύναμις* (1021 a 15-9). A third class included the relation of that which is measured to measure, and that which is known to knowledge (1020 b 31-2; cf. 1021 a 29-1021 b 2), or the reverse of this, knowledge to that which is known (1056 b 36). So far as I can determine, Aristotle referred to this classification as *πρὸς τι* or *πρὸς τί πως ἔχον* without making any distinction between the terms. If we compare the Stoic classification with that of Aristotle, we find that class one of Aristotle's division has become *πρὸς τί πως ἔχον* and classes two and three *πρὸς τι*.

<sup>36</sup> Rieth, *op. cit.*, pp. 77-84. For the reading see above, note 29.



because they qualify the substratum in a different way from the relative dispositions. What was the difference between the two kinds of relation? The latter, as we have seen, was an internal relation. Can we say that relations were powers externally related to their environment? This would accord well with the concept of qualities as powers suggested in Chrysippus' account of possibility.<sup>37</sup>

Simplicius' discussion of relative disposition (*πρός τί πως ἔχον*) adds little to what we have already found in Chrysippus. It includes right, left, father, and son. Such terms were always internal relations. They depended entirely upon their relation to something else (39), and they were such that they naturally happened and did not happen without any change and alteration concerning themselves (44).

Can we equate Simplicius' classification of being with the four Stoic categories? To this the answer must be in the negative. The self-subsistent appears to correspond to the qualified (*ποιός*), but that which is according to the differentia includes not only disposition (*πὸς ἔχον*) but qualities and qualified entities (*ποιός*): The classification relation (*πρός τι*) cannot be connected with the categories at all. It is used to describe the qualities and differentiae only in so far as they were powers. Only in the case of relative disposition can we find any real parallel between the two classifications.

In the Sixth Book of the *Enneades* Plotinus gives us a detailed criticism of the Stoic system of categories. Since the passage is long, I shall paraphrase the first sections and include a translation of the later sections only.

The discussion opens with the argument that, since substratum is prior to the other categories and all categories are under one genus *τι*, both prior and posterior must be under one genus, but this is absurd (VI, 1, 25). Again, if the Stoics classify matter as prior, they are assuming that that which is potential is prior to that which is actual (VI, 1, 26).

The priority of matter according to Plotinus raises problems concerning the relation between God and matter (VI, 1, 26). If matter is prior, God would be posterior to matter. If his body is composed from matter (*ὑλη*) and form (*εἶδος*), where would form come from? If then he is without matter, as a first prin-

<sup>37</sup> See above, p. 66.

ciple God would be incorporeal logos and the active would be incorporeal. If he is composite in substance without matter, since he is body, he must have a matter peculiar to himself.

The meaning of the term body in Stoic philosophy is the basis of the next objection (VI, 1, 26). How can matter, if it is body, be a first principle, since every body is a composite of matter and quality? If three-dimensioned is common in the case of body, they mean mathematical body, but if it is three-dimensioned with resistance, body will not be one.

The discussion at this point turns again to the nature of God (VI, 1, 27). If God is composite and posterior, as matter in a certain disposition (*ἔλη πως ἔχουσα*), and if he is a substratum, there must be something external to the substratum, which, acting upon it, will make it a substratum. But if God is himself a substratum with the matter, of what will they be the substrata?

The substratum is said to be a relation in regard to that which acts upon it (VI, 1, 27). If it does not need anything external to it, but can become all things, by changing its form, it would no longer be a substratum but all things.

Further, it is absurd to hold that the matter, that is, the substratum, is substance, but that bodies are not substances (VI, 1, 27). The cosmos, for instance, would not be substance except in so far as part of it is substance.

Plotinus' discussion of the qualified (*ποιά*) may be translated as follows (VI, 1, 29-30):

"They say that it is necessary for the qualified (*τὰ ποιά*) to be different from the substrata (*τὰ ὑποκείμενα*) for otherwise they would not have numbered it second. If, then, they are different, they must be simple also; if they are simple, they must not be composite; if they are not composite, they must not have matter either, in so far as they are qualified (*ποιά*); if they do not have matter, they must be incorporeal and active, for matter is a substratum for them (*ὑπόκειται*), in so far as they are acted upon. But if they are composite, first the division is absurd, since it distinguishes the simple and the composite, even though they are under one genus, placing one in one species (*ἐν θατέρῳ τῶν εἰδῶν*), another in another, just as if, dividing science, one should call part grammar and part grammar and something else.

But if they should say that the qualified (*τὰ ποιά*) is qualified matter (*ἔλην ποιάν*), first the *λόγοι* which are im-

manent in matter (*ἐνολοι*), although they are not material (*ἐν ὕλῃ*), will make something composite, but prior to the composite, which they make, they will be composed of matter and form (*εἶδους*). Surely, therefore, they themselves are not forms nor *λόγοι*. But if they should say that the *λόγοι* are nothing except matter in a certain disposition (*ὕλην πως ἔχουσιν*), they will obviously term the qualified dispositions (*πὺς ἔχοντα*), and they should place them in the fourth genus.

But if this disposition (*σχέσις*) is different, what is the difference? Or is it clear that the disposition (*τό πως ἔχειν*) here is more of a substance (*ὑπόστασις*)? And yet if it is not a substance there also, why do they number it as one genus or species (*εἶδος*)? For being and not being cannot be under the same (genus or species). But what is this disposition in matter (*τὸ ἐπὶ τῇ ὕλῃ πως ἔχον*)? Surely it is being or not being. And if being, it is certainly incorporeal; but if not being, it is mentioned in vain, and matter (*ὕλη*) only is being, and the qualified (*τὸ ποιόν*) is not anything. And neither is the disposition (*τό πως ἔχον*), for it is all the more not being. The fourth category which has been mentioned, much more so, for only matter is being. . . .

In regard to the dispositions (*ἐν δὲ τοῖς πως ἔχουσιν*) it is absurd perhaps to place dispositions third, or whatever the order is, since all dispositions are concerned with matter (VI, 1, 30). But they will say that there is a difference among dispositions, and that the matter is affected in one way here and there, and in another way in the dispositions, and that the qualified (*τὰ ποιὰ*) are in a certain disposition in regard to the matter (*περὶ τὴν ὕλην πως ἔχοντα*), and the particular dispositions in regard to the qualified (*τὰ ἰδίως δὲ πως ἔχοντα περὶ τὰ ποιὰ*). But since the qualified themselves are nothing, except matter in a certain disposition, the dispositions again revert to the matter and will be concerned with the matter."

Many of Plotinus' arguments are not very significant, since he uses concepts which the Stoics themselves did not use. The Stoics, for instance, so far as I have been able to determine, did not distinguish between the prior and the posterior, or between potentiality and actuality, and yet it is these concepts which form the basis of Plotinus' criticism in the first sections (VI, 1, 25-6). In discussing the relation of matter and God, Plotinus distinguishes between matter and form (VI, 1, 26-7). Here too he departs from Stoic doctrine, since the Stoics did not recognize

the existence of form (I, 65 and 494; II, 278 and 365), but regarded matter and quality as inseparable.<sup>38</sup>

In the course of his discussion Plotinus argues that if God is substratum he must be matter in a certain disposition (*ὑλη πως ἔχουσα*, VI, 1, 27). He maintains also that, if the qualified (*τὰ ποιά*) is qualified matter (*ὑλην ποιάν*), the *λόγοι* which are immanent in matter, although they are not material, will consist of matter and form (VI, 1, 29). Plotinus is assuming throughout that the substratum of God or logos is matter, and fails to recognize the fact that substratum in Stoic philosophy may be either an unqualified substratum, a common quality (i.e. the genus or species), or a particular qualified entity (cf. von Arnim, II, 374). God could properly be called substratum in a certain disposition since he was a *πνεῦμά πως ἔχον*, but the *πνεῦμα*, as a substratum, was quality rather than matter.<sup>39</sup> Plotinus is right in believing that the substratum was recognized as substance (VI, 1, 27), since Chrysippus, as we have seen, regarded the common quality, which was also the substratum, as substance,<sup>40</sup> but wrong in identifying the substratum with matter.

Plotinus' argument that if God is a substratum there must be something external to the substratum which will act upon it (VI, 1, 27) rests on a misunderstanding of Stoic philosophy. The active power was in the logos itself working out from within. God, we are told, runs through matter as honey through the honeycomb (I, 155).

When Plotinus asks, if God is a substratum, of what will he be the substratum, he may be answered easily (VI, 1, 27). God like all quality was a substratum for further differentiations, and these in turn, as differentiations, were a manifestation of the logos. If Plotinus is correct in using the logos as an example of the qualified (*ποιός*, VI, 1, 29), we might assume that the Stoics classified the logos or quality (*ποιότης*) under the wider term qualified (*ποιός*).

Plotinus' interpretation of the Stoic concept of body (*σῶμα*) is also questionable. As I pointed out in my earlier article, the term seems to have designated a capacity to act or be acted upon,

<sup>38</sup> See my previous article, pp. 51-2.

<sup>39</sup> For quality as a substratum, see above, p. 67.

<sup>40</sup> See above, p. 68.

and not a three-dimensioned body or a three-dimensioned body with resistance.<sup>41</sup>

In conclusion I shall try to summarize what can be determined regarding the meaning of the four categories. The two categories, substratum (*ὑποκείμενον*) and qualified (*ποιός*) may go back to Chrysippus' distinction between the common and particular quality. The common quality was the unqualified substratum, which was usually the genus or species; the particular quality was the qualified entity (cf. II, 374). In that case, both the substratum and the qualified entity were substrata subject to further differentiation. So far as I have been able to discover from passages in von Arnim the word "qualified" always denoted a particular qualified entity.<sup>42</sup> As a particular kind of substratum, it was not further analyzed into substratum and disposition.

There are two possible meanings for the term disposition (*πὺς ἔχον*) "making its substratum in a certain disposition" or "being in a certain disposition." According to Rieth, disposition referred to the quality as making its substratum in a certain disposition.<sup>43</sup> He maintained that such things as disposition (*ἔξις*), science (*ἐπιστήμη*), and perception (*αἴσθησις*) were *πνεύματά πως ἔχοντα* (II, 379, 132, and 71), giving matter its quality. From the sentence in Simplicius which refers to sweet and bitter and those things which dispose in a certain way (165, 35 = II, 403, 25: *τὸ γλυκὺ καὶ πικρὸν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὅσα τοιῶσδε διατίθουσιν*), Rieth concluded that sweet and bitter also were *πὺς ἔχοντα* which make the matter "disposed according to the differentia."

If Rieth was right in assuming that disposition meant "making its substratum in a certain disposition," the phrase should be applied to the differentiation and not to the substratum, but this does not seem to be the case. In all the examples that I have been able to find, disposition refers to the quality only when the quality is itself a substratum for another differentiation.

There is no doubt that all the qualities were *πνεύματά πως ἔχοντα*. This is attested particularly by a fragment of Chrysippus which states that the dispositions (*ἔξεις*) were air, and that air

<sup>41</sup> See my previous article, p. 57.

<sup>42</sup> For *ποιός* see II, 173, 175, 323a, 369, 391, 624; III, 255.

<sup>43</sup> Rieth, *op. cit.*, pp. 77-84.

caused each of those things which were organized under one disposition to be qualified (II, 449). But Chrysippus argued also that each quality was a particular qualified substance corresponding to its co-ordinate qualified entity or predicate.<sup>44</sup> The qualities were not all one but each was a particular qualified *πνεῦμα*. It seems likely, therefore, that justice was a *πνεῦμα* qualified in a certain way, and courage was a *πνεῦμα* qualified in another way. In that case, the *πνεῦμα* would be a quality which as a substratum was further differentiated.

If we are right in assuming that disposition means "in a certain disposition," it would reasonably include not only the relations, such as sweet and bitter, but differentiae which are not active, as, for example, white and black (II, 403).

Both disposition (*πὺς ἔχον*) and relative disposition (*πρὸς τί πὺς ἔχον*) were differentiations of the substratum, and as differentiations they were manifestations of the *λόγος* or *πνεῦμα*. The differentiation might be externally or internally related to something external to itself. If it were externally related, it was disposition; if it was internally related, it was relative disposition.

What was the role of the four categories, substratum, qualified, disposition, and relative disposition in Stoic philosophy? It is clear, I believe, that the first two were substrata, and the last two, differentiations.

MARGARET E. REESOR.

THE WOMAN'S COLLEGE OF  
THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA.

---

<sup>44</sup> See above, note 17.



## THE IDENTITY OF PLUTARCH'S LOST *SCIPIO*.

One pair of the *Parallel Lives* of Plutarch, and this in all likelihood the first of the whole work, has been lost to us. These biographies were the Ἐπαμεινώνδας and the Σκιπίων and are so named in the Lamprias catalogue, No. 7.<sup>1</sup> That catalogue, however, also lists a separate biography entitled Σκιπίων Ἀφρικανός, No. 28, and a question therefore arises concerning the identity of the Scipios in these two works. Plainly the figures involved are P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus Maior (236-184 B. C.) and P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus Africanus Numantinus (185/4-129 B. C.), known more simply to history as Scipio Minor. Ziegler, the most recent commentator on this matter, believes that Scipio Maior was treated in the biography paired with the *Epaminondas* and Scipio Minor in the individual work, No. 28 of the catalogue.<sup>2</sup> His argument is mainly based on quotations from certain of the *Lives*. Twice in referring to Scipio Minor and his biography (*Tib. Gracch.*, 21, 7; *Gaius Gracch.*, 10, 5) Plutarch describes him as Σκιπίων ὁ Ἀφρικανός, whereas in his only reference to Scipio Maior (*Pyrrh.*, 8, 5) the plain Σκιπίων is used. If one is willing simply to identify these usages with the titles in the Lamprias catalogue, the problem is quickly solved. Ziegler thinks that the possibilities for comparison of the battles of Leuctra and Zama also favor the selection of the elder Scipio as the Roman in the lost pair. Finally, it has been observed that in *De laude ipsius*, 4 (*Mor.*, 540 D-541 A) Plutarch compared the trial of Epaminondas for retaining the office of Boeotarch illegally with the better known series of trials which involved Scipio Maior.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Konrat Ziegler, *R.-E.*, XXI, s. v. "Plutarchos" (2), cols. 696-702, describes the Lamprias catalogue and gives a complete listing of its titles. Ziegler's long and excellent article on Plutarch was published as a book under the title *Plutarchos von Chaironeia* (Stuttgart, 1949) prior to its appearance in *R.-E.*, XXI (1951). There are a few revisions and bibliographical additions in the latter.

<sup>2</sup> Ziegler, *op. cit.*, cols. 895-6, discusses the problem and gives the bibliography.

<sup>3</sup> Ludwig Peper, *De Plutarchi Epaminonda* (diss. Jena, 1912), pp. 129-31; cited by Ziegler, *op. cit.*, col. 896.

In criticism of this view it first must be noted that in the three references to the Scipios *supra*, the identity of both of them is obvious in context, apart from the addition of ὁ Ἀφρικανός in the case of Scipio Minor and its absence in the case of Scipio Maior. In both the references to Scipio Minor, furthermore, Plutarch repeats the simple Σκιπίων, without adding ὁ Ἀφρικανός, in the course of further describing him in the same paragraphs. Plutarch's usage in these three passages is hardly an adequate basis for a distinction between the two Romans. Moreover, it is not easy to believe that our author consciously preferred to omit the term ὁ Ἀφρικανός when referring to the man who originally won that title, but to use it in identifying his grandson by adoption. As for the other two points in Ziegler's argument, they are circumstantial at best. If there are dramatic possibilities in a comparison of the battles of Leuctra and Zama, the same can be said for a comparison of Leuctra and the final attack on Carthage in 146 B. C., for an argument can be made that in these two struggles the power of Sparta and Carthage was definitively crushed. Lastly, an examination of *De laude ipsius*, 4, shows that the court trials of Epaminondas and the elder Scipio are not directly compared therein. The passage is concerned with situations in which reasonable praise of oneself and one's achievements is proper. To illustrate this point the Theban and the Roman are contrasted with Pelopidas and Cicero respectively in defending their public actions from attack by the political opposition. In view of these inadequacies in Ziegler's somewhat limited criteria for identifying the Scipio of the lost *Parallel Life*, a broader approach to the problem seems desirable. I propose first to consider the probable nature of the other biography in the lost pair, the *Epaminondas*, then to compare the *Epaminondas* with other biographies of the *Lives* which possess similarities to it both as to type of personality and to kind of portrayal by Plutarch, and finally in the light of this information to consider which of the two Scipios more closely approximates to this type of personality and is the more suitable for a similar portrayal.

First of all, our knowledge of the personality and career of Epaminondas makes it relatively easy to describe in general terms the kind of treatment he received from Plutarch. The laudatory tradition concerning him that grew up after his death,

his unsurpassed reputation for integrity, his great achievements at home and in the field, and Plutarch's regional pride in the fame of the Boeotian national hero all combine to make it certain that this biography was most favorable in its portrayal of the character.<sup>4</sup> By nature and training a man inclined to thought and reflection as well as to action, Epaminondas was forced by the circumstances of history, however, to spend most of his adult life in the active service of his native Thebes. But there is sufficient evidence available to reveal the scholarly side of his character. For example, in *Pelop.*, 4, 1, his preference for learning, attendance at lectures, and the study of philosophy are contrasted with the interest of his friend Pelopidas in physical exercise. In fact, philosophy is credited with an enduring influence on Epaminondas.<sup>5</sup> He was fortunate in having for his tutor the famous Pythagorean, Lysis of Tarentum, who after expulsion from that city came to Thebes, where he was welcomed into the home of Polymnis, the father of Epaminondas. Lysis was so effective a tutor that he made Epaminondas a Pythagorean of life-long convictions. To be sure, once he entered public life the opportunities for prolonged study and reflection were forever past, but he never ceased throughout his career to practice the principles of his persuasion. Polybius in commenting on his incorruptibility (XXXII, 8, 6) compares him to Aristides and Athenaeus (X, 419a) illustrates his well-known frugality by describing how like Pythagoras he frequently dined on honey alone. The philosophical and ascetic nature of his character which emerges from the tradition concerning him is a perfect complement to his political and military achievements on behalf of Thebes, and because of this ideal balance between reason and action in the character we can better understand Plutarch's choice of him as the Greek hero in the initial pair of the *Lives*.

Now an examination of the fifty pieces in the *Parallel Lives* reveals a small number of figures whose equal interest in the life of the mind and the practical world makes them very similar to

<sup>4</sup> Swoboda, *R.-E.*, V, s. v. "Epaminondas" (1), cols. 2675-6, discusses the later tradition concerning the Theban hero.

<sup>5</sup> Swoboda, *op. cit.*, col. 2676, gives numerous references on this matter. See especially Plutarch, *De genio Socr.*, *passim*, which portrays the Theban liberators of 379 B. C. in a philosophic discussion in a manner reminiscent of the Scipionic Circle.

the Theban hero. They too receive the highest praise Plutarch can bestow. In this select number are the *Lives* of Brutus, Dion, and Cato Minor, and these together with that of Epaminondas might well be described as the scholar-statesman group of the *Parallel Lives*.<sup>6</sup> All portray men of considerable scholarly and philosophical interests who had for the most part to devote themselves to public service and offices. Brutus is pictured as a combination of philosopher-saint and embattled man of affairs; Dion is his Greek counterpart; and Cato Minor is the Stoic defender of republicanism who acts on his principles to the bitter end. It is interesting to observe the role played by this group in the light of the general plan of the entire work. The *Lives* necessarily excluded career philosophers, artists, and literary men since the Greeks far outnumbered the Romans in these fields and since there was no need to remind the imperial people of Greek cultural supremacy. Hence in a biographical collection devoted entirely to men of action this elite group stands in an ideal position, portraying a type attracted both to the life of the mind and to the world of action. Plutarch himself must have fancied he had much in common with this personality type, to judge from the variety of public offices he held.<sup>7</sup> No doubt this was a factor contributing to these laudatory portraits.

It is against the background of the characteristics of this elite group of the *Lives* as well as of the choice of the Roman who would make the perfect opposite number to Epaminondas that the problem of identifying the lost *Scipio* can best be examined. To this end a comparison of the credentials of the two Scipios is now in order. There is little to choose between them on the basis of military achievements, for both were great commanders and both gained victories which certainly were of the first im-

<sup>6</sup> No one to my knowledge has ever made a comprehensive study of the *Lives* for the purpose of classifying them according to personality types. H. D. Westlake, *C. Q.*, XXXIII (1939), pp. 11-22, made very effective use of this method in analyzing what he called the "chivalrous hero" class, which includes *Timoleon*, *Pelopidas*, *Marcellus*, and *Aem. Paullus*. I hope to publish a paper in the not too distant future which will classify all the *Lives* into six general classes. Such an analysis will help the reader as he faces this huge and seemingly amorphous collection and it will also reveal some of the author's attitudes and problems in treating each of the types.

<sup>7</sup> Ziegler, *op. cit.*, cols. 657-9, describes the various offices and public duties performed by the civic-minded Plutarch.

portance. In the halcyon days of the Republic, however, the moral force of Scipio Minor's character achieved a pinnacle of influence in public affairs which no one before or after him was ever to know at Rome. Plutarch himself recognized this fact with these words (*Tib. Gracch.*, 21, 7): οὐ δοκοῦσι Ῥωμαῖοι μηδένα δικαιοτέρον μηδὲ μᾶλλον ἀγαπῆσαι. Almost a century after his death Cicero immortalized his character and this unsurpassed role in the state in *De Republica* and *De Amicitia*, and though Plutarch came to Latin relatively late in life, these works very likely were read by him. On the other hand, Scipio Maior was never able to approach such a position in the state, even in the years immediately after Zama. Indeed, after a prolonged conflict the power of his political foes was decisively demonstrated in the "Trials of the Scipios," the result of which was Scipio's embittered withdrawal from public life.<sup>8</sup>

Both the Scipios certainly can be called philhellenic, but this term requires some qualification in the case of the elder of the pair. He and a few of his contemporaries demonstrated an interest in things Greek, but the heart of his concern for Greece was of a political nature.<sup>9</sup> In the first two decades of the second century it could hardly have been otherwise. Not until the middle decades of the century with the famous literary and philosophical circle headed by Scipio Minor was there an effective and continuing interchange of ideas between Greek and Roman. Scipio's relations with Polybius and Panaetius were famous, and his influence on the latter's political theory was considerable.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>8</sup> See H. H. Scullard, *Roman Politics 220-150 B. C.* (Oxford, 1951), pp. 82-8; 110-45, for a full account of the vicissitudes of Scipio's career from 201 B. C. until his death, and pp. 290-303 for an excellent analysis of the "Trials." A. H. McDonald, "Scipio Africanus and Roman Politics in the Second Century B. C.," *J. R. S.*, XXVIII (1938), pp. 153-64, gives a briefer treatment of Scipio's activities in the same period.

<sup>9</sup> McDonald, *op. cit.*, pp. 163-4. Ruth M. Brown, *A Study of the Scipionic Circle (Iowa Studies in Classical Philology, I [1934])*, tries to see three phases to the Circle, the first with Scipio Maior and fifteen contemporaries, the second with Scipio Minor and twenty-seven others, the last with Laelius and eleven others. But as J. Wight Duff says in his review of this book, *C. R.*, XLIX (1935), p. 28, though the roots of the Circle went back to Africanus Maior and his companions, they simply made possible the actual flowering of it in the time of Scipio Minor and his friends.

<sup>10</sup> For Polybius, see the comment of K. von Fritz, *The Theory of the*



His own literary production consisted only of speeches, but his patronage of the work of Terence and Lucilius was of lasting importance.<sup>11</sup> Personally affable and of simple habits, a cautious general, yet physically brave, he was also a political conservative aware of the need for progressive legislation. Velleius Paterculus (I, 12, 3) sums him up very well: *omnibus belli ac togae dotibus ingenuique ac studiorum eminentissimus saeculi sui, qui nihil in vita nisi laudandum aut fecit aut dixit ac sensit*. This short comparative analysis of the military achievements, *auctoritas*, philhellenism, and intellectual interests of the Scipios demonstrates, I believe, the qualities which make Scipio Minor the more likely choice for the Roman hero in the first pair of the *Parallel Lives*. His military and political achievements and his leadership of the Scipionic Circle make him a perfect subject for a biography of the scholar-statesman type and for the portrait of the quintessential Roman to be placed opposite the *Epaminondas*. Lastly, there are some considerations about the deaths of these heroes worth noticing. Both Epaminondas and Scipio Minor died at the height of their fame, something which cannot be said of the victor of Zama. Furthermore, from Plutarch's point of view the deaths of Epaminondas and Scipio Minor must have been disastrous for the times.<sup>12</sup> After Mantinea Thebes and Boeotia lost their precarious hegemony and political power in Greece was again hopelessly fragmented. The mysterious death of Scipio in 129 B. C. also removed his stabilizing influence from the state in the middle of the social and constitutional crisis associated with the name of the Gracchi.

KEVIN HERBERT.

BOWDOIN COLLEGE.

---

*Mixed Constitution in Antiquity* (New York, 1954), p. 26; for Panaetius, Adolph Schmekel, *Die Philosophie der mittleren Stoa* (Berlin, 1896), pp. 6 f., 378, 442.

<sup>11</sup> Münzer, *R.-E.*, IV, s. v. "Cornelius" (335), cols. 1460-2, for this point and what follows.

<sup>12</sup> Whatever the failures of the statesmanship of Epaminondas, Plutarch certainly did not recognize them; see J. B. Bury, *A History of Greece to the Death of Alexander*, 3rd rev. ed. by Russell Meiggs (London, 1952), pp. 625-6.



THE LEGISLATION OF SPURIUS THORIUS:  
CORRIGENDA.

In my article in *A. J. P.*, LXXVII, pp. 376-95, I made two excursions into prosopography which I now regret, although they do not affect my main arguments. The first is a minor matter. I found the statement (n. 23, p. 383) that C. Fimbria (cos. 104) was killed in the Cinnan disturbances in several 19th-century commentators on Cicero's *Rhetorica*. It appears to have no ancient authority nor to find other modern support, and accordingly the argument that his identification with the orator in *De Orat.*, II, 91 and *Brutus*, 129 involves an anachronistic past tense in *De Orat.*, *loc. cit.* falls to the ground; but I still think that his placing in the *Brutus* is a possible argument against the identification. The second is graver, and I must plead guilty to oversights so serious that they are as inexplicable to me as they are certainly inexcusable. They concern the stemma of the Claudii Pulchri (Note B, pp. 392-5). It is *certain* that the App. cos. 79 was the father of P. Clodius, Clodia, etc. and the brother of C. Claudius (cos. 92) (*Cael.*, 33 with *Har. Resp.*, 26). That he was the praetor of 89 (*Arch.*, 9) is not absolutely secure. The Fasti Capitolini make it certain that the cos. 92 was the grandson of another Gaius. Since *Cael.*, *loc. cit.* shows that all Claudii in the direct line back from Clodia had held the consulship, at least as far as here concerns us, the father App. C. f. of the consul of 92 was probably the consul of 143, not the App. cos. 130 whose father's *praenomen* is uncertain. Borghesi's emendation of *Planc.*, 51 and the simplified stemma, which I criticised, are thus very plausible.

This result does not, however, preclude there having been one or more parallel branches to whom *Appius ille maior* may have belonged, e. g. the descendants of the cos. 130. Nor is there anything against Münzer's supposition that it was the cos. 130 himself who made the joke in the Senate referred to by Cicero (*R.-E.*, Claudius, no. 11). We do not know when he died, but a date before 91 is likely. The date of the discussion on the Thorian bill is as uncertain as ever.

A. E. DOUGLAS.

THE UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON.

## REVIEWS.

L. P. WILKINSON. *Ovid Recalled*. Cambridge, University Press, 1955. Pp. xviii + 484; 1 pl. \$6.50.

One can say without any qualification that this is, to date, the best existing book on Ovid. In his introduction Wilkinson does justice to the well-known works of Sellar, Rand, Ripert, and Fränkel. But the first did not complete the section on Ovid; Rand's and Ripert's little books are sketches rather than full portraits; and Fränkel's Sather lectures, though suggestive, are very idiosyncratic, not to say "fanciful" as Wilkinson puts it. In contrast, Wilkinson's book is thorough, complete, and admirably balanced. It is not "intended as a contribution to scholarship" and is "addressed primarily to the Latinate reading public." But it is at the same time by far the most extensive and detailed survey of Ovid's total work which we possess and it takes ample account of all the recent scholarly literature. The fact that it is written for a non-scholarly public in a fresh and readable style turns out to be an outstanding asset at which even scholars ought to rejoice.

The book contains an admirable biography (Chapters I and IX) and long but succinct chapters on the *Amores* (IV), the *Heroides* (V), the *Ars Amatoria* (VI), the *Metamorphoses* (VII), the Poems of Exile (VIII-X) and the *Nachleben* (XI-XII). It is equipped with ample citations, bibliography, and indexes of Ovid passages quoted and of proper names (unfortunately there is no topical index). What is so impressive about it is its temperate and humane point of view: Wilkinson has no axe to grind—he does not "suggest for a moment that we should put Ovid back on his pedestal beside Virgil"—but he also sees what the world has lost in losing its hold on Ovid and tries by copious citations and running criticisms to show just what Ovid was and was not. In quoting—and his quotations are abundant—he always gives both the Latin and his own verse translation. The latter is usually in heroic couplets and for the most part clear, economical, and felicitous. It stands up well against such excellent modern versions as those of Baker, Moore, Watts, and Humphries. Much indeed of the book's value lies in this method of citation; we have the Latin text before us and we have, in Wilkinson's English version, a fresh and lively picture of how he, in the first instance, feels about the Latin. The method of citation followed by so many others (e.g. either mere references or a bald prose version) not only makes the reading process very cumbersome but puts an unnecessary barrier between the poet and the reader. We get far closer to Ovid by Wilkinson's method and, moreover, what is so often a forbidding obstacle becomes a positive delight.

The book is full of admirable *aperçus*. I would especially mention his discussion of the elegiac Ovid's debt to his Hellenistic sources (pp. 19-23), of the Elegiac couplet (Chapter III) with his admir-

able use of analogous instances in English verse, of Ovid's humor in the *Amores* (IV *passim*); his balanced treatment of the boring and interesting aspects of the *Heroides*, his rare restraint in his account of the sometimes over-praised *Fasti*, his excellent comments on Heinze's comparison of epic and elegiac narrative (pp. 279-80). I find his chapters on the verse of the exile slightly less interesting than the others but so (with rather few exceptions) is the verse! The two chapters on Ovid in the Middle Ages and in the Renaissance are very compressed yet far more than the usual blinding forest of names and influences which chapters of *Nachleben* so often are. His analyses of Ovid's influence on Chaucer and Shakespeare are exciting. (I do not find his account in the Epilogue of Ovid's decline quite so convincing or interesting: the end of the book is perhaps its least satisfactory part.) But what is most captivating about the work as a whole are the innumerable analyses of the passages cited—analyses which are mostly an enthusiastic underlining of the poet's successful strokes.

Despite all this excellence, however, the book is also somewhat disappointing. To put it bluntly: it says little that is really new, little that gives us a new insight into Ovid or a new conception of his achievement. Nor do I think that this is due solely to the fact that it "is not intended as a contribution to scholarship." The kind of new insight I have in mind does not require the apparatus of technical scholarship so much as the exercise of a truly critical imagination. Let us examine this point a little in relation to Wilkinson's longest chapter (VII) on the *Metamorphoses* (pp. 144-240).

First of all, Wilkinson's discussion of the sources is disappointing. He says (p. 145): "Into the labyrinthine question of Ovid's debt to his predecessors for material I do not propose to penetrate. Fifty years have done little to modify the necessarily tentative conclusions of G. Lafaye and L. Castiglioni in their thorough examination of the subject." But the last fifty years have done much to modify our views as to the general relation of Greek "originals" to Roman "copies" and it is not true that even Ovid (a relatively neglected author) remains where Lafaye and Castiglioni left him. Despite his large bibliography Wilkinson fails to mention the significant work of A. Rohde; he mentions but does not grasp the importance of Hans Diller; and he perhaps more understandably fails to penetrate to the genuine insight beneath the "fanciful" exterior of Hermann Fränkel. The first and primary principle to grasp here is that the *Metamorphoses* was a quite novel undertaking anticipated by no Hellenistic poet and reflecting in a unique way a Roman personality of the Augustan age. Callimachus did *not*, as Wilkinson tells us (p. 152), set out to write in the *Aetia* a *carmen perpetuum* (in Greek: *ᾄσμα διηνεκές*): that he did not do so is precisely why his detractors (the *Telchines* of fragment 1: Pfeiffer<sup>2</sup>) abuse him, as he tells us in so many words. The linkage of the episodes in the *Metamorphoses* has almost nothing in common with that of the *Aetia*: the proper Roman analogies here are, as Pfeiffer points out (*Prolegomena*, I, p. xxxv and *Proc. Classical Assoc.*, XXXVIII [1941], p. 9), the *Fasti* for *Aetia* I-II and Propertius IV for *Aetia* III-IV.

More important, there is so great a spiritual gulf between the

*Metamorphoses* and the *Aetia* that we can only greet with wondering dissent the remark of Wilkinson (p. 155) that "to those . . . familiar with Callimachus, there is nothing novel or unique about the spirit of the *Metamorphoses*." There are Callimachean touches in the *Fasti* and Ovid's other elegiac poems but even there Ovid's subjectivity is something quite different from the peculiar mixture of realism, antiquarianism, irony, and at times genuine religious feeling with which Callimachus approaches his material. Most important: whereas Callimachus like most other Greeks preserves, for all his informality and use of the first person, a cool objectivity and detachment, we feel in Ovid like most other Romans the constant signature of a unique personality. And we feel this no less in his "objective" or epic hexameters than in his "subjective" elegiac narratives (here Heinze was carried away by his stylistic analysis and I myself in my 1938 article went far too far in his direction).

For the sense of personality in Roman literature is not confined to the more obviously confessional lyric, elegy, or letter: the *Aeneid* or the *Annals* are personal in a sense that the *Argonautica* or any Greek history are not. That is, they do not merely reflect a man at a particular juncture of history, as in one sense all literary works do, but they themselves are a highly personal response to events. With this goes a quite new style and technique: Heinze, Pöschl, and others have pointed this out for Virgil but as yet no one (with the shining but partial exceptions of A. Rohde and Hans Diller) has pointed it out for Ovid.

The failure to be clear about this blunts the effect of Wilkinson's occasional admirable *aperçus*. He sees the details and misses the ensemble. He has for example excellent bits on Ovid's "baroque" descriptions, his "pseudo-naïveté," his grotesque realism, his burlesque and humor, the "plastic quality of his art," his religious scepticism, the "mid-summer night's dream" quality of certain scenes, his psychological cleverness and genuine humanity, his "clean-cutness" as opposed to Virgil's and Propertius' "suggestiveness" (p. 237), his rhetoric (which is never just *topoi*), the evident flagging of his interest and inventiveness after Book XI. In all these criticisms Wilkinson reveals a real freshness and even subtlety of appreciation. He correctly warns against over-political interpretations of the poem (such as my own of 1938) or the absurd attempts of scholars to pretend that the divine machinery is always taken by Ovid with epic seriousness or those interpretations of the Pythagoras soliloquy (Book XV) which would make Ovid into a Pythagorean philosopher. His summary of what Ovid did to the Virgilian hexameter is excellent and lucid. What he fails to do is to perceive that all these points are facets of a single style and a single personality. His criticism remains discursive and, in this sense, superficial.

It seems to me that Ovid is very often just a smooth versifier with great verbal adroitness at times verging toward tiresome ingenuity. As an elegist he lacked the personal depth and sense of lived amatory experience which make Catullus and Propertius so interesting; as a writer of hexameter he obviously lacks the seriousness or patriotic-moral force, the "*lacrimae rerum*" or pathetic intensity of the *Aeneid*. When he turned into himself as he did in the *Exilic*

Poems he occasionally moves us but mostly, it must be admitted, reveals a tiresome and unattractive self-pity, a monotony of querulousness that both bores and repels. But at his best—as he is in large sections of *Metamorphoses* I-XI—he reveals in both his humor and in what is most fittingly called his *humanitas*—his instinctive feeling for poor suffering humanity—a conception of life which is to be sure very un-Virgilian and unepic and quite lacking in the kind of personal passion that flashes from Lucretius, Catullus, or Propertius but which is also unique and precious in its own right.

On the one hand, Ovid refuses to admit the super-human pretensions of divinity. The comedy of Apollo's pursuit of Daphne, of Jupiter's tauric wooing of Europa is set against the picture of the solemn conclave of the gods which decreed the flood from the grandeur of the *Palatia Coeli*. (The incongruity of *maiestas* and *amor* here was meant by Ovid—I cannot but think—to have its contemporary Augustan application.) We see this in another way in the contrast of Sol as god and as doting father. On the other hand, Ovid's treatment of such poor mortals as Actaeon, Byblis, Alcyone, Procris, or Pygmalion reveals his sympathy for the strictly human element as it faces the consequences of passion. There is not a trace of the heroic morality of Sophoclean tragedy or Virgilian epic. Here Ovid remains faithful to the Euripidean and Hellenistic conception of human emotion as a *pathos* of which man is the unhappy victim rather than the responsible master. But here also Ovid has developed the heretofore merely mythological idea of metamorphosis into a kind of cosmic sympathy where it is not the gods (save in a thinly symbolic sense) but nature itself which takes pity on suffering humanity. I would agree with Wilkinson (p. 212) that it is wrong to read a conscious system of symbolism into Ovid's mythology. There is not theory here so much as an attitude toward human and non-human nature. We may not like this attitude—we may justly prefer the moral seriousness of Virgil or the passion of Catullus—but we cannot, I think, deny its originality. Above all it is something quite different from the art of a Callimachus, Theocritus, or Apollonius. All these authors, it seems to me quite clear, excelled Ovid (and generally Virgil also) in their ability to see objects and people as they are (compare here Virgil's Dido or Ovid's Medea to the Medea of Apollonius, Virgil's shepherds to those of Theocritus, Ovid's Erysichthon to Callimachus') but none of them gives us the same sense of personal feeling for life,—none of them as narrators seems to stand inside their characters, to feel with and for them as Ovid does. Sometimes this subjectivity does not produce a happy result: it in fact leads all too often to a sacrifice of reality to rhetoric. But when the poet's feelings are really engaged—and these can range from grotesque humor to real pathos—the result is more moving than anything in Alexandrine poetry.

It is of course not quite fair to Wilkinson to demand too much of a book not intended for scholars. It is in a way a tribute to his achievement that we are made so poignantly aware of what he has not done,—of the extent to which his Ovid has not quite come alive. Perhaps I can best word my criticism of this really excellent book by saying that it is too much of an apology for Ovid—a listing of neglected charms—and too little an attempt to see him for what he



is. I think that Fränkel was wrong in much of his detailed exegesis of the poems but I now think he was essentially right in seeing that Ovid had still something quite important to say to his age and to us. What I miss in Wilkinson is this kind of perception: his book lacks the underlying insight which would have given it unity. But it remains, as I have said at the outset, the best existing book on Ovid.

BROOKS OTIS.

HOBART COLLEGE.

---

HEINE MELLE MULDER. *Publii Papinii Statii Thebaidos Liber Secundus commentario exegetico aestheticoque instructus*. Groningen, De Waal, 1954. Pp. 390. \$4.00 (obtainable from H. M. Mulder, Jan van Arkelstraat 15, Kampen [Nederland]).

Among the many services of Professor P. J. Enk to Latin studies must be included the zeal with which he inspired two of his pupils at the University of Groningen to take up the challenge presented to modern scholarship by the exegesis of the *Thebaid*. Dr. Mulder's edition of the second book now takes its place beside that of the first by H. Heuvel (Zutphen, 1932), from which it differs by dispensing with a Dutch translation, by stating that the Latin commentary is aesthetic as well as exegetic, and by adding a full bibliography and index. Apart from an edition, which resembles Heuvel's, of the burial of Opheltis (VI, 1-295) by their fellow-countryman at Utrecht, H. W. Fortgens (Zutphen, 1934), and another, more recently, of the eleventh book in the form of an unpublished London thesis by the Rev. A. G. Maher (mentioned by J. Boussard, *R. E. L.*, XXX [1952], p. 220, n. 2), these two doctoral dissertations of Heuvel and Mulder are unique so far in providing any part of this tantalizing epic with the kind of commentary which is badly needed for the whole poem.

The differences between Mulder's text and that of A. Klotz (Leipzig, Teubner, 1908) are so few that, instead of a critical apparatus, a dozen footnotes suffice to indicate them. They are mostly concerned with punctuation, but, in addition to two orthographical changes, Mulder adopts *tu* for *tum* at 265, *in pectore* for *in pectora* at 327, and Alton's *inpediunt* for *inpeditant* at 590. Of these substitutions, the first presents a less likely monosyllabic elision and does not improve the sense, the second seems unnecessary, and the third is a slight improvement.

Three main divisions of *Thebaid* II are recognized in the mission of the ghost of Laius from the underworld in order to exacerbate Eteocles (1-133), the marriage of Adrastus' daughters to Tydeus and Polynices (134-374), and the embassy of Tydeus to Eteocles (375-743). In his introductory remarks to each of these sections within the commentary and in other notes Mulder is anxious to defend the literary art of Statius from strictures like those of Léon Legras, whose *Étude sur la Thébaïde de Stace* (Paris, 1905) has been responsible to some extent for the low opinion in which this poet was held during the next fifty years. What the *Thebaid* needs



now to correct the impression left by Legras is, as Mulder observes in his Praefatio, an adequate commentary on the poem as a whole in addition to a book like Heinze's *Virgils Epische Technik*, but he is quick to add that Statius is an unlikely and unrewarding subject for a study like Pöschl's more recent *Die Dichtkunst Virgils, Bild und Symbol in der Äneis*.

The poet was apparently an innovator in his treatment of the story as he was in his language, for example with the summons of Laius' ghost from the underworld at Jupiter's behest, with the decision by lot whether Eteocles or Polynices should reign first, and with the mission of Tydeus to Thebes. Arguments that Statius betrays lack of structural skill amid his departures from precedent may be based, in Mulder's opinion, on misunderstanding of the poem. Legras, for instance, regarded as "un excès évident" the intervention of both the Fury and Jupiter in order to promote enmity between the royal brothers, but Mulder defends both actions cogently. Much, too, is said in the commentary about the rôle of Adrastus in the *Thebaid* as a "rex optimus, pietate insignis, sapiens quasi Stoicus" (to quote from the Index) instead of the bellicose monarch of tradition.

As for the linguistic innovations, the most serious problem for editors of Statius is to decide whether unparalleled usages are authentic or corrupt. On 5: *Styx inde novem circumflua campis* Mulder observes that *campis* is dative and that no other examples of this construction with *circumflua* are cited by the *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae*. He may of course be right in seeming to accept this fact without more ado. But should *campis* be altered to *gyris* with W. B. Anderson (*Proc. Camb. Philol. Soc.*, CLXXVIII [1941-5], p. 10, which is one of the very few relevant articles unnoticed by Mulder) rather than to *ripis* with Bentley? Or does the proximity of *noviens Styx interfusa* to *campi* in Verg., *Aen.*, VI, 439-41 favor the retention or the rejection of *campis*?

The commentary is copious, lucid, and more extensive than that of Heuvel on the first book. Variant readings are carefully discussed and no effort is spared to illustrate the meaning of the poet. Some of the notes are perhaps over-lengthy or contain elementary material, e. g. on 158 f. we find "*natae metri causa pro filiae (- - -) scribitur*"; but to complain about this occasional tendency would be ungrateful. Instead the following observations are offered without intent to detract from the credit due to the editor for his wide learning and careful exposition.

58. *per Arcturum*, which Mulder, like Lactantius, correctly understands as "northwards," may be paralleled by Luc., X, 289: *in Borean is rectus aquis mediumque Boeten* describing the general course of the Nile.

380. The *Sisyphii portus* might have been named as Cenchreae and Schoenus on the eastern side of the Isthmus, which was the route taken by Tydeus. In the note on 382 (not 381) *praetervectus Nisum*, there is no need to refer to the indirect and to ignore the direct part of Lactantius' comment: "Megaram significat, in qua Nisus regnavit." In that on 383: *laevus abit*, there is no mention of *ω's habet*, which is supported by I, 384 (see Alan Ker, *C. Q.*, n. s. III [1953], pp. 175-6).

400-1. On *astriferum iam velox circulus orbem | torsit et amissae redierunt montibus umbrae* the notes give only a partial explanation, for *circulus* is the ἐνιαυτοῦ κύκλος of Eur., *Phoen.*, 477 and *astriferum orbem* is primarily the zodiac. The meaning is "the year has swiftly brought the zodiac with its signs round in a full circle" (in relation to the position of the sun). Statius' meaning is slightly more recondite than that of Verg., *G.*, II, 402: *atque in se sua per vestigia volvitur annus*, which Mulder quotes on 402 for a different purpose. As for 401, approval is rightly given to Lactantius' explanation that the *umbrae* are now as they were a year earlier, when Eteocles became king. Nor is Mulder in any doubt that the *umbrae* have nothing to do with "the shade of the leaves which have fallen and grown again" (the interpretation of the Loeb translator, J. H. Mozley, to whose errors Mulder regularly calls attention). But in merely detecting an antithesis, which is not to the point here, in the two sentences of 400-1 between night and day, Mulder misses the real significance of *amissae redierunt montibus umbrae*. The higher the sun is in the sky, the shorter are the shadows, cf. Ov., *Met.*, III, 50: *fecerat exiguas iam sol altissimus umbras* and 144: *iamque dies medius rerum contraxerat umbras*. So, when Tydeus tells Eteocles that the mountains are casting their shadows again, he means that the sun is again low in the heavens in his annual course, and the time is winter when, to a Roman poet, a new year has begun for alternating kingship as for later magistracies. Tydeus' subsequent language in 403-5 is appropriate to that season: *et te iam tempus aperto | sub Iove ferre dies terrenaque frigora membris | ducere*. Although Mulder says here of *ferre dies*: "significatur ergo molestia solis ardoris" because he again sees an antithesis between day and night, two of his parallels (*sub Iove frigido* and *gelido . . . sub Iove* from Horace and Claudian respectively) seem to tell a different story.

671-2. *clipeum nec sustinet umbo | mutatum spoliis*. Mulder attempts to justify *umbo* as Tydeus' "elbow" and accepts Vollmer's opinion that the hero's shield, which Statius describes as *mutatum spoliis*, "durch die zahlreichen Speerwürfe fast seines Leders beraubt war." This seems less likely than Anderson's punctuation (*op. cit.*, pp. 11-12) with a semicolon after *sustinet* and alteration of *mutatum* to *mutatur* (or *mutatus*), whereby the meaning becomes: "and he (Tydeus) can no longer hold his shield; the shield is exchanged for spoils," i. e. Tydeus, as Anderson adds, "drops his shield and picks up some portable spoils from his slain enemies instead."

"De versu caesura carente cf. vs. 448" at 176 f. and another observation on caesura at 248 would seem to require more explanation than is provided by references to L. Lehanneur's Paris thesis of 1878. But there are extremely few grounds throughout for the slightest complaint about technical details. Errata and misprints in this beautifully printed book are rare. "Klotzius" is a misnomer for "Helmius" in the footnote on p. 215, "Trist." should be "Fast." in the Ovidian citation on p. 220, the verse no. of *Fast.* II, 198 should be 138 on p. 249, and Jannaccone's name is misspelled on pp. 339 and 362. Minor misprints occur on pp. 113, 123, 132, and 242.

Dr. Mulder's learning and good sense in dealing with the many

difficulties provided by a single book of the *Thebaid* deserve the highest praise. It is to be hoped that so instructive a commentary will have the success it deserves in recalling attention to the interesting problems and also to the merits of an epic which does not deserve oblivion.

ROBERT J. GETTY.

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO.

---

O. A. W. DILKE. Statius, *Achilleid*. Edited with Introduction, Apparatus Criticus and Notes. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1954. Pp. vii + 162. \$4.25.

The *Achilleid* has its difficulties, but in theme, style, and language it is more straightforward than the *Thebaid*. Therefore, if a revival of interest in Statius as an epic poet is to be encouraged, it is the more suitable work for recommendation to beginners, especially now that it has been equipped for the first time in English with a critical and annotated edition which is competently executed and attractively produced.

A succinct Introduction deals with Statius' life, with the date of composition, theme, synopsis, sources, language and style, grammar and syntax, and character-drawing of the poem, and with the influence of the poet. The MSS are also described and a select bibliography is added. Dilke's concern with "Ueberlieferungsgeschichte" is slight, and he does not discuss the full extent of Klotz's views (summarized with approval by G. Pasquali, *Storia della tradizione e critica del testo*<sup>2</sup> [Florence, 1952], pp. 175-7) concerning the ancestry of the famous Puteaneus, Parisinus 8051 (P).

Whereas Silvia Jannaccone, in the immediate predecessor to this edition of the *Achilleid* (Florence, 1950), paid attention primarily, apart from P, to the three MSS, Etonensis 150 (E), Gudianus 54 (K), and Parisinus 10317 (Q), and designated their agreement by the symbol  $\omega$ , from which Klotz and Garrod had rightly excluded E, Dilke recognizes four groups: (i) P, (ii) E and Monacensis 14557 (R), (iii) Q, K, and Bruxellensis 5338 (C), the last being of slight value, and (iv) Bernensis 156 (B), as well as the *codices deteriores*. Thanks largely to his collations for the first time of R (fourteenth century) and B (eleventh century), of E throughout, and of the other chief MSS anew, the critical apparatus is fuller and more reliable than any provided for the poem so far. The conjectures of earlier scholars are recorded and a count shows that ten of these have been incorporated in the text. (At II, 11 the note in the commentary appears to be correct and the apparatus incorrect with regard to *escendat*, which is to be credited to Kohlmann rather than to Baehrens.) Dilke also adopts two slight changes of his own, *oras* for *auras* at I, 676 and *Ithaces* for *Ithacus* or *Ithacis* at I, 733, and the *partus* of the *deteriores* and other editors is abandoned in favor of *portus* at I, 932.

Klotz, like Kohlmann before him, may have held P in excessive esteem, an extreme instance being his preference at I, 30 for the

unmetrical and "fatuous parenthesis," as Housman called it, of *illa discusso primum subit aera ponto*. It is often not easy to decide whether P's *lectiones difficiliores* are improbable Latinity or examples of what Wilamowitz described as the poet's "inveniendi sollertia et dicendi audacia." As an example of "a superstitious cult of the Puteaneus," W. Morel (*C. R.*, LV [1941], p. 75), followed by Dilke, denounced (in a passage where Achilles describes his training by Chiron) II, 142: *ardentesque errare casas* as giving "both bad sense and bad grammar: bad sense because it is really no exploit to ramble amongst burning huts, and bad grammar because *errare* (in its active forms) cannot govern an object." Nor, as Dilke observes, does there appear to be any parallel for the transitive use of *undare* at I, 86-7: *Acacides . . . sanguine Teucros | undabit campos*; yet, he adds, "*undabit* for *inundabit* seems possible." Why not, then, *errare* for *pererrare* as a description of Achilles' nonchalant endurance as Chiron's pupil (*nec duri tanto sub teste labores*, as he says eleven lines later)? Is the simple verb so much stranger than *ire* for *perire* in Lucr., III, 526?

Diminishing confidence in the tradition represented for the *Achilleid* by P alone is shown by the remarks of Jannaecone, "non può mantenere questo rango" (in emphatic type, ed. p. 15) and Dilke, "modern editors have perhaps been apt to accept too often P's unsupported text" (p. 20). Thus, with R. Helm, Housman, and the Loeb translator Mozley, he rejects P's *unam* for the *unum* of the other MSS in Thetis' speech to Neptune at I, 75-6: *nec tibi de tantis placeat me fluctibus unam | litus et Iliaci scopulos habitare sepulcri*. But there may be implied in *de*, as well as its obvious meaning with *unam*, a suggestion of Thetis' departure from her own element, cf. the direction she takes in I, 121-2: *de litore surgens | Nereis*, when she comes to visit Chiron. Also there may be a hint of kinship in *fluctibus* (cf. in Neptune's reply 92 *infra*: *cognatisque utere fretis: dabo tollere fluctus*), while *tantis* is "so noble," "so worthy of honor" (cf. *si quis adhuc undis honor* three lines earlier). Thetis is beseeching Neptune not to acquiesce in the prospect of her sorrowful sojourn by the tomb of Achilles on the rocky Trojan shore.

At I, 232-3: *prosequitur divam celeresque recursus | securus pelagi Chiron rotat*, Dilke defends the *rogat* of the other MSS against P's *rotat* by citing Ov., *Met.*, VI, 450: *celeris missae spondere recursus*, and Jannaecone adds *Her.*, 6, 59: *dent modo fata recursus*. To Wilamowitz's defense of *rotat* and description of *rogat* as "languidum" in his *De Tribus Carminibus Latinis Commentatio* (Göttingen, 1893), p. 11, it should be added that the pointlessness of *securus pelagi* with *rogat* is well illustrated by Mozley's innocently literal rendering: "careless of the sea entreats her speedy return." But with *rotat* Chiron escorts Thetis and the sleeping Achilles into the water and, untroubled by the sea (cf. I, 684: *it pelago [or pelagi] securus ratis*), canters swiftly round them back to land in an equine gesture of farewell (cf. *erecto prospectat equo* two lines later). For the salutation cf. I, 56-7: *Tyrrhenique greges circumque infraque rotantur | rege salutato*, where the meaning of the verb is clear from the dolphins' lifelike motion in Verg., *Aen.*, VIII, 673-4; and for the noun cf. I, 829: *variosque quater legere recursus*.

At I, 723-4: (*clipeum*) *qui pulcher signis auroque asperrimus; hasta | haec sat erit*, P has *hasta*, BKQ *ardet*, and ER *astat*, which Dilke adopts as well as Garrod's *nec sat erit* in the next line. But *hasta* in addition to *clipeum* is advocated by the mention of both at 852-4 and 879 *infra*.

The explanatory notes, on the whole, are concisely and helpfully informative, but the commentary could have been amplified to advantage, especially if Statius' affinity with his predecessors had been more closely examined and clearly described. For example, the first two words of the poem are thus annotated: "*Magnanimum*. Used by Virgil as an epithet of Aeneas, *Aen.* I, 260; V, 17, 407; IX, 204; by Ovid of Achilles, *Met.* XIII, 298; by St. of various heroes. *Aeaciden*. A frequent Homeric patronymic for Achilles, derived, like *Alcides*, from a grandfather." Now, if four Vergilian references are worth mention, so too is *Aen.* X, 771, and Aeneas and Achilles are not the only *magnanimi* in Vergil and Ovid respectively, for Volcens and *heroes* generally in the one and Anchises, Phaethon, and (probably) Theseus in the other also have this epithet. Furthermore, the note on the second word could have been merged in that on the first with a reference to such a phrase as *Il.* IX, 184: *μεγάλας φρένας Αἰακίδαο*. Other examples of indebtedness in the *Achilleid* to Homer as well as Vergil have been assembled more recently by H. M. Mulder in the volume of essays which was presented to P. J. Enk (*Ut Pictura Poesis* [Leiden, 1955], pp. 119-28).

A selection of miscellaneous comment follows:

P. 8. "Juvenal's complaint about hoarse Codrus's recitations" concerned Cordus, see John G. Griffith, *C. R.*, n. s. I (1951), pp. 138-9.

P. 26. Garrod's edition was reviewed in *B. Ph. W.* by Klotz, not by R. Helm, for whose review see *W. K. Ph.*, XXV (1908), 597-604.

P. 71. In the text at II, 72 *insidiosus* for *imperiosus* may have been corrected by an erratum slip in other copies, but not in that which was sent for review.

P. 80, 6 f. n. *iuvēnem deducere*. It should have been made clear that the verb here means "to escort" and in Manil., I, 3 "to bring down." Duff on Juv., 7, 54 and Dilke here should have spoken of "spinning," not "weaving" (cf. Enk on Prop., I, 16, 41) as the original metaphor.

P. 83, 28 f. n. *coeuntia*. A reference to Val. Fl., I, 284-5 would not be irrelevant, and Prop., II, 1, 22 refers, not to "Xerxes' bridge," but to his canal across the isthmus of Mt. Athos.

P. 85, 48 f. n. *secundi . . . Iovis*. For Neptune so described cf. Sen., *H. F.*, 599, *Phaedr.*, 904; Val. Fl., IV, 130.

P. 87, 64 n. *repostam*. Cf. Val. Fl., IV, 713. Justice is hardly done to this poet or to Lucan in the notes, for the resemblances between both of them and Statius in the *Achilleid* are somewhat more numerous than p. 12, n. 2, might suggest.

P. 87, 66 n. The amatory implication of *furto* should be noticed here and at *Theb.*, VIII, 61, as it is at I, 561 *infra*.

P. 88, 71 n. *semideos*. It is said that no other writers speak of Theseus as having accompanied the Argonauts, but see Plut., *Thes.*, 29, 3; Apollod., I, 9, 16; Hyg., *Fab.*, 14, 5; and cf. Pseud. Dio Chrys., *Or.*, 37, 14.



P. 88, 73 f. n. *aut permitte fretum*. Thetis has just cried to Neptune: *si quis adhuc undis honor, obrue puppes*, i. e. the *puppae* carrying Paris and Helen back to Troy. Dilke translates *aut permitte fretum* by "or entrust the command of the sea to me," and remarks "the omission of *mihi* is perhaps compensated by its emphatic position (after *fas sit*) at the end of the sentence." A glance at the context will show that this is an improbable explanation, for *mihi* is too far away. Statius instead is imitating Neptune's complaint in Val. Fl., I, 644-5; *veniant Phariae Tyriaeque carinae | permissumque putent*, and Thetis is first exclaiming vehemently "sink their ships" and then adding, with ironical disgust, "or else let them have the sea by right."

Pp. 95-6, 147 n. *patria omina*. This expression, Dilke suggests, "applies to the gift of prophecy, perhaps bestowed on Chiron by his father Saturn (Kronos) even if taught him by Apollo." On the other hand the adjective describes Chiron's relationship to Achilles, cf. II, 102: *sic dabat ille pater*. Indeed, according to one story, Chiron was Peleus' maternal grandfather and consequently the great-grandfather of Achilles (W. H. Roscher's *Lexikon*, I, 889 s. v. "Cheiron"), but Statius was probably thinking of the Centaur merely as the foster-father of his young protégé.

P. 111, 388 n. *instabili* . . . *Delo*. Cf also Verg., *Aen.*, III, 73-7.

P. 111, 407 f. n. *umbo*. This word is said to be "more suitably used of a promontory, as here, than of the isthmus of Corinth" in *Theb.*, VII, 15. But is not the *Isthmius umbo* there the *Acrocorinthus*, for which see *Theb.*, VII, 106-7?

P. 123, 574 f. n. *digitosque sonanti infringit citharae*. Here Dilke may be right in preferring *sonanti* to P's *sonantis*, but the meaning is hardly "makes her fingers supple for (playing on) the lyre." As Jannaccone observes, *infrangit* includes a suggestion of Achilles' passionate ardor, cf. I, 888 *infra* and note.

P. 135, 811 n. *virili*. Dilke finds either *virili* or *virilis* "unexpected, since elsewhere Lycopomides' daughters have no manly attributes whatever," but Ulysses is alluding slyly to Achilles whom he has now identified among the maidens.

P. 138, 878 n. *intactae*. That Achilles' clothes "miraculously fell off their own accord" is possible, but if *intactae* with *vestes* could be taken as amounting to "maidenly," the word would have more point. Cf. the concluding words of this scene in 884-5 *infra*: *Peleaque virgo quaeritur* ("Peleus' daughter is looked for in vain").

P. 140, 908 ff. n. *turba*. This word hardly includes Lycopomides, who, according to his own statement in 775 ff. previously, is now too old for warfare. Therefore Prop., IV, 11, 76, as a parallel for three people designated as a *turba*, is not so apposite here as Ov., *Met.*, I, 355 and VI, 200 would be for two.

The *Achilleid*, like any book of the *Thebaid*, needs a fuller commentary than is supplied in Dilke's edition, which, however, in this and other respects is unquestionably superior to that of Jannaccone or of Brinkgreve (Rotterdam, 1913). But, even if Dilke's judgments are sometimes debatable and his illustrative comments could be improved by greater familiarity with other poets of the Silver Age, he has done his author and Latin poetry in general a service



with a work which should attract favorable attention to a pleasant little epic. With its many merits and a high standard of scholarship which is the aim of the editor throughout, this edition bears witness to the fact that the younger Latinists of the United Kingdom are not unworthy successors to the generation which numbered Postgate and Housman.

ROBERT J. GETTY.

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO.

La Notion du Divin, depuis Homère jusqu'à Platon. Sept exposés et discussions par H. J. ROSE, PIERRE CHANTRAINE, BRUNO SNELL, OLOF GIGON, H. D. F. KITTO, FERNAND CHAPOUTHIER, W. J. VERDENIUS. Vandœuvres-Genève, 8-13 Septembre 1952. Publié avec le concours de la Bollingen Fondation, 1954. Pp. viii + 308. (*Fondation Hardt pour l'Étude de l'Antiquité Classique, Entretiens*, I.) (Available in U. S. A. from Walter J. Johnson, Inc., 125 E. 23rd St., New York.)

Not only on its title page but in all respects this volume is a welcome and notable example of international scholarly collaboration. The conference reported here was held (September 8-13, 1952) in Switzerland under the auspices of a Swiss society, the publication was assisted by the Bollingen Foundation of New York, and the actual printing was done by the Stamperia Valdonega in Verona. The seven scholars who gave the lectures represent five countries, and used either French, German, or English. The discussions that followed each lecture, in which three additional scholars took part, Victor Martin, William Lameere, and Olivier Reverdin, are even more immediately and delightfully polyglot, as questions, answers, and comments succeed one another in any of three languages being used. It is, incidentally, a tribute to the careful work of the compositors and the (unidentified) editor that misprints are almost entirely absent.

It is, however, less the novelty of the presentation than the content that matters. Here too there is every ground for satisfaction. Each speaker was chosen for recognized competence in his particular field, and the lectures, as one would expect, are excellent one and all. What distinguishes the volume from the usual symposium is the open discussion after each lecture. While a few of the lengthier statements sound prepared, for the most part there is every indication of a spontaneous interchange of ideas, of the free give-and-take of informed, critical minds centering on a common problem. It is this that gives the volume a far greater degree of unity than is found in most symposia, however pre-arranged. The opportunity to raise critical objections to the views expressed and to have these objections at once answered opens the way, if not always to a meeting of minds, at least to a clearer definition of the problem and the views concerning it that are tenable.

Since it will not be possible to review in detail the closely argued

content of each lecture, it may be helpful to list the speakers and titles, with occasional comments on points that seemed of particular value.

The Introductory Lecture by H. J. Rose lays the groundwork effectively for what follows. In a typically acute remark he says of the title "Father" used of Zeus: "At least it had the negative aspect that we do not normally find the relation of God and man paralleled to that of master and slave; it is rather that of the senior and junior members of a family."

In "Le Divin et les Dieux chez Homère" Chantraine proceeds from an exhaustive collection of the relevant passages to examine the various aspects of the problem, the meaning ascribed to the words *δαίμων* and *θεός*, divine intervention, the personal and anthropomorphic nature of the gods, destiny, and the relation of the gods to morality. Homeric anthropomorphism, he rightly insists, is a form of rationalism, which is at least comparable to the later attempts to explain obscure or disquieting phenomena by "natural causes." And the fundamental Greek drive to discover order, *τάξις*, in the universe finds expression, even amid the anarchy of the Homeric Olympus, in the sovereignty of Zeus. Yet one may ask whether this "anarchy" is really an inherent aspect of the divine society, and not rather an unintentional by-product of the poet's use of the divine machinery, which dramatically produces a conflict between the gods that the religious consciousness would not normally feel.

As the starting point for his investigation of "Die Welt der Götter bei Hesiod," Bruno Snell takes the catalogs of the Muses and the Nereids. Though at first sight this is rather unpromising material, his analysis shows the importance of Hesiod's attempt to account for all the divine forces active in the world: it was, in fact, his emphasis on the general rather than the particular that opened the way to philosophy. This and his grappling with the problem of evil are the great contributions of Hesiod. The lecture of Gigon, on "Die Theologie der Vorsokratiker," forms a natural and effective sequel. The philosophers were concerned, not with the cults practiced in the *polis*, but rather with the general ideas that had come to the fore in and through the work of the poets. Ionian philosophy, he finds, had two primary aims: the recognition of celestial phenomena as natural, not as fearsome manifestations of divine intervention, and the attempt to fix and define the place of the Divine in the universe.

The essay by Kitto, "The Idea of God in Aeschylus and Sophocles," is written with his customary clarity and reveals the sure touch of the finest critic of ancient drama in our day. Without going into his interpretations in detail, we may note that he emphasizes the double plane, human *and* divine, on which the dramatic action takes place. This does not mean, as is so often said by people who should know better, that the human actors are blind puppets of Fate, or Destiny, or the Gods. The men and women of the plays are autonomous human beings, with full moral responsibility for their acts. But the gods are also concerned and active, and repeatedly the poets reveal to us a double motivation for what takes place, one purely human, the other divine. These are coordinate:

the gods are indeed *θεοὶ μεταίτιοι*, and the "addition of the divine plane gives to the action the authority of a universal, together with the sharpness of a particular." However else they differ, in this point the two poets are in full agreement.

"Euripide et l'accueil du divin" is one of the last works of F. Chapouthier and appeared only after his untimely death. He finds three tendencies present in the work of this most baffling of the three ancient tragedians. In part he is a traditionalist, accepting the gods at face value and fascinated with the forms of inherited cult and ritual. Again, he shows a strongly negative and critical attitude towards the gods, especially as regards the moral value or the truth of the myths told about them. Finally there are certain positive features that enrich his concept of the divine, of which perhaps the most significant is his linking of the divine with the inner spiritual life and conscience of the individual. This marks an important step towards the later development of pagan—and Christian—mysticism.

Finally, there is the highly suggestive paper by Verdenius, "Platons Gottesbegriff." Perhaps the key idea of his presentation is the recognition that to the Greeks "God" is primarily a predicate term. "Der griechische Gott ist nicht göttlich, weil er Gott ist, sondern er ist Gott, weil er etwas Göttliches ist." One consequence is that, for Plato: "je göttlicher, um so unpersönlicher," and we find here also the basic difference between the Platonic (or in general, the Greek) concept of the Divine and the Christian concept.

This review could attempt no more than to suggest the riches contained in this volume. It is a book that merits reading, and re-reading. The Foundation Hardt has earned our congratulations, and we may look forward eagerly to additional "Entretiens sur l'antiquité classique," of which the second has just been announced.

FRANCIS R. WALTON.

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY.

---

JAN-OLOF TJÄDER, editor. *Die nichtliterarischen lateinischen Papyri Italiens aus der Zeit 445-700. I, Papyri 1-28; III, Tafeln 1-160.* Lund, C. W. K. Gleerup, 1954. Pp. 522. (*Skrifter utgivna av Svenska Institutet i Rom*, XIX, 1, 3.)

Not all papyri come from the valley of the Nile. There is a famous group of Latin documents, deriving chiefly from the archives of the church of Ravenna, which unaided by the Egyptian climate successfully passed through all vicissitudes and are extant today. The first mention of them is in a letter sent in 1433 to Cosimo di Medici, the grandfather of Lorenzo, and Jacques Cujas in 1561-62 was the first to read any of them. In 1805 Gaetano Marini gathered them and some others (including, alas, a few forgeries) between the covers of one book (*I papiri diplomatici raccolti ed illustrati*). Although a good number of the pieces were subsequently republished here and there, Marini's volume has by and large served as

the standard edition. Now Jan-Olof Tjäder, who has already distinguished himself for a number of significant articles on the Latin cursive, has provided a new and up-to-date edition of the most important segment of Marini's work.

The present edition in no way replaces the earlier. It is limited to those private documents which were written in Italy in the fifth to seventh centuries (Marini's pieces span six centuries) and for which an original still exists. The year 700 forms a convenient terminus, for the documents break abruptly here; the next to follow chronologically date a full century and a half later. In the present work there are 55 items. Unfortunately it was impossible to print the whole at once. The volumes under review are I, containing Nos. 1-28 and III, an atlas of plates of all fifty-five. Volume II, devoted to Nos. 28-55 (chiefly contracts) will appear in the future. An important papyrus that dates between 425 and 450 and would thus form the earliest of the group was unfortunately discovered too late to be included (cf. pp. 32 and 66). Of the 55, 36 certainly derive from the Ravenna archive and perhaps all do but, since there is some uncertainty, Tjäder prefers to call them "Italian" rather than "Ravenna" papyri.

Since a complete replacement for Marini, i. e. the publication of all the mediaeval papyri extant, would be a hereculean task, Tjäder's decision to stop considerably short of this is fully understandable. However, he has made a great contribution to such a project for he has provided in his general introduction a series of exhaustive lists which form a perfect starting point for anyone who cares to undertake it. These present, with bibliography and indication of present whereabouts: (1) all the mediaeval Latin papyri not included in the present publication (Verzeichnis B, pp. 37-52; 78 entries); (2) those that would have been included had the originals been still extant (Verzeichnis A †, pp. 52-6; 12 entries); (3) all others whose originals have been lost (Verzeichnis B †, pp. 56-64; 45 entries).

Tjäder is a skilled palaeographer and his foremost contribution is in this field. It is no doubt because of this particular interest that the volume of plates provides full reproductions of all the pieces included, a practice which has become extremely rare in papyrological publications of the last few decades. He has read all but four from the originals and his emendations of Marini's texts or those of subsequent editors number in the hundreds; one can place complete confidence in his scrupulously accurate transcripts. In one instance (No. 18-19) he has brought together two pieces which had hitherto been considered parts of separate documents. In a lengthy introduction he discusses the script in detail, reproducing each letter and showing how it appears in various combinations (pp. 86-128), and provides one exhaustive list of the different methods of abbreviation practised by the scribes (pp. 132-46) and another of their numerous orthographic aberrancies (pp. 146-65). As illustrative material for the development of the script he reproduces the relevant portions of Marichal's catalogue of Latin papyri from Egypt (pp. 88-95), adding a few items that were published after Marichal wrote (1950). Illustrative examples from inscriptions and literature, etc. for the orthographical and phonological variants are generally in-

cluded in the commentaries to the individual pieces. Surprisingly, Tjäder has not used for this purpose the material from Egypt although it offers many illuminating parallels (e.g., cf. the list in *P. Colt*, II, pp. 12, 13, 17 with Tjäder's, pp. 146-65. Especially striking is the parallelism in the use of unassimilated forms; cf. *P. Colt*, II, p. 17 and Tjäder, pp. 164-5).

The documents are all well known and some are even famous. Only four are not to be found in Marini and of these only one has never been published before. The twenty-eight of the present volume include estate records, wills, an appointment of a guardian, a release and—the heart of the collection—nineteen donations, in most of which the church of Ravenna figures as beneficiary. No. 2 is the famous piece that mentions property confiscated from the Arians by Justinian and handed over to the church of Ravenna (the wheels of bureaucracy turned no faster then than now: the transfer probably started in 557; by 565 it still had not been completed). No. 10-11 is the equally famous document concerned with a piece of property near Syracuse that Odoacer had donated to Pierius, one of his powerful supporters. All walks of life are represented from Stephanus, *vir illustris et magnificus* (No. 18-19) through a well-to-do silk merchant (4-5.B V 11-VI 2) to a tailor (14-15) and an ex-slave (20). Many illiterates appear and not only from among the lower classes: a man could become a subdeacon or make his way to the command of a *numerus* without being able to read or sign a document with anything but a cross (Nos. 8, 23). All the pieces offer rich material for the social and economic life of the times which, with the appearance of this new edition, may be used more than it has in the past. (Neither Dill in his *Roman Society in the Last Century of the Western Empire* nor Bury in his *Later Roman Empire* even mentions the documents; Stein's *Hist. du Bas-Empire* lists Marini in the bibliography but hardly utilizes the volume for socio-economic evidence).

For each piece Tjäder provides a bibliography, text, translation, apparatus, and commentary. The last is particularly good on palaeographic, grammatical, and orthographic points, and fully adequate in the identification of personalities and the explanation of administrative and legal terms. In addition, the nineteen documents dealing with donations are preceded by a long introduction (pp. 250-79) that classifies the various elements found in such instruments and traces their development (Tjäder concludes that a complete change of procedure took place in the middle of the sixth century and raises the question of how much this was due to the introduction of Greco-Byzantine practices and how much to the influence of the church).

Ten pieces which fall within the limits of this volume have been omitted because their originals are no longer extant (pp. 52-6). The texts of three of them are reproduced in various connections (P† 2 on p. 299, P† 6 on p. 396, P† 7 on p. 370) but for the others one must go to Marini. This decision is open to question. It arose perhaps from the author's particular concern with palaeography, for such pieces are, to be sure, useless from that point of view. Their value as sources of linguistic evidence is also probably doubtful since one cannot check whether a given aberrant form



came from the pen of the ancient scribe or the modern editor. But to those who use the papyri as sources for economic or social or legal history, a transcript even admittedly imperfect can still supply significant information.

If Tjäder has been successful as a palaeographer, he has signally failed in some of the fundamental duties of an editor of papyri. Scholars have been publishing such volumes for well over half a century and they have gradually achieved a standard technique. For some reason Tjäder did not use these as a model and, as a result, he has seriously curtailed the usefulness of his volume. Decades ago it was recognized that the key to an edition of papyri was its indexes; if anything, papyrus publications are over-indexed, if such a thing is possible. Tjäder provides merely an index of names, a miserably inadequate index of selected words, and an equally inadequate general index (I even found an omission in one of the few places where the index purports to be exhaustive: the rubric *numerus* [p. 521], presumably to be followed by all occurrences, omits *numerus Dacorum* No. 18-19.29, 64). In routine checking of various points I had to skim over each text half-a-dozen times simply because there was no index verborum. The omission was so striking that at first I thought that complete indexes were to be included in the second volume, but there is an express statement to the contrary (p. 14).

It is the practice of most modern editors to number the lines of a document consecutively no matter whether the papyrus is written in parallel columns or whether it consists of several separate fragments. This makes reference to it as simple as possible. Tjäder has not followed this system. If the original papyrus consists of two pieces he assigns it a hyphenated number, e. g. No. 4-5, No. 18-19. He changes the line numbering with each column and he occasionally introduces the marking of separate fragments by letters. The only way a user can refer, say, to the 33rd line of the well-known piece containing notices of a series of wills is by the monstrosity "P. 4-5.B II 10," thereby nearly trebling the chances of making an error. Then, to compound the complexity, instead of referring entries in the apparatus criticus and the commentary to line numbers, he has introduced two further systems of reference: superscript letters for the first and superscript numerals for the second. Lastly, the commentaries are all inconveniently lumped together in a section at the back of the book. This sort of thing is generally done to save composition costs; in a publication that costs over \$30 we can legitimately expect to have commentary accompany document.

The apparatus criticus is held down to a minimum. Tjäder's readings are so clearly superior to those of his predecessors that it would have served no purpose to perpetuate them and he has wisely refrained from doing so, except where uncertainty still exists. He has wisely refrained as well from cluttering the apparatus with the correction of common orthographical variants. He has, however, gone further and excluded corrections of scribal blunders. This move was ill-advised. The scholar who picks up this book merely to consult certain references—and there will be many more such than those who read it from cover to cover—will often be puzzled. He will wonder whether the modern editor or the ancient scribe com-



mitted *perfecte* (13.39) or *epodecta* (20.91) or *Crihsogonus* (18-19.B 41). The explanation of the first is buried in a note to a later line in the document (13.48, comm. 12) and the second can be found in the list of orthographical variants in the general introduction (p. 162); one gets no light on the third until one reaches the index of personal names. When an orthographical variant leads to confusion, Tjäder enters the correct form in the apparatus. But he is not at all thoroughgoing: e. g., *relicta* for *relecta* is noted in No. 13 but left without comment in Nos. 4-5, 6, 8.

I mentioned above the general high quality of the commentary. Only here and there did I note points which deserved and did not receive comment and these were mostly minor (e. g., the consistent use in No. 16 of the nominative *Theodosiacus* instead of the genitive calls for a note, and words like χρυσοκαταλλάκτης in 16.38 or *proemptor* in 4-5.B VI 4, which are certainly rare if not hapax, should have been signalized for the lexicographers). However, some of Tjäder's exasperating practices have crept into this portion of his work as well. The first appearance of an illiterate in the documents is 4-5.B IV 4 and they occur frequently thereafter. Tjäder has very nicely summarized the evidence of his papyri on this score—and buried it in a footnote on p. 271 with absolutely no cross references in the commentaries. The use of the term *uncia* as a fraction of a holding first occurs in No. 8.II 15 and often elsewhere. Not until the commentary to 16.12 does Tjäder cite Lécrivain, *Partage oncial* and he provides no cross references to this note. (In one sense it doesn't matter since he has omitted the full citation of this work from the general bibliography and I was unable to track it down.) An article on the "noms bizarres adoptés par les premiers chrétiens" is cited for *Prejecticius* in No. 4-5.B III 11, but *Cumquodeus* (2.15) and *Deusdedit* (4-5.B VII 2), which seem just as bizarre, are left without comment. Syrians first appear in the documents in No. 4-5.B VI 14 but no citation of bibliography occurs until 20.83 and, again, no cross references are provided. Bibliography for *horrearius* and *defensor* is not to be found in the commentaries at all; it is included, of all places, alongside the entries for those words in the index.

I have noted a few points which need comment or correction. For additions to the list of wills from Egypt on pp. 192-3 see now R. Taubenschlag, *The Law of Greco-Roman Egypt* (second edition, Warsaw, 1955), pp. 193-4. The explanation furnished for XMT in comm. 7 to 6.23 is now out of date; cf. *P. Colt*, 7 introd. and A. D. Nock's review in *Speculum*, XXVI (1951), p. 505, as well as the commentary to *P. Mich.*, 378. *Sana mente integroque consilio* which occurs in the Roman wills (e. g., 4-5.A 10, cf. comm. 4) perhaps is to be connected with the formula νοῦν καὶ φρονῶν which is found so frequently in Greco-Egyptian wills; cf. H. Kreller, *Erbrechtliche Untersuchungen*, pp. 309-10. In 4-5.B VI 13 and VI 6, *olosiricoprata* is a "Seidenhändler" rather than a "Seidenfabrikant." On p. 258 Tjäder points out that Justinian's Nov. 47, issued on 31 August 537, which introduced a new system of dating documents, only gradually affected the scribes' practices: the old system was used until 552, new and old from 552 to 557, and only from then on did the new fully supplant the old. The evidence from the Egyp-

tian papyri is not nearly so cut and dried: some scribes used the new as early as 541 (*P. Cairo Masp.*, 67126) and some clung to the old as late as 565 (*P. Cairo Masp.*, 67109). In No. 14-15.A I 2 and ff., *bracarius* is a maker of leg-bindings rather than a "Strumpfhosenwirker" (p. 308) or "Strumpfwirker" (p. 313), or he may be merely a tailor as in Dioel. Edict. 7.42. In 16.38 *χρυσωκαταλακτις* (for *χρυσωκαταλλάκτης*) is translated "Bankier"; the title is very exact and should be rendered "Geldwechsler." Bankers did a good deal more than deal in foreign exchange. In 20.91 and 124 *epodecta/ypodecta* (i. e., *ὑποδέκτης*) is a "Steuererheber" rather than an "Einkassierer." No. 16.26 (cf. comm. 12), dated ca. 600, mentions a *numerus Theodosiacus* and Tjäder, citing three other occurrences of roughly the same period, quite reasonably conjectures that the unit was named for Theodosius, son of Maurice. An unpublished Colt papyrus dating 512 (to appear shortly as P. Colt 15) refers to an *ἀριθμὸς Θεοδοσιακῶν* stationed in the Negeb. C. J. Kraemer, the editor, argues cogently that the unit was probably activated between 420 and 430 by Theodosius II and that it was disbanded shortly before 600. Was it reactivated in Italy? Or, since the old unit of the same name was now out of existence, was a new one created in Italy and named after Maurice's son?

As I mentioned at the outset, Volume II of this publication has not yet come off the press. I earnestly hope there is still time to add three appendices: (1) a series of indexes such as any standard edition of papyri has or, at the very least, an index verborum; (2) the text of those pieces published by Marini but omitted by Tjäder because their originals were lost; (3) the new papyrus whose discovery came too late to enable it to be included in this volume. Certainly, without the first, it will be impossible for scholars to derive anywhere near the benefits they should from this edition.

LIONEL CASSON.

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY.

---

GIUSEPPE NENCI. Pirro: *Aspirazioni egemoniche ed equilibrio mediterraneo*. Torino, 1953. Pp. 199. (*Università di Torino. Pubblicazioni della Facoltà di Lettere e Filosofia*, V, fasc. 2.)

This book is a protest against the anecdotal picture of Pyrrhus, prevalent in both ancient and modern times, and an attempt, as the title implies, to understand Pyrrhus and his policies in the light of conditions in the Mediterranean in the first decades of the third century B. C. In the first two chapters Nenci grapples at length and somewhat repetitiously with the problem of the sources. He maintains convincingly that Pyrrhus' personality lent itself to biographical treatment and that in the course of the third century two biographical traditions developed about him—a popular and eulogistic one, and a hostile one produced by the Cynics to whom Pyrrhus was the perfect example of the man who was never satisfied with his lot. The arguments that behind these biographical treatments stood

Pyrrhus' own autobiography (*ὑπομνήματα*), traces of which can be detected in Frontinus, are not particularly convincing. The author is undoubtedly correct that the biographical accounts, because of their inclusion of only carefully selected material, give a rather distorted picture of Pyrrhus. His aim to free himself as much as possible from the biographical tradition is certainly commendable, but, since there are few other sources on Pyrrhus, the result is that, when he tries to analyze Pyrrhus' policies, he often has to resort to speculation or downright guessing.

The main theme of the book is the close collaboration between Pyrrhus and the first two Ptolemies. It is known that Pyrrhus with his wife Antigone, stepdaughter of Ptolemy I, was restored with Ptolemaic help to Epirus in 296. There seems little doubt that in the following years his activities against Demetrius (not Antigonus, p. 96) were in Ptolemy's interests as well as his own. In 280 Pyrrhus, in response to a call from Tarentum, set out on his famous western expedition. The traditional interpretation is that Pyrrhus intended to help Tarentum, as requested, against Rome and at the same time to establish his own kingdom in Italy. Nenci, however, is convinced that the response to Tarentum's appeal was only a pretext on Pyrrhus' part. The real objective of the campaign was Carthage, not Rome. Philadelphus wished Egypt's western commercial rival to be eliminated, and Pyrrhus, who had political but not economic ambitions, was the perfect tool for this purpose.

The author's two chief theses—that Ptolemy wanted the elimination of Carthage and that Pyrrhus was to be the agent—are obviously important if they can be proved. Much of the evidence, however, which Nenci adduces to support his theories does not necessarily lead to the interpretations which he advocates, and some of the arguments seem inconsistent. The marriage of Agathocles to Theoxena, the daughter of Ptolemy I, even supposing Nenci is correct in dating it to the period 310-307 (p. 122), is hardly proof that Ptolemy was behind Agathocles' attack on Carthage. The adoption by Soter (after 300) of the so-called Phoenician currency standard, presumably to aid Egyptian trade in the eastern Mediterranean, could have been expected to serve the same purpose in the west and need not signify that Egypt was getting ready for the conquest of western markets (p. 116). Rostovtzeff (*Soc. and Econ. Hist. of the Hellenistic World*, I, pp. 394-7), after studying the evidence, concluded that relations between Egypt and Carthage were friendly. The argument (p. 119), that the Ptolemies did all in their power to conciliate the Phoenicians while at the same time planning to ruin Carthage which had always been united by the closest ties to its mother country, seems to involve a contradiction. It should not be forgotten that Appian (*Sic. I*) specifically says that at the time of the First Punic War Philadelphus was on terms of friendship with both Romans and Carthaginians.

Nenci's handling of the evidence for the years 282-280 is particularly open to criticism (pp. 95-7). He is surprised that after the deaths of Lysimachus and Seleucus Pyrrhus did not press his claims to the throne of Macedon, but instead allowed Ptolemy Keraunos to establish himself there without a struggle. The usual explanation of Pyrrhus' conduct is that at the time of Keraunos'

murder of Seleucus early in 280 Pyrrhus was already too much involved in his final preparations for sailing to southern Italy to turn his attention to Macedon, even if he had dared face Keraunos, now master of the armies of both Lysimachus and Seleucus. Nenci rejects this reasoning and supports his arguments by accepting, without discussion, Corradi's (*Studi Ellenistici* [1929], pp. 123-4) now discredited date of 282 for Korupedion and the same year (? p. 96) for Keraunos' assassination of Seleucus and seizure of Macedon. Thus Pyrrhus would have had ample time to campaign in Macedon, if he had so wanted, but he neglected this opportunity in obedience to the wishes of Ptolemy II. Philadelphus was anxious to have Pyrrhus set out against Carthage because, having recently reconciled himself with Keraunos, he felt that Macedon was now in the hands of *un sovrano fedele* (!). Actually Justin, XVII, 2, 9, says that Keraunos *deprecatur concordiam* with Philadelphus—the logical inference being that no agreement was reached. Although Justin, XVII, 2, 13-14, speaks of aid given to Pyrrhus for his expedition by Antigonos, Antiochus, and Keraunos, while no mention is made anywhere of aid given by Ptolemy II, Nenci is convinced that Egyptian financial assistance was very great. The failure of any ancient author to refer to it is attributed to the secrecy of Ptolemaic diplomacy. And, finally, as further proof that Pyrrhus' campaign was directed against Carthage, it is asserted (pp. 135-6) that the three kings would not have aided him unless they had been assured that he intended to fight for the Greeks against Carthage. There is much to be said for the old notion that the real concern of the kings was to remove a dangerous trouble maker from Greece. In the available evidence dealing with the eve of Pyrrhus' departure for the west, Justin's statement (XVII, 2, 15), that Pyrrhus married the daughter of Keraunos, lends itself most readily to support of Nenci's interpretation, but in this marriage one can equally well recognize a precaution taken by Pyrrhus against any possible meddling in Epirus by the unscrupulous Keraunos.

In his discussion of sources the author remarks (p. 33) that the subsequent greatness of Rome caused later authors to take it for granted that Pyrrhus' purpose was to carve out a kingdom for himself in Italy at the expense of Rome. Nenci, of course, believes that Pyrrhus intended to remain in Italy only long enough to arrange satisfactory terms between Tarentum and Rome and then to turn to his real goal—Sicily and Carthage. The Romans, however, who for some years had been aggressively interfering in southern Italy, were convinced that Pyrrhus' ambitions were directed against them. This attitude of the Romans caused Pyrrhus to get far more involved in Italy than he (and Philadelphus) had ever planned, but his constant efforts to negotiate with the Romans show that Rome was not his real enemy. This is a possible interpretation of the course of events—and Nenci elaborates it with great ingenuity—but others could be offered. It is certain that Pyrrhus was interested in Sicily, but, unless one accepts the theory that the whole expedition was engineered by Philadelphus to eliminate Carthage as a commercial rival, it could be argued that Pyrrhus, like the Athenians long before (Thucydides, VI, 90), was dreaming of Sicily, Italy, and Carthage.

I have an uncomfortable feeling that I may have been unduly

harsh in my criticisms of this book, but its many merits are too often overshadowed by serious faults—verboseness, repetitiousness, careless use of evidence, and the building of theories for which there is no evidence. The book reveals a wide knowledge of the Hellenistic period on the part of the author and much originality, but on finishing it one has the disappointed feeling that, despite its ability to stimulate the reader to new ways of thinking, it cannot honestly be called a success. The delineation of Pyrrhus as an irresponsible adventurer may be unsatisfactory, but Pyrrhus as a mere pawn of the Ptolemies does not make a convincing portrait.

JOHN V. A. FINE.

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY.

### BOOKS RECEIVED.

(It is impossible to review all books submitted to the JOURNAL, but all pertaining to the classical field are listed under BOOKS RECEIVED. Contributions sent for review or notice are not returnable.)

Archi (G. G.), David (M.), Levy (E.), Marichal (R.), Nelson (H. L. W.). *Pauli Sententiarum Fragmentum Leidense* (Cod. Leid. B. P. L. 2589). Leiden, *E. J. Brill*, 1956. Pp. 111; 6 pls. (*Studia Gaiana*, IV.)

Bowie (Smith Palmer). *Virgil's Georgics: A Modern English Verse Translation*. Chicago, *Univ. of Chicago Press*, 1956. Pp. xxix + 111; \$3.75.

Copley (Frank O.). *Plautus, The Rope (Rudens)*. Translated with an Introduction. New York, *Liberal Arts Press*, 1956. Pp. viii + 76. \$0.45. (*Library of Liberal Arts*, No. 43.)

David (M.), van Groningen (B. A.), Kiessling (E.). *Berichtigungsliste der griechischen Papyrusurkunden aus Ägypten*, Band III, Heft 1. Nach dem Tode von Fr. Preisigke und Fr. Bilabel fortgesetzt. Leiden, *E. J. Brill*, 1956. Pp. 160.

Day (John) and Keyes (Clinton Walker). *Tax Documents from Theadelphia. Papyri of the Second Century A. D.* Edited with Introduction and Notes. New York, *Columbia Univ. Press*, 1956. Pp. xviii + 342; 2 pls. \$10.00.

Dijksterhuis (E. J.). *Archimedes*. Copenhagen, *Ejnar Munksgaard*, 1956. Pp. 421; frontispiece. (*Acta Historica Scientiarum Naturalium et Medicinalium*, XII.)

Dumbarton Oaks Papers Numbers Nine and Ten. Edited by the Committee on Publications, The Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection. Cambridge, *Harvard Univ. Press*, 1956. Pp. ix + 316; frontispiece; 116 pls.

Festugière (A. J.). *Epicurus and his Gods*. Translated by C. W. Chilton. Cambridge, *Harvard Univ. Press*, 1956. Pp. xiii + 100. \$3.00.

Giomini (Remo). *L. Annaei Senecae Agamemnona edidit et commentario instruxit*. Rome, *Angelo Signorelli*, 1956. Pp. 215.

Gomme (A. W.). *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, Vol. II: *The Ten Years' War*, Books II-III; Vol. III: *Books IV-V* 24. Oxford, *Clarendon Press*, 1956. Pp. xi + 436; 4 maps; ix + 437-748; 3 maps. \$13.45.

Goodenough (Erwin R.). *Jewish Symbols in the Greco-Roman Period*, Vols. V and VI: *Fish, Bread and Wine*. New York, *Pantheon Books*, 1956. Pp. xi + 197; 186 illus.; xii + 256; 269 illus. \$15.00. (*Bollingen Series*, XXXVII.)



Green (William M.). Aurelii Augustini Contra Academicos, De Beata Vita, necnon De Ordine Libri quos ad fidem codicum recensuit, prolegomenis notisque instruxit. Utrecht and Antwerp, *Spectrum*, 1956. Pp. 150. (*Stromata Patristica et Mediaevalia*, Fasc. II.)

Gruzewski (Alexander). De XVI Iuvenalis Codicibus Qui in Polonia Asservantur. Warsaw, 1956. Pp. 87; 16 pls. (*Auctarium Maeandrium*, V.)

Helm (Rudolf). Der antike Roman. 2., durchges. Auflage. Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1956. Pp. 80.

Helmbold (W. C.) and Rabinowitz (W. G.). Plato's Phaedrus. Translated with an Introduction. New York, *Liberal Arts Press*, 1956. Pp. xviii + 76. \$0.40. (*Library of Liberal Arts*, No. 40.)

Johnson (Franklin P.). The Farwell Collection. Cambridge, *Archaeological Institute of America*, 1953. Pp. viii + 76; 90 figs. (*Monographs on Archaeology and Fine Arts* sponsored by the Archaeological Institute of America and the College Art Association of America, VI.)

Lever (Katherine). The Art of Greek Comedy. London, *Methuen and Co.*, 1956. Pp. ix + 212. 21 s.

Lobel (E.). The Oxyrhynchus Papyri, Part XXIII. Edited with Notes. London, *Egypt Exploration Society*, 1956. Pp. 112; 11 pls. (*Greco-Roman Memoirs*, No. 34.)

Ostwald (Martin) and Vlastos (Gregory). Plato's Protagoras. B. Jowett's translation extensively revised by M. Ostwald; edited, with an introduction, by G. Vlastos. New York, *Liberal Arts Press*, 1956. Pp. lviii + 69. \$0.75. (*Library of Liberal Arts*, No. 69.)

Pease (Arthur Stanley). M. Tulli Ciceronis De Natura Deorum Libri III: Liber Primus. Cambridge, *Harvard Univ. Press*, 1955. Pp. viii + 537. \$15.00. (Bimillennial Edition.)

Rudberg (Gunnar). Platonica Selecta. Stockholm, *Almqvist & Wiksell*, 1956. Pp. 141.

Serrao (Feliciano). Il frammento Leidense di Paolo: Problemi di diritto criminale Romano. Milan, A. Giuffrè, 1956. Pp. vi + 135. (*Università di Roma, Pubblicazioni dell' Istituto di Diritto Romano e dei Diritti dell' Oriente Mediterraneo*, XXXIII.)

Skard (Eiliv). Sallust und seine Vorgänger. Eine sprachliche Untersuchung. Oslo, A. W. Brøgger, 1956. Pp. 109. (*Symbolae Osloenses*, Fasc. Supplet. XV.)

Snell: Festschrift Bruno Snell zum 60. Geburtstag am 18. Juni 1956 von Freunden und Schülern überreicht. München, C. H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1956. Pp. 258.

Talamanca (Mario). Studi sulla legittimazione passiva alla "Hereditatis Petitio." Milan, A. Giuffrè, 1956. Pp. vii + 215. (*Università di Roma, Pubblicazioni dell' Istituto di Diritto Romano e dei Diritti dell' Oriente Mediterraneo*, XXXII.)

Tièche (Édouard). Georg Finsler in seinen Briefen an Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf. Bern, *Verlag Herbert Lang & Cie*, 1956. Pp. 62. (*Schriften der Literarischen Gesellschaft Bern*, Neue Folge der Neujahrsblätter, VII.)

Valgiglio (Ernesto). Achille, eroe implacabile: Studio psicologico sull' Iliade. Turin, *Ruata*, 1956. Pp. 126. L. 750.

Van Camp (Jean) and Canart (Paul). Le sens du mot *θεῖος* chez Platon. Louvain, *Bibliothèque de l'Université, Bureau du Recueil*, 1956. Pp. 452. Fr. 375. (*Recueil de Travaux d'Histoire et de Philologie*, 4<sup>e</sup> série, Fasc. 9.)

Ventris (Michael) and Chadwick (John). Documents in Mycenaean Greek. Three Hundred Selected Tablets from Knossos, Pylos and Mycenae with Commentary and Vocabulary. Foreword by Alan J. B. Wace. Cambridge, *University Press*; New York, *Cambridge Univ. Press*, 1956. Pp. xxxi + 452; 3 pls.; 26 figs. \$15.00.

Wagenvoort (H.). Studies in Roman Literature, Culture and Religion. Leiden, *E. J. Brill*, 1956. Pp. viii + 316. Guilders 30.